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Abstract 
Digital platforms are layered modular information technology architectures that support disruption. 
Digital platforms are particularly disruptive, as they facilitate the quick release of digital innovations that 
may replace established innovations. Yet, despite their support for disruption, we have not fully 
understood how such digital platforms can be strategically designed and configured to facilitate 
disruption. To that end, this thesis endeavors to unravel disruptive digital platforms from the supply 
perspective that are grounded on strategic digital platform design elements. I suggest that digital 
platforms leverage on three strategic design elements (i.e., business, architecture, and technology design) 
to create supportive conditions for facilitating disruption. To shed light on disruptive digital platforms, I 
opted for payment platforms as my empirical context and unit of analysis. Through primary and 
secondary data sources, findings suggest that digital platforms with an Analyzer and Prospector strategy 
profile have favorable conditions to facilitate disruption. It is envisioned that insights gleaned from 
multiple cases will contribute towards bridging existing knowledge gaps in strategic management, digital 
platforms, and open innovation literature.   
 
Dansk Resume 
 
Digitale platforme er modulære, lagdelte informationsteknologiske arkitekturer, der understøtter 
disruption. Digitale platforme er særligt disruptive, da de faciliterer hurtig udgivelse af innovationer, 
som kan erstatte etablerede innovationer. På trods af deres støtte til disruption, har vi dog ikke forstået, 
hvordan sådanne digitale platforme kan strategisk designes og konfigureres, så at de faciliterer 
disruption. Til dette formål bestræber man sig på at optrævle disruptive digitale platforme ud fra 
udbudsperspektivet, der er baseret på strategiske digitale platformsdesignelementer. Jeg påstår, at de 
digitale platforme udnytter tre strategiske designelementer (dvs. business, arkitektur og teknologidesign), 
der skaber understøttende betingelser for at facilitere disruption. For at belyse disruptive digitale 
platforme, valgte jeg betalingsplatforme som min empiriske kontekst og analyseenhed. Resultaterne fra 
primære og sekundære datakilder peger på, at digitale platforme med en Analyzer og Prospector-
strategiprofil har gunstige betingelser for at facilitere disruption. Det er hensigten, at indsigter fra flere 
cases vil bidrage til at bygge bro mellem eksisterende vidensforskelle i strategisk ledelse, digitale 
platforme og åben innovationslitteratur. 
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Introduction 
Digital platforms are layered modular information technology (IT) architectures (Baldwin et al. 2000; 
Yoo et al. 2010) that have the potential to disrupt established innovations such as existing products and 
services and their corresponding value configurations. Digital platforms are particularly predestined to 
generate disruptive innovations due to their practice of digital modularity. Digital modularity is the 
decomposition of digital products or services into their basic components, which in turn can be 
combined, extended, or configured in new ways, towards a desired outcome (e.g., simpler in their 
composition), while maintaining or even extending their attributes (El Sawy et al. 2010; Schilling 2000; 
Staudenmayer et al. 2005). In the same vein, the act of new combinations or configurations towards a 
desired outcome is considered to be a basic form of innovation (Schumpeter 1934, p. 66). New 
combinations or configurations are particularly applicable for digital innovations, since the cost of 
creating or accessing digital components is negligible—in most cases, free (e.g., open-source software 
libraries), scalable, and globally accessible. Accordingly, it suggests that difficult-to-replicate modularity 
innovations can be construed as a competitive advantage among digital platforms. 
As modularity allows standardized and fast component combinations with the help of boundary resources 
(e.g., APIs) (Ghazawneh et al. 2013), digital platforms usually team up with third parties (e.g., 
developers) to make use of external components to co-create modularized products or services. 
Researchers term this type of collaboration “interfirm modularity,” or, in innovation terminology, 
“coupled open innovation” (Chesbrough 2003; Gassmann et al. 2004; Staudenmayer et al. 2005). In this 
line, digital platforms can be perceived as incubators and catalysts for modularized innovations. As 
digital platforms foster new and rapid cycles of innovation, they arguably have the ability to introduce 
disruptive innovations as well. I argue that innovations introduced by digital platforms have the ability to 
support disruption by imitating or exceeding the value proposition of established innovations. Disruptive 
digital platform innovations are niche to begin with, but they inherently have the supportive conditions 
for becoming disruptive at day one and fulfill their actual disruption in the event of their becoming a new 
standard or dominant design (Suárez et al. 1995; Rogers 2003; Wang 2010). 
Take the music sales industry as an example. The established value configuration (i.e., established 
innovation) in traditional music sales markets stems from the sale of music files (e.g., Apple iTunes). 
Conversely, Spotify challenges the aforementioned value configuration. Spotify’s value configuration is 
based on streaming music instead of offering downloads. In this way, Spotify attempts to transform 
established music value configurations from music ownership to music as a service. From a business 
model perspective, both music value configurations compete for the same consumers who demand music 
consumption. Spotify, though, diverges in how it sells and delivers its service, which is in and of itself a 
new form of innovation in the music sales industry. Considering this innovation from a disruptive 
innovation theoretical lens, Spotify’s music value configuration could set the foundation for a new 
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standard in the music sales market. To put it differently, Spotify music streaming service (i.e., its 
technology architecture for on-demand music) has supportive conditions for disruption by proposing a 
new logic for music consumption. As a matter of fact, streaming as a new form of music value 
configuration is increasingly gaining a foothold in the music industry (e.g., Apple Music), exhibiting its 
potential towards becoming truly disruptive. 
Similarly, the idea of new value configurations or new technology architectures is in alignment with 
architectural innovation theory (Henderson et al. 1990). Architectural innovation theorizes that products 
consist of (1) components and (2) architectures, where the latter structures the aforementioned 
components to a systematic whole stipulated by the product inventor. In this context, innovations in 
architecture usually maintain the overall value proposition of a product (e. g., music consumption). 
Innovations in architecture (e.g., Spotify’s cloud computing servers) change the underlying composition 
of established product components in new ways, which may support efficiency gains or new avenues for 
new value-added features (e.g., on-demand music service). If successful, new innovations in architecture 
have consequences for incumbent organizations, as these innovations challenge the existing (product) 
architecture and knowledge, which may result in product obsolescence—in other words, disruption 
through modularity innovation. 
As we have a good understanding about traditional modularized products when facing disruptive 
innovations (Henderson et al. 1990), we have not fully understood how modern digital platforms 
introduce disruptive innovations (Burgelman et al. 2007; Eisenmann et al. 2011). First, compared to 
traditional firms that operate in value chain economies (i.e., firms transforming inputs into valued outputs 
in a sequential manner) (Porter 1985), digital platforms operate in so-called network economies (Stabell 
et al. 1998), where value is primarily created through efficient connections among a large number of 
network participants (Eisenmann et al. 2006; Rochet et al. 2003). In these network economies, digital 
platforms play an important role, as they are considered to be enablers of these efficient connections. In 
this regard, it suggests that innovations in modularity (e.g., new architectures or components) are vital for 
digital platforms to achieve competiveness (de Reuver et al. 2017; Yoo et al. 2010). Secondly, since 
information systems literature suggests that business and IT strategies have symbiotic relationships 
(Chen et al. 2010; Sabherwal et al. 2001), and innovations are arguably in some ways shaped by these 
two strategy elements, we have ambiguity as to how digital platforms leverage on these two strategic 
elements (henceforth labeled “design elements”) to create supportive conditions for disruption. 
This thesis suggests that disruptive innovation introduced by digital platforms are in some ways 
supported or driven by business- and IT-related design elements, where innovations either sustain or 
replace established innovations (e.g., from MP3 files to streaming music). To identify supportive 
conditions for disruptive innovations, this thesis aims to identify business and IT strategy design 
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elements that are pertinent for digital platforms. Secondly, this thesis aims to derive improved 
prescriptive knowledge by deriving design principles (cf. Hevner et al. 2004) for digital platforms that 
exhibit supportive conditions for disruption. Accordingly, I endeavor to unravel disruptive digital 
platforms by providing an answer to the following research question (RQ): 
How to design and configure digital platforms that facilitate disruption? 
Generally speaking, as soon as digital platforms introduce innovations that partially or fully replicate the 
attributes of established innovations, digital platforms obtain supportive conditions for disruption; they 
become truly disruptive in the event of broader adoption towards a new standard. To explore this 
phenomenon, I adopt the supply perspective of an organization as my unit of analysis and draw on 
layered modular architecture (Yoo et al. 2010) and configuration theories (El Sawy et al. 2010) to derive 
digital platform design principles. I segment the main RQ into the following three sub-research questions 
(SRQs): 
 SRQ1: What are the design elements of digital platforms? SRQ1 aims to identify generic strategic design 
elements that are pertinent for digital platforms. I suggest that digital platforms are driven by three interrelated 
design elements: business, architecture, and technology design. 
 SRQ2: How are design elements configured to create conditions for open innovation? SRQ2 aims to explore 
how the aforementioned three design elements foster open innovation. Open innovation is explored as most 
modern digital platforms practice this type of innovation to co-create modularized innovations that either 
maintain or change established innovations. 
 SRQ3: Which design element configurations are supportive for disruption? SRQ3 aims to derive a typology of 
configurations of design elements that create supportive conditions for disruption. 
 
To answer the preceding RQ, I advance a research model that decomposes digital platforms into three 
interrelated design elements: (1) business design (i.e., strategic orientation of digital platforms) (Chen et 
al. 2010; Miles et al. 1978); (2) architecture design (i.e., architectural setup, composition, and 
governance of digital platforms) (Henderson et al. 1990; Iyer et al. 2010; Yoo et al. 2010); and (3) 
technology design (i.e., the means to support modularized open innovation) (Besen et al. 1994; 
Ghazawneh et al. 2013; Katz et al. 1986; Saloner 1990; Sanchez et al. 1996; West 2003). 
Theoretical Background 
Introduction to Disruptive Innovation Theory   
Disruptive innovation theory (Christensen et al. 1996), which has its roots in creative destruction theory 
(Schumpeter 1934), explains why incumbent organizations with successful products and dominant 
market shares are challenged and replaced by simpler technologies in the long run. Schumpeter’s (1934) 
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seminal work on organizational innovation and competition suggests that innovation by entrepreneurs 
has the ability to disturb economic equilibria of existing systems such as transforming an entire industry 
towards a technology standard. In his studies, Schumpeter categorizes industries as either Mark I 
(unstable and dynamic) (Schumpeter 1934) or Mark II (stable) (Schumpeter 1962). 
Mark I industries are characterized by creative destruction, where organizations such as market entrants 
with innovative solutions shape the competitive landscape, as industry boundaries are not fixed. Mark II 
industries, on the other hand, are characterized by creative accumulation, where industry boundaries and 
market positions are stable, allowing incumbent organizations to refine their existing or established 
innovations towards economy of scale and scope benefits. In his studies, Schumpeter asserts that 
innovation is largely a phenomenon that emerges within organizational boundaries, a notion clearly 
contrary to the open innovation literature, which propagates the idea that innovation can and should be 
co-created with external stakeholders (e.g., customers) (Chesbrough 2003). 
As Schumpeter’s works provide rather abstract explanations about the symbiotic relationship between 
innovation and competition with disruptive consequences for established organizations and their 
innovations (i.e., Mark I industries, creative destruction), the work of Christensen et al. (1996) is more 
specific in its unit of analysis. Having the disk drive industry as their empirical context (i.e., market 
perspective), Christensen et al. (1996) endeavored to explore how simple and inferior (technology) 
innovations surprisingly outperform established innovations by incumbent organizations in the long run. 
Generally speaking, disruptive innovations can be understood as innovations that leverage on alternative 
resources, components, methods, capabilities, or new combinations of existing sources to produce 
products/services that are atypical to the dominant or sustaining innovations (henceforth referred to as 
“established innovations”) (Christensen et al. 1996). In this context, incumbent organizations and their 
related stakeholders (e.g., industry consultants) initially underappreciate disruptive innovations as they 
are perceived to be inferior (e.g., low performance) or incompatible or simply have conflicts with 
existing business models and revenue-generating customers. Another reason for being reluctant to 
unfamiliar innovations is that incumbent organizations usually prefer to exploit their established 
innovations, as these are proven to reliably generate revenues that sustain existing competitiveness and 
organization. This arguably reduces the incentives to adopt new, alien innovations. As incumbents 
improve and refine their established innovations in an incremental fashion (e.g., a product becomes 
faster), disruptive innovation theory defines these type of innovations as sustaining innovations, which 
sustain the current existing competitive advantage  (Christensen et al. 1996). 
This notion suggests that innovation and competition have a symbiotic relationship with each other, with 
self-reinforcing effects that again are arguably influenced by strategic elements (e.g., business strategy), 
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as organizations decide about (de)investments into new or established innovations to achieve or maintain 
competitiveness. As organizations continuously nurture their existing sources, paradoxically, the 
overemphasis on established or sustaining innovations is considered to be the root causes for incumbent 
organizations’ vulnerability to disruptive innovations (Christensen et al. 1996; Hill et al. 2003). 
To begin with, disruptive innovations find their application in underdeveloped market segments of an 
industry, as these inferior innovations are considered to be affordable, simple, and good enough to get 
specific jobs done (Christensen et al. 2007). Though, with the lack of technical debt and accelerated 
adoption and improvements in their features, these initial inferior innovations move from niche into the 
territory of mainstream markets. As soon as the improvements are close to matching the value 
proposition of established innovations, prior inferior innovations have under these circumstances 
obtained supportive conditions for disruption, which may introduce a new dominant design or standard 
within a certain business environment (e.g., from music files to streaming music) (Christensen et al. 
1996). 
Overview of Disruptive Innovation Studies 
A substantial body of innovation and management literature has studied the organizational implications 
of disruptive innovations (Ansari et al. 2015; Assink 2006; Christensen et al. 1996; Crossan et al. 2010; 
Damanpour et al. 2006; Danneels 2004; Dougherty et al. 1996; Govindarajan et al. 2006; Sandström et 
al. 2009).  
The study by Ansari et al. (2015) sheds light on how new market entrants (e.g., TiVo TV box) with 
disruptive innovations strategically navigate and balance coopetitive tensions with their incumbent 
counterparts while dealing with legacy systems in the U.S. television industry. Their findings suggest 
that market entrants may consider a dynamic and evolutionary approach with incumbents by 
continuously adjusting their business strategies to promote symbiotic relationships while teaming up with 
other established stakeholders (e.g., content providers/distributors, manufacturers, ratings firms, viewers, 
regulators, and industry associations) to increase leverage and create conditions for success. In the 
information system (IS) literature, disruptive innovation has been extensively studied as well. The study 
by Krotov et al. (2008) on radio-frequency identification (RFID) technology suggests that innovations 
have dualistic attributes; they are either sustaining, which preserves existing competences of an 
incumbent organization (e.g., retailer), or they are disruptive, which undermines existing competences 
(e.g., marketers). In this line, disruptiveness is determined by industry context. The study by Lucas et al. 
(2009) explores the rise and fall of Kodak. Their findings suggest that disruptive technologies like digital 
photography were clashing with the existing culture at Kodak, where organizational inertia was one of 
the root causes of Kodak’s failure, creating hurdles to transforming its revenue-generating product line 
from physical (chemical photography) to digital. 
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To provide a more holistic view on disruptive innovation studies, Hill et al. (2003) synthesized 
innovation studies originating from various research streams (e.g., strategic management, organization 
and economics) to derive generic factors that are typically causing challenges for incumbent 
organizations facing disruptive innovations. In general, disruptive innovations challenge incumbent 
organizations in the following three areas: (1) economic, (2) organizational, and (3) strategic. 
From an economic viewpoint, which relates to market dominance, market control, and the creation of 
market entry barriers, Hill et al. (2003) suggest that incumbent organizations prefer to exploit their 
current investments in established innovations to sustain existing competitive advantages and protect 
market shares. By tacitly enforcing a specific mode of competition or dominant design, which usually 
exhibit the attributes of established innovations (i.e., the use of standardized but costly technology), 
incumbent organizations enact economic barriers against market entrants and increase competitive 
pressure on them. One way to build market barriers is to influence legal frameworks (e.g., financial 
industry) to deter market entrants, as they would have to incur large sunk costs (e.g., costly certified IT 
systems); this reduces a potential competitor’s motivation to enter markets in the first place. 
Incumbents consider disruptive innovations damaging to their prior investments in established 
innovations meant to protect existing markets. On the other hand, disruptive innovations are welcomed 
by market entrants, who see them as a way into prior closed markets. By leveraging on nascent 
technologies (e.g., blockchain) that emulate established innovations (e.g., legacy payment systems), 
market entrants avoid the resources (i.e., established innovations) that give incumbent organizations a 
competitive edge. In so doing, market entrants created conditions to compete more independently while 
using different means, such as innovations, with disruptive attributes. 
From an organizational viewpoint, which relates to organizational inertia, incumbent organizations have 
underdeveloped absorptive capacities (Cohen et al. 1990) towards new innovations that do not originate 
from their organizational boundaries. Similar to the notion of “not invented here,” organizations prefer 
predictability, reliability, and control, which are usually manifested through institutionalized routines. 
These routines in turn create inflexibilities towards unknown innovations, as routines dictate to 
prioritization of existing knowledge to ensure efficient resource exploitations. Take biotechnology firms 
as an example. Compared to their pharmaceutical counterparts, which utilize chemistry to create their 
products, biotechnology firms leverage on molecular biology to offer competitive products with a similar 
value proposition (i.e., medical treatment of patients). However, the knowledge and skills for 
biotechnology products are different compared to pharmaceutical ones, exhibiting in these scenarios the 
attributes of competence-destroying innovations (Tushman et al. 1986), as they get the same job done. 
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Lastly, the strategic viewpoint presents the third challenging factor for incumbent organizations in 
adopting new innovations. Incumbent organizations are embedded in business networks (Iansiti et al. 
2004). Through these networks—a collection of various interdepended stakeholders such as suppliers, 
distributors, and customers— organizations are in some ways peer-pressured into reinforcing a current 
dominant business logic, because the current logic is the source of their current revenue streams and 
competitive advantages. In these scenarios, vested business interests create collective switching costs, 
obstructing network participants from adopting new innovations—especially innovations that 
undermine their competitive advantage (David 1985; Shapiro et al. 1999).  
As the abovementioned sections convey rather a generic description of disruptive innovation theory, 
Christensen (2013) defines disruptive innovations as: “[…] straightforward [technologies], [that] 
consist[s] of off-the-shelf components put together in a product architecture that was often simpler than 
prior approaches. They offered less of what customers in established markets wanted and so could rarely 
be initially employed there. They offered a different package of attributes valued only in emerging 
markets remote from, and unimportant to, the mainstream.” 
The definition suggests that disruption innovation theory can be understood from two different units of 
analysis: (1) market perspective (i.e., innovation that relates to the external business environment; e.g., 
consumer view) and (2) supply perspective (i.e., innovations that occur within organizational boundaries; 
e.g., simpler product architecture).  
The next section presents key literature on disruptive innovations, which can be understood from the 
market and supply perspective. 
Understanding Disruptive Innovation from the Supply and Market Perspective 
Disruptive innovation studies with a market perspective as their unit of analysis have the external 
business environment as their research foci, attempting to uncover the innovation dynamics among 
market participants (e.g., product performance, price from a user, or competitor viewpoint). Accordingly, 
these types of studies explore market segments of an industry (e.g., niche versus mainstream). Disruptive 
innovation studies that have the supply perspective as their unit of analysis, on the other hand, have the 
goal of uncovering the composition and inner workings of innovations (e.g., sophisticated and simpler 
product architectures). Table 1 illustrates key disruptive innovation studies with two different theoretical 
perspectives. 
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Table 1. Disruptive Innovation Literature: Two Theoretical Perspectives 
Unit of Analysis Theories/Categories Defining Attributes 
Market Perspective 
 
Key Reference: 
Christensen et al. (1996) 
New Market Generation An innovation that creates new consumer demand and a 
market that has not existed before. 
 
Low-End Market 
Disruption 
Inferior innovations located in niche markets that match 
and exceed established innovation in mainstream markets 
(e.g., performance, price) over time.  
Supply Perspective 
 
Key References: 
Abernathy et al. (1985) 
Tushman et al. (1986) 
Henderson et al. (1990) 
Competence-Enhancing & 
Destroying Innovations 
Competence-enhancing innovations solidify the 
knowledge, methods, and asset base of organizations for 
creating established products. Competence-destroying 
innovations abolish them through new knowledge, 
methods, and asset base. 
Architectural Innovation 
(Modularity perspective of 
competence enhancing & 
destroying innovations) 
Product has new architecture compared to established ones 
while maintaining its components. 
Disruptive Innovation from the Market Perspective 
From a market perspective, innovations generate two types of market instances: (1) innovations that 
create new markets and satisfy new consumer needs, and (2) low-end market innovations, which are 
inferior innovations to begin with, but through continuous improvements moving into mainstream 
markets, they increasingly satisfy the needs of consumers in mainstream markets (Christensen et al. 
2013). From a competition viewpoint, low-end market innovations are usually identifiable and often 
ignored by incumbent organizations, as they operate within existing industry boundaries. New market 
innovations, on the other hand, are particular in that they are opaque and initially unnoticed because their 
market or industry affiliation has not been established. Therefore, they are not on the competition radar 
of market incumbents. Nevertheless, new market innovations still cause disruptions in unaffiliated 
markets/industries as they get the same or similar job done. 
New Market Generation 
New market generation is manifested in innovations (e.g., products, services, or business models) that 
create a new market space that has not existed before. But the new markets may unexpectedly challenge 
existing mainstream markets because they get the same job done (Kim et al. 2004; Markides 2006; 
Schumpeter 1962). Being first movers, these types of innovations usually create monopolistic power over 
supply and price as they face no competition. But this advantage is usually short-lived. New profitable 
markets attract competitors in the form of second or late movers (Shamsie et al. 2004), who usually 
challenge new market monopolists in a rapid fashion as they adapt new market innovations at a faster 
pace by simply observing and avoiding the same trial and errors of the new market creators. Take the 
iPhone as an example. Launched in 2007, it could be considered as a sustaining or established innovation 
for doing phone calls. But at the same, looking at its mobile computing and Internet connectivity, the 
  
 
9 
iPhone created an entirely new market for consumers in how the mobile Internet is consumed—the latter 
arguably a terrain defined and dominated by laptop manufacturers. 
From an intra-organizational perspective, new market creators face considerable challenges as well. 
Demand for new market innovations are difficult to predict as organizations have no track record or 
experiences to derive informed managerial decisions to mitigate uncertainty and risk for unproven 
innovations. Secondly, new market innovations may substantially contribute to the sunk cost structure of 
an organization as new market innovations tend to differ from existing production sources or knowledge 
bases (e.g., Apple’s first mobile phone), which are usually optimized to cater to established innovations 
in existing markets (e.g., Mac computers). In this scenario, management is required to undertake 
additional capital investments or decide on de-investments in other business units, which may cause 
organizational challenges like inertia (Hill et al. 2003). 
Low-End Market Disruption 
Low-end market innovations are innovations that are initially located in existing, niche, and unprofitable 
markets of an industry because they do not match the needs of users in mainstream markets (e.g., 
performance). The work of Christensen et al. (1996) on the disk drive industry suggests that incumbent 
organizations are usually reluctant to adopt inferior innovations like smaller disk drives as they do not 
match the needs of revenue-generating customers, who demanded larger and faster disk drives. 
Accordingly, they create arguably little incentive for market incumbents to invest scarce resources into 
new businesses endeavors, where market demand is opaque or negatively perceived. This phenomenon is 
particularly observable among publicly traded incumbent organizations as management compensations 
are profit orientated, pressuring organizations to exploit and sustain their existing revenue-generating 
products, which usually takes the shape of sustaining or established innovations. 
Over time, however, these underappreciated low-end market innovations improve in their features, 
having the potential to move up into mainstream markets and hence into the territory of incumbent 
organizations. Lacking technical debt and being simpler to manufacture compared to sustaining or 
established innovations, disruptive innovations improve in their performances at an accelerated pace and 
steeper trajectory. In so doing, prior inferior innovations may achieve a level of being good enough to 
match or exceed the value proposition of established innovations—thus having disruptive properties. 
In this context, disruptive innovation competes on the basis of several value proposition attributes, such 
as performance, reliability, availability, easy of use, aesthetic appearance, and cost or brand reputation 
(Abernathy et al. 1985). As soon these value proposition attributes are about to reach or intersect with the 
needs of mainstream consumers, disruptive innovations may disintermediate consumer relationships with 
sustaining innovations (Christensen et al. 1996; Schumpeter 1962). To keep disruptive innovations at a 
distance, though, incumbent organizations respond by expanding their investments into current 
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established innovations in the hope of widening the value proposition gap between established and 
disruptive innovations. However, this may result in over-engineered established innovation. Over-
engineered innovations exceed the demand of existing consumers in mainstream markets, who are 
incapable of absorbing the additional performance increases, whereas disruptive innovations are 
economically and performance-wise good enough to satisfy their needs (Christensen et al. 1996). Hence, 
over-engineered innovations can be considered an additional contributing factor that causes the demise of 
established innovations. 
Disruptive Innovation: The Supply Perspective 
Disruptive innovation literature with a supply perspective as the unit of analysis (i.e., organizational 
perspective) attempts to explain disruptive innovations broadly through the lens of competence-
enhancing or competence-destroying innovations (Abernathy et al. 1985; Tushman et al. 1986). 
Competence-Enhancing or Destroying Innovations 
Competence-enhancing innovations are improvements that solidify existing knowledge or asset of 
organizations in how products/services are created and/or delivered. In digital economies (e.g., digital 
media industry), the efficient delivery of standardized digital goods (e.g., music streaming) is a highly 
sought competence. Since competence-enhancing innovations maintain and enhance established 
innovations, competence-enhancing innovations are theoretically aligned with sustaining innovations 
(Christensen et al. 1996), which propagate the idea that incumbents prefer to invest and optimize existing 
means for creating their current profit-generating (established) innovations. This type of organizational 
behavior is consistent with resource dependence theory (Pfeffer et al. 2003), which suggests that 
organizations rely on their accumulated resources and skill sets to ensure their own organizational 
survival. On the negative side, though, resource dependence reduces the incentives and motivation to 
allocate additional capital for new competence-enhancing innovations (e.g., investing in streaming 
expertise), where the commercial outlook is considered to be opaque. 
To the contrary, competence-destroying innovations undermine the expertise of established innovations. 
To begin with, competence-destroying innovations are subject to a period of instability and fermentation 
until a dominant design (i.e., standard) prevails (Suárez et al. 1995). But as soon as competence-
destroying innovations gain increased adoption and approach accepted common practice, they cause 
severe ramifications for incumbent organizations, eroding existing resources and skills in the creation 
and delivery of established innovations. To put it differently, the way incumbents have created their 
established innovations may become outdated. Organizations with little or no technical debt (e.g., market 
entrants) that have successfully integrated competence-destroying innovations have created supportive 
conditions to grow at a faster rate in both creation and delivery compared to established ones. In these 
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kinds of situations, incumbents are pressured to consider whether or not to abandon old competences and 
adopt new ones to ensure organizational sustainability. This is particularly challenging for large 
incumbent organizations with research and development (R&D) units as they usually identify early 
competence-destroying innovations but struggle to react adequately (e.g., Kodak) (Lucas et al. 2009). 
Take Blockbuster and Netflix as an example. Founded in 1985, Blockbuster was the dominant player in 
the U.S. video rental market. With its recognizable brand and large network of physical stores that were 
conveniently located for walk-in customers, Blockbuster was the uncontested market leader. Blockbuster 
was considerably successful with its multi-billion-dollar business, but it had to file for bankruptcy in the 
year 2010. On the other hand, Netflix, founded in 1999, was a small market actor that focused initially on 
a niche market by renting out movies by mail. Over time, though, Netflix managed to reengineer its 
organization by transforming its business from movie mail delivery to a movie streaming service. This 
was an extraordinary organizational transformation, and the adoption of new competences transitioned 
Netflix from a physical-orientated business (e.g., mail delivery) to a digital one (e.g., online servers), 
which required new skill sets to deliver movies in a different way. In this specific context, Netflix out-
innovated Blockbuster through process innovation (Schumpeter 1934, p. 66). 
Architectural Innovations 
In the same theoretical vein of competence-destroying innovations, the work of Henderson et al. (1990) 
on architectural innovation provides insights as to why incumbent organizations and their corresponding 
products, in the form of modularized systems, are vulnerable to innovations in new product architectures. 
Architectural innovation destroys the competences (i.e., architecture knowledge or blue sprint) of 
incumbent organizations in how products are manufactured and assembled. In this context, architectural 
innovation by a competitor is an attempt to challenge and replace incumbents’ architecture knowledge, 
which may reduce demand and use and result in product obsolescence. The work of Henderson et al. 
(1990) in the semiconductor industry explores and studies the composition and structure of modularized 
products in terms of their (1) architecture and (2) components, where architecture serves as a blueprint 
that dictates how the aforementioned components are structured to a logical whole. Generally speaking, 
modularity describes systems in regards to their components’ (1) compositions, (2) recombination 
possibilities, and (3) how tight the aforementioned components relate to each other (e.g., being loosely or 
tightly coupled) while adhering the rules of architecture (Orton et al. 1990; Schilling 2000). Considering 
architecture and components as two dimensions (see Figure 1), Henderson et al. (1990) propose four 
types of modularity innovations that either refine (i.e., competence-enhancing innovations) or overturn 
(i.e., competence-destroying innovations) the logic of existing products.  
1. Incremental Innovations refine existing components and maintain existing architectures.  
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2. Modular Innovations overturn existing components but maintain existing architectures. 
3. Architectural Innovations refine existing components but overturn existing architectures. 
4. Radical Innovations overturn existing components and architectures. 
 
Figure 1.  Architectural Innovation 
Incremental & Modular Innovations. Innovations that maintain the architectures of existing products 
strengthen the competences of incumbents in how these modularized products are structured. In this 
sense, both innovation types reinforce the incumbent’s architectural knowledge for certain product 
classes, which in turn creates favorable conditions to lead and define standards for an entire industry, 
which is still achievable in the event of refined or overturned components. Take Apple’s iPhone as an 
example for modular innovation. The phone consists of hardware and software components, where third-
party applications from Apple’s App Store have the ability to replace or extend prior installed (digital) 
components while still maintaining the underlying (product) architecture of the physical phone itself. 
Architectural & Radical Innovation. Innovations in architecture, however, have broader ramifications for 
incumbent organizations. Organizations that introduce architectural innovations implement subtle 
changes into existing modularity product classes while maintaining a similar value proposition (e.g., 
music consumption through streaming services instead of music downloads). In this context, architectural 
innovations appear to be harmless from a competition viewpoint, but with accelerated adoption, new 
architectures could replace incumbent’s architecture knowledge that could impact their 
commercialization efforts for their existing products. If new architectures indeed promise efficiency 
gains (e.g., simpler and getting the same job done), they have favorable conditions to evolve to a new 
standard, which creates a new competitive advantage for the new architecture owner. In the innovation 
terminology, this is defined as disruption. Furthermore, the process towards a new architecture standard 
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could be accelerated if new architecture unleashes untapped innovations, as it opens up new features that 
were not feasible before, which increase value propositions even further compared to existing ones. 
To illustrate, music streaming services require arguably different competences and means compared to 
traditional music download services, while the components (e.g., digital music files) are largely 
maintained or slightly refined (e.g., better file compression techniques to achieve better Internet 
bandwidth use). With its new architecture (e.g., servers that support on-demand cloud computing), 
streaming services offer arguably a superior value proposition: instant music access and a large music 
library. If this type of music consumption becomes popular, unprepared incumbent organizations with no 
architecture knowledge in music streaming could face the risk of disruption. 
Radical Innovations. Lastly, radical innovations are contenders for creating a complete new dominant 
design that abolishes the architecture and the components of established innovations. 
Defining Supportive Conditions That Facilitate Disruption.  
Based on the above-mentioned literature, this dissertation defines innovations with supportive conditions 
for facilitating disruption when unproven, inferior, but nascent innovations imitate or replicate value 
propositions of established innovations (i.e., products, services, or systems). In the modularity context, 
modularized systems with new architectures and/or new components that replicate the value proposition 
of established modularized systems can be considered as disruptive contenders as well. In the event of 
broader adoptions, innovations with supportive conditions for facilitating disruption can be considered 
potential candidates for a new dominant design or standard that replaces established innovations. 
Research Gap: Digital Platform Disruption. 
Considering architecture and components from an innovation and competition viewpoint, the work of 
Henderson et al. (1990) on architectural innovation is one of the first studies on strategic modularity that 
explains how organizations achieve competitive advantage or get challenged by it. That being said, the 
theory of architectural innovation illustrates that competition advantage and innovation relate to each 
other or have self-reinforcing effects (Pil et al. 2006). For instance, the degree of control exercised over 
components (e.g., loosely or tightly coupled components) gives indications as to what kind of innovation 
an organization permits to achieve or maintain its competitive advantage, which again provides cues 
about their strategic postures (e.g., being aggressive or conservative). To illustrate, consider Android and 
iOS, which are both mobile operating systems and hence digital components of Google’s and Apple’s 
mobile phone business units. Android is largely open-source and hence a highly malleable digital 
component for third parties (i.e., loosely coupled component).  Apple’s iOS, on the other hand, is 
proprietary (i.e., tightly coupled component) and restricts any third-party modifications (i.e., innovation) 
to maintain control, as Apple considers iOS an innovative asset and component that gives it competitive 
advantage. If we consider these aforementioned illustrations, Google and Apple exhibit two different and 
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opposing strategies (i.e., open versus closed) while promoting mobile operating systems. Accordingly, 
understanding competition and innovation in the realm of modularity (e.g., architectural innovation) can 
serve to identify strategic postures among organizations to derive strategy profiles that are pertinent for 
digital platforms. 
Beyond doubt, the work of Henderson et al. (1990) is a key reference literature that provides the 
theoretical foundation to understand disruptive innovation in the modularity context. As prior research 
indicates a symbiotic relationship between competiveness and innovation in the modularity context (Pil 
et al. 2006), there is, however, a paucity of studies that explain how advanced digital platforms in value 
networks facilitate favorable conditions for disruption. 
In the same vein of disruptive innovations and digital platforms, de Reuver et al.’s (2017) proposed 
research agenda on digital platforms suggests that there are few studies that explain the transformative 
digital platforms that shape entire industries. Specifically, de Reuver et al. (2017, p. 7 ff) state: “The 
emergence of platform thinking and the resulting ‘platform economy’ demands research into the 
transformative and disruptive impact of digital platforms on organizations and their business models and 
the business environment as a whole […] [f]irms are not isolated anymore, and value is co-created and 
co-delivered by multiple contributing entities. New theories and models that capture, explain and predict 
the potentially disruptive nature of digital platforms are needed.” 
Therefore, unpacking the supportive conditions for facilitating disruption requires an understanding of 
what is considered (1) innovation and (2) a competitive advantage in the digital platform context. 
Arguably, assets and methods for achieving innovation and competitive advantages in network 
economies are different compared to traditional organizations that adhere to the notion of value chain 
economies (Porter 1985; Stabell et al. 1998). Lastly, deciphering competitive advantage and innovation 
principles among digital platform organizations allows us to derive characteristic strategy postures and 
hence strategy profiles that are pertinent to digital platforms. The next section provides an overview of 
the platform literature, with an emphasis on digital platforms, which are layered modular technology 
architectures that promote value networks (Baldwin et al. 2000; Baldwin et al. 2008; Pil et al. 2006; 
Tiwana et al. 2010b; Yoo et al. 2010). 
Platform Literature 
Research on platforms can be categorized into four main research streams (Thomas et al. 2014): (1) 
organizational, (2) product family, (3) market intermediary, and, lastly, (4) platform ecosystems. 
Platform studies belonging to the organizational research stream try to understand how organizations 
create structures and building blocks (i.e., a platform) for storing and enhancing organizational resources 
and capabilities (e.g., dynamic capabilities). The product family research stream, on the other hand, has 
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its roots in engineering, technology, and innovation studies. The platform (e.g., automobile) provides a 
stable core for a range of product families to serve different market needs. Platform studies belonging to 
the market intermediary research stream have an economic view on platforms, treating them as market 
places, market makers or multi-sided platforms that enable efficient connections among various 
stakeholders that wish to exchange good or services (e.g., payment services) (Eisenmann et al. 2006; 
Hagiu et al. 2011; Rochet et al. 2002). Lastly, the platform ecosystem stream studies the strategic use of 
technology platforms within value networks, which is guided by the notion of modularity, where 
platform owners exercise control over architecture and integrate selectively complementary assets (e.g., 
internal and external components) (Baldwin et al. 2000; Yoo et al. 2012). The platform ecosystem stream 
has its roots in strategic management (Porter 1985), technology value creation (Teece 1986), information 
systems competition (Shapiro et al. 1998), and technology standards (Farrell et al. 1985; Suárez et al. 
1995; Utterback et al. 1993). Compared to other platform research streams, platforms in platform 
ecosystem studies are distinct, as they tend to share the ownership and control with external actors. Take 
Samsung and Google as an example. Samsung produces popular mobile devices, which in turn rely on 
Google’s Android mobile operating system (i.e., a component) to be a complete consumer product. In a 
way, Samsung and Google co-own the mobile device while maintaining control about their respective 
hardware and software components. As this dissertation aims to understand disruptive digital platforms 
and consider them as layered modular architectures, this study belongs to the platform ecosystem 
research stream. 
Digital Platform Literature 
A common characteristic of digital platforms is that they provide a technology foundation for third 
parties (e.g., developers) to create innovative components (e.g., apps), which in turn assist digital 
platforms achieve their competitive advantages (Ghazawneh et al. 2015). Researchers have studied many 
facets of digital platforms, such as the governance and development for operating systems (Benlian et al. 
2015; Eaton et al. 2015; Ghazawneh et al. 2013; Pon et al. 2014; West 2003; West et al. 2000), the 
classification of app store platforms (Ghazawneh et al. 2015), music distribution platforms (Burgelman et 
al. 2007; Tilson et al. 2013), e-commerce platforms (Tan et al. 2015), enterprise resource planning (ERP) 
systems (Ceccagnoli et al. 2012; Sarker et al. 2012; Wareham et al. 2014), game consoles (Cennamo et 
al. 2013), and mobile payment platforms (Ondrus et al. 2015).  
A common theme among these studies is platform governance. Digital platforms are constantly 
challenged to consider the needs of existing and new stakeholders (e.g., developers) to maintain 
attractiveness and competiveness while preventing fragmentation that would deteriorate service 
performance (e.g., incompatibility) (Eisenmann et al. 2011; West 2003). As digital platforms provide 
tools and avenues for collaborations at the component level of products, these actions are basically 
invitations to create value networks based on the logic of modularity. 
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Digital Platforms: Layered Modular Architectures 
Past studies laid the foundation for conceiving digital platforms as layered modular information 
technology architectures that have the logic to create value or business networks around their platform 
boundaries (Baldwin et al. 2000; Baldwin et al. 2008; Pil et al. 2006; Tiwana et al. 2010b; Yoo et al. 
2010). Consistent with Yoo et al. (2010), digital platforms can compromise up to five distinct but 
interlinked layers to assemble modularized products or services (Yoo et al. 2010):  (1) device, (2) system, 
(3) network, (4) service, and (5) content. Figure 2 illustrates the digital platform layers of Apple’s 
payment service Apple Pay. 
 
Figure 2. Digital Platform Layers & Components of Apple Pay 
Device Layer: A physical, programmable IT artifact for storing and processing digitally encoded data 
and instructions. Apple’s iPhone and smartwatch embody these traits by being a physical technology 
artifact that stores and runs the Apple Pay software and initiates the Near-Field-Communication (NFC) 
chip for conducting contactless payments.  
System Layer: A logical software system for controlling and executing software and hardware 
components. Apple’s mobile payment solution Apple Pay requires iOS and Watch OS as operating 
systems to regulate the payment app (software), NFC chips, and its secure element (physical). 
Network Layer: Network channel for transporting data packages among different network participants. 
Apple’s mobile payment service relies on mobile operators (e.g., AT&T) and payment networks (e.g., 
Visa) to process and settle payments. 
Service Layer: Software applications for storing, generating, and distributing services. Apple Pay is a 
payment service that not only mediates commercial transactions but also offers Application 
Programming Interfaces (API) and Software Development Kits (SDK) to facilitate the integration of 
Apple Pay into third-party applications. 
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Content Layer: Representation of digital data in terms of audio, video, text, and images. Originating 
from the service layer, Apple Pay generates payment data in the form of purchase amount, merchant, 
time and/or location, to name a few.  
Each of these five layers is basically an avenue for and invitation to third parties to contribute their own 
components to practice modularity to complement/enhance digital platforms in their features and overall 
value proposition (Schilling 2000; Staudenmayer et al. 2005). Nevertheless, access—and the quality of 
access to these layers—is subject to platform governance (e.g., moderated or unmoderated), which 
suggests the existence of commodity and value layers within digital platforms, where the latter presents 
control points and value capture opportunities (Kazan et al. 2014b). For instance, in the computer 
industry, hardware (i.e., the device layer of digital platforms) is largely considered to be a standard off-
the-shelf component that shares the attributes of abundance and commodity. Data analytics (content layer 
of a digital platform), on the other hand, present a source for deriving business value, as data is in most 
cases guarded against third parties (e.g., payment data). 
Considering digital platforms and third parties from an innovation viewpoint, the innovation literature 
considers   this kind of collaboration open innovation, which is basically a conjoint innovation effort to 
create value (e.g., commercializable innovations) (Chesbrough 2003), or, in a broader sense, is 
understood as generativity (Zittrain 2006). Generativity describes unsolicited innovations by third 
parties, where the system owner (e.g., platform owner) has no control over the innovation process. 
However, as governance influences component access or contribution, and innovation indirectly, 
platform components at different layers are either loosely coupled, which suggests flexibility (e.g., 
Android is open-source on the system layer), or the platform components are tightly integrated into 
layers that suggest control (e.g., iOS is proprietary on the system layer). 
Considering platform layers from an outsourcing viewpoint, they are similar to the notion of vertical 
integrations or make-or-buy decisions (Harrigan 1984). Digital platform owners have to decide which 
layers are to be internally developed, reflecting their need of control or having the in-house knowledge to 
develop themselves, and which ones are to be outsourced or shared with third parties to balance 
shortcomings. Arguably, the more that platform layers are controlled and tightly integrated with each 
other (e.g., Apple platform layers), the more favorable conditions are created to capture monopolistic 
value opportunities. On the contrary, if digital platforms face resource constraints (e.g., lack of 
component knowledge in one layer), a digital platform may have to open its layers towards third parties 
to offer a complete modularized product. 
To illustrate, Google’s initial android phone strategy was to give away the device layer to external phone 
vendors (e.g., Samsung, HTC, Huwai), which have the sources (e.g., production facilities) to bring 
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affordable Android phones into the hands of consumers. Over the years, though, Google realized that a 
“let a thousand flowers bloom” phone strategy (Boudreau 2012) had diminishing returns on quality and 
user experience, endangering Android’s brand perception and potentially the use of Google’s services. 
To counteract, Google took steps to integrate more layers with each other to control user experience and 
value. Specifically, Google started to verticalize layers by designing, developing, and marketing its own 
mobile phone (e.g., Pixel), while leveraging on interchangeable hardware manufacturers (i.e., device 
layer). In this way, Google created a flagship phone that embodies Google’s vision of mobile computing 
that couples layers (i.e., device, system, service, content) to increase its perceived value. An outcome of 
Google’s layer verticalization strategy is that it set the bar for other Android phone vendors to release 
similar high-quality phones, which fosters Android’s competitiveness. 
From a strategy and competition viewpoint, layered modular architectures have the advantage, as well as 
the challenge, of being doubly distributed (Yoo et al. 2010). They are distributed, as they provide third 
parties environments to collaborate with their own components at different platform layers. But at the 
same time, they are digital platforms, and third parties conjointly or independently (1) control and (2) 
generate component knowledge in select strategic layers. Specifically, digital platform owners may face 
the risk of housing Trojan horses within platform boundaries. To begin with, third parties are welcomed 
as they contribute and build a stronghold in underappreciated commodity layers and increase their value 
proposition. However, hosted third parties could initiate a Trojan horse strategy within digital platforms 
by bundling commodity and value layers, where commodity layers function as entry points to encroach 
into the value layers of digital platform owners. Take Apple’s iPad as an example. Amazon contributes 
with its Kindle eBook service to iPad’s content and service layers. But concurrently, Amazon competes 
with Apple on the device layer with its own Kindle eBook readers and tablets (Yoo et al. 2010). In this 
sense, platform governance has to ensure a fine line between welcoming third parties to facilitate 
innovation and growth while at the same time putting measures in place to limit potential competitors. 
Based on the above-mentioned observations, digital platforms function as innovation and distribution 
hubs, as they have the logic to enrich and orchestrate components into valued modularized products and 
services within value networks. In the same vein, the digital platforms that can be considered attractive 
and competitive offer the best conditions for practicing modularity, which offers high-value capture 
opportunities. As digital platforms deliver products and services within value networks, digital platforms 
rely on digital infrastructures. In this dissertation, digital infrastructures are considered information 
delivery architectures that deliver and connect digital platform stakeholders to a value network. In this 
sense, this dissertation posits that the majority of value creation within value networks takes place in the 
realm of digital platforms, and digital infrastructures’ primary function is to connect and deliver value 
among network participants (See Figure 3). 
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Digital Infrastructures 
Another key component for digital platforms is access to digital infrastructures (i.e., network layer) to 
channel platform derivatives (e.g., services) in the most efficient and economic manner (Hanseth et al. 
2010; Hanseth et al. 1996; Henfridsson et al. 2013; Star et al. 1996; Tilson et al. 2010). Hanseth et al. 
(2010), in their study about the evolution of the Internet, define digital infrastructures “as shared, open, 
heterogeneous and evolving socio-technical system of Information Technology (IT) capabilities.” Tilson 
et al. (2010) define digital infrastructures “as basic information technologies and organizational 
structures, along with the related services and facilities necessary for an enterprise or industry to 
function.” Henfridsson et al.’s (2013) study about the Scandinavian airline industry describes digital 
infrastructures as “the collection of technological and human components, networks, systems, and 
processes that contribute to the functioning of an information system.” 
 
Figure 3. Value Networks 
 
In alignment with the above-mentioned definitions, where digital infrastructures share the attributes of 
being basic and necessary for systems to function at the firm (e.g., digital platforms) or industry level, 
this dissertation defines digital infrastructures as efficient value delivery architectures that operate as 
backbones of value networks to connect and deliver value (e.g., platform services) among network 
participants. To illustrate, the Internet delivers digital platform services (e.g., music by Spotify) as 
standardized data packages to its consumer. Digital infrastructures are an important component of digital 
platforms (i.e., a component for the network layer [see Figure 3]); digital platforms arguably strive for 
unimpeded access, as digital infrastructures deliver services beyond platform boundaries in the most 
efficient and effective way. On the contrary, as platforms lacking access to digital infrastructures, and by 
that equally lacking an important component for their network layers (e.g., traditional payment 
infrastructures), digital platforms are compelled to forge partnerships with third parties to compensate 
their component shortage (e.g., banks). Alternatively, digital platforms select other access options (i.e., 
network layer components) that replicate digital infrastructures (e.g., blockchain systems).  
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The next section provides key literature and theories to contrast two different value economies: value 
chain and value networks. Organizations operating in value chain and value network economies have 
different sources and appreciations for assets, methods, and innovations that in turn provide competitive 
advantages. As previously illustrated, innovation and competition have symbiotic relationships (see 
disruptive innovation section), which either sustain established innovations (i.e., sustaining innovation) 
or facilitate their disruption. Thus, to understand innovation and competition principles in the digital 
platform context, the next section contrasts value chain and value network economies. 
Competitive Advantage   
In this section, I contrast how organizations in (1) value chain and (2) value network economies (Stabell 
et al. 1998) distinguish themselves in achieving their competitive advantages. As previously discussed 
(see section research gap: digital platform disruption), competitive advantage and innovation have self-
reinforcing symbiotic relationships, as certain types of innovations are supportive for maintaining 
competitive advantages for current established innovations. Alternatively, organizations create 
innovations that are supportive for achieving competitive advantages by disrupting established 
innovations. Thus, understanding disruptive digital platforms requires understanding characteristic assets 
and methods that are pertinent for each value economy. 
Research on firm competition has received a substantial amount of attention among scholars in their bid 
to explain how organizations achieve competitive advantage (Chesbrough 2003; Christensen et al. 1996; 
Porter 1980; Porter 1985; Schumpeter 1934; Teece et al. 1997; Wernerfelt 1984). Competitive advantage 
can be understood as a business condition that allows organizations to claim favorable market positions 
to capture business value. Having  a competitive advantage is usually reflected in sustainable or superior 
financial performances compared to rival organizations that operate in the same business environment 
(Porter 1991). To achieve or revitalize competitive advantages, organizations are usually involved in 
continuous innovation efforts (e.g., research and development) that improve their asset base (e.g., 
resources, components) or methods (e.g., knowledge) to continue in creating competitive products, which 
allows them to charge premium prices (e.g., higher perceived quality) or produce existing products at a 
lower cost base (Schumpeter 1934). As organizations in value chain and value network economies have 
different appreciations and logics to create value (e.g., what is considered to be scarce or difficult to 
imitate)  (Stabell et al. 1998), these characteristic value creation and innovation patterns may further 
assist in deriving strategy profiles that are applicable for organizations in value chain and value network 
economies, such as  digital platforms. 
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Competitive Advantage in Value Chain Economies  
Porter’s (1985) work on value chains has evolved to a key reference in management literature. A key 
characteristic of organizations in value chain economies is that value is created by transforming inputs 
(i.e., assets and methods) into valued market outputs in a sequential manner (Stabell et al. 1998). Porter’s 
(1985) value chain model embraces a company perspective that sheds light into the processes and 
structures of firms’ understanding how resources and capabilities at different stages along the production 
line are leveraged to create value. Specifically, Porter (1985) delineates the value chain model into 
primary activities (e.g., logistic, production, marketing) and supporting activities (e.g., procurement, 
human resource management). The delineation has the advantage of structuring value chains in stages 
and costs centers. As this allows cost transparency for certain production steps, organizations can 
calculate a make-or-buy decision (Harrigan 1984) by comparing internal production costs with external 
organizations. This may result in collaboration opportunities as parts of the production line are 
outsourced to third parties. As more collaborations take over, organizations with prior monopolistic 
power over their production lines get gradually disintegrated or distributed in their value chains, thus 
transforming from once vertical integrated organizations to horizontal ones. 
Source of Innovation: Intra-Organizational 
Schumpeterian innovation theory asserts that innovation is an outcome of entrepreneurial competition 
that is grounded on new combinations of existing resources (Schumpeter 1934) or the leverage of 
ordinary capabilities (i.e., public knowledge) or dynamic capabilities (i.e., tacit knowledge) that reside in 
organizations to create products (Teece et al. 1997). Schumpeter’s (1934, p. 66) concept of new 
combinations, one of the early works on firm competition and innovation, delineates innovation further 
into five categories: (1) a new product, (2) new method of production, (3) new market, (4) new source of 
supply for materials / pre-manufactured goods, and (5) the emergence of new organizations that create or 
abolish monopolistic market structures. The latter arguably shares the attributes of disruption. 
Assets: Resource-Based View Theory  
Another research stream that explains firm competition is the resource-based view (Wernerfelt 1984), 
which advocates a supply perspective on firm resources to explain competition-enhancing or diminishing 
factors. For instance, similar to the notion of market entry barriers (see page 6), Wernerfelt (1984) 
suggests resource position barriers—e.g., the privileged access to resources—which create hurdles for 
other firms to source the same resource under equal economic terms. Imposing strategic constraints on 
industry-specific key resources is a business strategy that can put rivals under economic pressure, even to 
the extent of endangering organizations in their existence.  
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Take Samsung and Apple as an example. In 2005, flash memory chips were a highly sought industry-
specific key resource for electronic device manufactures. Apple secured from Samsung under favorable 
and exclusive terms these highly demanded flash chips for its iPod music player line. Having exclusive 
access to flash memory chips, Apple created bottlenecks in the flash memory market that prevented other 
firms from producing their devices and thus competing effectively. Moreover, smaller competitors were 
put out of business (Darlin 2005). Although resource access or control is an important factor for 
achieving competitiveness, the way resources are processed is likewise important, which can be 
explained through the dynamics capabilities lens. 
Method: Dynamics Capabilities  
Complementing the resource-based view, dynamics capabilities (1997, p. 516) is defined as “firm's 
ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly 
changing environments. Dynamic capabilities thus reflect an organization's ability to achieve new and 
innovative forms of competitive advantage given path dependencies and market positions.” In this sense, 
dynamic capabilities can be subsumed as tacit knowledge that allows for mastery and refinement of 
internal resources (e.g., technology) and the streamlining of organizational and managerial processes to 
create valued outputs that are difficult to imitate. This in turn may translate into efficient resource 
exploitations to create competitive products. To illustrate dynamic capabilities, Apple has a rich set of 
dynamic capabilities (i.e., tacit knowledge such as process engineering) that meticulously orchestrate and 
combine its software and hardware units to create highly demanded products. 
Business Strategies in Value Chain Economies 
From a business strategy viewpoint, and similar to the theory of strategic alignment (Henderson et al. 
1993), where technology assists business strategy and vice versa, the value chain model (i.e., supply 
perspective) connects with Porter’s (1980) prior work on market or business strategies (i.e., demand 
perspective). If we take the cost leadership strategy profile (i.e., industry level) with its corresponding 
focus strategy (i.e., market segment level), the cost leadership strategy profile relies on efficiency to be 
competitive. For instance, a cost leader competes through standardized high-volume production methods 
to obtain economic scale and scope advantages. This in turn may result in cost savings along the value 
chain to increase profit margins while maintaining or assisting to pressure competitors by reducing the 
market prices. In this sense, value chains have to be designed in a way that supports the cost leadership 
strategy profile, which requires control/access to (select) resources (see resource-cased view theory) and 
the knowledge (see dynamics capabilities theory) to operate high-volume production lines. The 
remaining strategy profile differentiation explains organizations that compete through product 
differentiation or customization by serving different consumer needs that have divergent preferences 
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compared to mainstream consumers (e.g., exclusive brand) (Porter, 1980). The value chain model has in 
this specific case (i.e., differentiation strategy profile) arguably its theoretical limitations to explain 
consumer preferences, as consumer preferences are driven by individualistic personal appreciations, 
challenging the value chain model in its explanatory power.    
Competitive Advantage Value Network Economies  
Value Networks  
Organizations in value network economies (Stabell et al. 1998) create value primarily by establishing 
efficient connections and matches among their network participants (e.g., payers and payees) to mediate 
a network-related product or service (e.g., payment) (Eisenmann et al. 2006). The value creation 
activities carry the attributes of being simultaneous, parallel, dyadic, or polyadic, which are different 
compared to organizations operating in value chain economies that have the logic create value in a 
sequential manner (Stabell et al. 1998).  
Within value network economies, organizations can be considered competitive when more network 
participants are efficiently connected with each other (Eisenmann et al. 2006; Hagiu et al. 2011). Though 
to establish a network in the first place, organizations leverage on network promoting technology 
artifacts, such as digital platforms that have the logic to orchestrate connections (Yoo et al. 2010). 
Accordingly, organizations that are in possession of digital platforms that generate the outmost value 
compared to rivals (e.g., the number and size of connections) can be deemed as having a competitive 
advantage (Eisenmann et al. 2006). 
Source of Innovation: Open Innovation 
Compared to Schumpeterian innovation, which propagates the idea that innovation emerges within 
organizational boundaries due to entrepreneurial activity (e.g., R&D department), open innovation theory 
suggests that organizations should look beyond their organizational boundaries and integrate or 
externalize knowledge to create competitive products and services (Chesbrough, 2003). In the digital 
platform context, literature describes this type of innovation practice as coupled open innovation 
(Gassmann et al. 2004). Unlike other open innovation mechanisms that are unidirectional innovation 
transfers—similar to the notion of value chain chains (e.g., inside-out or outside-in) (see Figure 2)—
coupled open innovation propagates the idea that innovation activities are simultaneous and continuous, 
which arguably is pertinent for network-orientated organizations that create value through efficient 
connections (see Figure 4). In this context, organizations that provide the best tools and conditions for 
third parties (e.g., developers) to practice open innovation (e.g., developer tools like SDKs and APIs), as 
well as having a network of select innovation partners (e.g., mobile phone manufacturers), may create 
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innovations that are perceived to be higher valued then rival ones. Conceivably, these innovations could 
in turn result in competitive advantages to absorb greater value. 
 
Figure 4. Open Innovation Concepts 
 
In so doing, digital platforms typically practice open innovation through means of interfirm modularity to 
exchange or complement components with third parties (Staudenmayer et al. 2005; Yoo et al. 2010). 
Assets: Components Access Through Interfirm Modularity  
Interfirm modularity in the realm of digital platforms is defined as the development, sourcing, and 
distribution of components with multiple organizations to co-create a platform-related product and 
service (Freeman 1991; Langlois 2002; Langlois et al. 1992; Sanchez et al. 1996; Schilling 2000; 
Schilling et al. 2007; Staudenmayer et al. 2005; Yoo et al. 2010). Modern digital platforms achieve 
interfirm modularity through the means of boundary resources or interfacing technologies such as 
application programming interfaces (APIs) or software development kits (SDK) that have the function to 
provide components (e.g., libraries) to third parties to co-create modularity-based products and services 
(Baldwin et al. 2008; Eaton et al. 2015; Ghazawneh et al. 2013). For instance, third-party developers 
submit their applications to Apple’s App Store, and these are basically external components that 
complement the iOS platform. 
Compared to traditional arrangements, where partnerships for interfirm modularity are usually 
characterized as being idiosyncratic, difficult to establish, having high transaction costs, and relatively 
durable to recoup costs (e.g., automotive industry) (Gulati et al. 2000), organizations leveraging on 
digital platforms have the advantage of forging interorganizational relationships in a plug-and-play 
fashion, because (digital) components are usually highly accessible. This allows dynamic configurations 
by mixing and matching components from different sources and releasing them as a unified platform 
product or service to a value network. Take ProgrammableWeb.com as an illustrative example. 
ProgrammableWeb.com is a prominent API directory provider that lists various digital firms that offer 
industry-specific APIs (i.e., components) to third parties, ranging from ecommerce, education, health, 
transportation, or payment. These publicly available APIs are basically unsolicited invitations (as long as 
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they adhere to the terms of use) to forge digital interorganizational linkages at the component level to 
complement digital products. This clearly differs compared to traditional interorganizational 
arrangements that usually exhibit high transaction costs. 
Method: Modularity Configuration  
As interfirm modularity provides quick access to a pool of ready-made components for value creation 
and innovation opportunities; the very same components, however, are also often available to rivals as 
well. This is especially valid for open-source components that are freely available, obstructing 
organizations such as digital platforms in creating strategic component constraints, which diminishes 
their ability to generate a competition advantage. Nevertheless, to leave competitors behind, 
organizations owning digital platforms may pursue a strategy of superior configurations that is less 
susceptible to replication (cf. Kazan et al. 2014; Pagani 2013; Woodard et al. 2013). 
The notion of superior configurations is consistent with Pagani’s (2013) work on the broadcasting 
industry. She (2013) asserts that configuration management within value networks is a valuable business 
capability in its own right, and Pagani (2013. p. 629) concludes: “[as] [d]evices, software, 
organizational capabilities, and business processes will increasingly be restructured as […] 
[components] that can be quickly and seamlessly connected with other [components,] [v]alue will lie in 
creating [components] that can be plugged into as many different value chains as possible […] As 
modularization takes hold, the ability to coordinate among the [components] will become the most 
valuable business skill.” In this sense, mastering coordination, which is synonymous with configuration, 
is a powerful business capability, as it provides organizations such as digital platforms the ability to 
leverage on alternative means to achieve equifinal or superior products or services. In other words, 
strategic configuration could create superior products or replicate mainstream products (e.g., established 
innovation) at a lower cost structure.  Clearly, this can be considered as a competitive advantage (Porter 
1985), especially in value networks, where modularity is the dominant approach for interorganizational 
partnerships to co-create products. In this sense, digital platforms compete by designing the best platform 
architecture and components and release configurations that generate competitive platform derivatives 
(Pagani 2013; Stabell et al. 1998; Yoo et al. 2010). Considering superior configurations from the 
disruptive innovation theoretical angle, it shares the notion of architectural innovation (Henderson et al. 
1990), where innovation in product architecture and components challenges established innovation.  
Research Contribution 
This dissertation theorizes that digital platforms strategically design and configure their architecture and 
components on different layers towards competiveness. In so doing, digital platforms likely exhibit 
innovation attributes that support established innovations or innovations that facilitate disruption. They 
have supportive conditions for facilitating disruption, as they are atypical and new compared to 
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established innovations and become truly disruptive in the event of a new standard (the latter is not the 
subject of this dissertation) (Suárez et al. 1995). Considering competition and innovation conjointly, they 
could give insights about strategy profiles that are suitable to explaining digital platforms. As we have 
good understandings of how organizations in value chain economies structure their inner workings to 
create competitive products, and how these inner workings arguably mirror strategy profiles (e.g., value 
chain and cost leadership) (Porter 1980; 1895), the same concept is not fully understood for organizations 
in value network economies (see Table 2). As such, this dissertation presents a small but concrete step to 
provide a fitting response towards de Reuver et al.’s (2017) research agenda to understand disruptive 
digital platforms. 
Table 2. Competition & Innovation Principles in Value Chain & Value Network Economies 
 Value Chain Economies Value Network Economies Digital Platforms 
Source of 
Innovation 
Schumpeterian Innovation 
Innovation emerges within 
organizational boundaries. 
Open Innovation 
Innovation emerges inside & 
outside organizational 
boundaries. 
Coupled Open Innovation 
Innovation emerges inside & 
outside in a continuous & 
reciprocal fashion. 
Assets 
 
Resource-Based View Strategic Linkages, 
Architecture & Components 
Strategic Interfirm 
Modularity 
Method Dynamic Capabilities Interfirm Modularity Strategic Modularity 
Configurations 
Business 
Strategy 
Value Chain  Market 
Strategies 
(e.g., Cost Leadership) 
Research Gap Research Contribution 
Proposing the Disruptive Digital Platform Model 
Based on the notion of strategic alignment (Henderson et al. 1993) that advocates a relationship between 
IT systems and business strategies and vice versa, I delineate digital platform disruption as an outcome of 
open innovation capabilities, where the latter is grounded on (1) business design (i.e., strategic 
orientation of digital platforms) (Chen et al. 2010; Miles et al. 1978); (2) architecture design (i.e., 
architecture and component governance of digital platforms) (Henderson et al. 1990; Yoo et al. 2010); 
and (3) technology design (i.e., attributes of boundary resources to practice interfirm modularity) 
(Ghazawneh et al. 2013; Saloner 1990; West 2003). Having a strategic modularity viewpoint, this 
dissertation contends that the attributes of each design element and the configuration of these design 
elements towards open innovation allow digital platforms to acquire novel value configurations. In other 
words, innovations that either support established innovation or innovations that facilitate disruption (cf. 
Christensen et al. 1996; Kazan et al. 2013; Kazan et al. 2014a; Kazan et al. 2014b). 
Accordingly, this dissertation defines digital platform disruption as the design and configuration of 
digital platforms that introduce differentiating innovations into value networks, which have supportive 
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conditions to facilitate disruption. Figure 5 provides an overview of our proposed model of digital 
platform disruption.  
 
Figure 5. Digital Platform Disruption 
 
Business Design: Strategic Orientation of Digital Platforms 
Literature on business strategies suggests that organizations can be subsumed and classified into three 
industry-independent strategy profiles (Miles et al. 1978; Sabherwal et al. 2001): (1) Defender, (2) 
Prospector, and (3) Analyzer. Strategy profiles are useful theoretical lenses to classify organizations 
within existing business environments (e.g., competitor analysis), by categorizing characteristic attributes 
(e.g., competition and innovation activities) that are pertinent for certain types of strategy profiles. 
The Defender follows an exploitative business strategy. Presenting an established organization within 
existing and stable business environments, the Defender prioritizes predictability and efficiency in its 
daily operations and business logic, which is usually reflected in exploiting existing technologies, assets, 
methods, products, and markets to optimize its cost structure in a continuous fashion. Accordingly, the 
Defender shows less flexibility regarding unproven innovations. Having its focus on exploitation, the 
Defender achieves its competiveness by creating high-quality and high-volume standard products that are 
targeted to serve mainstream markets. Likewise, to the Defender, the Cost Leadership profile (Porter 
1980) shares similar traits, which emphasize an economy of scale and scope in its value creation logic. 
As its name indicates, the Defender presents an incumbent organization that defends the status quo by 
maintaining and refining existing value creation logic for an existing business environment, such as 
market position, and existing revenue-generating products. Considering the Defender through the 
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disruptive innovation lens, it typically presents organizations that have adopted the strategy of 
established innovations to sustain existing products within existing mainstream markets. 
The Prospector follows an explorative business strategy. Prospector organizations are usually present in 
the form of flexible and agile entities that seek experimentation and accept risk with new technologies or 
new business environments—organizations where revenue outlooks are opaque. If the Prospector is 
successful with its exploration, it grants favorable economic opportunities compared to its rivals, such as 
benefiting from a first mover advantage in profitable business environments, or possessing proprietary 
knowledge (i.e., dynamic capabilities) for innovations that promise high-growth opportunities (e.g., 
blockchain systems). To some extent, the Prospector mirrors the Differentiator strategy profile (Porter 
1980) and seeks its advantage in serving profitable market niches with unique products (e.g., brand 
perception) that are higher valued by the market. As the name indicates, the Prospector explores new 
innovations that may result in new value opportunities. Thus, the Prospector is considered an initiator of 
technology and market change, if the innovations are perceived to be superior compared to established 
innovations (e.g., price, speed, quality). Considering the Prospector through the disruptive innovation 
lens, it typically represents organizations that follow the path of disruptive innovation, as Prospectors 
experiment and use atypical means to offer competitive products that have similar value propositions 
compared to established innovations. 
The Analyzer has an ambidextrous strategy posture, which combines the best traits of the Defender and 
Prospector to minimize risk (i.e., Defender), while at the same trying to maximize new business 
opportunities (i.e., Prospector). The Analyzer has the competitive advantage of having a solid foundation 
of core products that provide a steady and reliable revenue stream to ensure organizational survival for 
the long run. From this stable foundation, though, the Analyzer has the ability to enter carefully into new 
business endeavors that are alien to the Analyzer. As such, Analyzers behave like a second mover, by 
observing and following Prospectors concerning new technology adoptions or entering into new 
markets. In so doing, organizations with an Analyzer strategy profile are usually quick in catching up 
with Prospectors. Analyzers are fast second movers, because they study and avoid the initial trial costs 
incurred by Prospectors—and secondly, Analyzers have the advantage of having a solid economic 
foundation from their revenue-generating core businesses, which in turn allows them to close the gap 
with Prospectors. From a disruptive innovation theoretical perspective, the Analyzer is receptive towards 
exploration opportunities. But at the same time, the Analyzer does not initiate change. In this sense, the 
Analyzer is arguably a strategy profile that accelerates the adoption of disruptive innovations, but it is not 
the inventor of disruptive innovations. 
Take Google Pay as an example. Google Pay is a highly flexible digital payment platform that empowers 
third parties to co-create customized payment applications. Nevertheless, Google maintains control over 
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the Google Pay payment platform. Third-party developers who would like to integrate Google Pay into 
their own applications are required to register and are afterwards reviewed to see if they followed 
technical and legal standards, since Google has to fulfill the requirements demanded by credit card 
payment networks (i.e., the network layer of a digital platform), which are component providers of 
Google Pay’s network layer, in order to have access to a global payment network. In this sense, Google 
Pay resembles an Analyzer Business Design Profile that pursues innovation by providing flexibility with 
third parties to increase its market reach, but at the same time it exercises control through maintaining 
payment network access. 
From above, I infer that digital platforms similarly exhibit strategy profiles (Miles et al. 1978), leading to 
what I construe as Business Design Profiles. Specifically, the way digital platforms adopt or reject 
certain assets and methods, the way modularity is practiced between third parties (e.g., open, moderated, 
or proprietary), and the type of innovations permitted (i.e., established or disruptive innovation) within 
digital platform boundaries may assist in identifying Business Design Profiles that are supportive in 
facilitating disruption. I am not aware of past studies that specifically discuss strategic profiles for digital 
platforms. 
Architecture Design: Modularity Governance of Digital Platforms 
Research on digital platforms has studied various idiosyncrasies of proprietary or open-platform 
governance schemes and their outcomes, such as what kind of applications (i.e., innovations) are co-
created with third parties (Boudreau 2010; Ghazawneh et al. 2013; Makadok et al. 2009; Tiwana et al. 
2010a; West 2003). While these studies have indeed provided valuable theoretical contributions to the 
digital platform literature, most studies have adopted rather a monolithic view on digital platforms. To be 
specific, most digital platform studies have their unit of analysis at the service layer (e.g., how third-party 
applications are created and accepted) (cf. Eaton et al. 2015; Kazan et al. 2014b; Yoo et al. 2010), which 
arguably limits our understanding of digital platforms from a strategic modularity viewpoint. For 
instance, there is little discussion within the extant literature of how architecture and components (e.g., 
access or contribution of components to different layers) impact digital platform strategies and vice versa 
(i.e., Business Design Profile). 
As previously discussed (see digital platform section), I conceive digital platforms not as monolithic IT 
artifacts but rather as comprising five distinct interlinked layers (see Figure 2). Depending on 
governance, each of these layers offers avenues for interfirm modularity or (coupled) open innovation 
opportunities (Kazan et al. 2014; Yoo et al. 2010). It is suggested that certain types of governance 
exercised on each layer (e.g., open, moderated, proprietary) shapes the overall structure of digital 
platforms in being either loosely (e.g., distributed) or tightly coupled across its layers (e.g., centralized) 
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to accommodate business needs such as strategy (see Figure 6) (Ghazawneh et al. 2013; Iyer et al. 2010; 
Tiwana et al. 2010b). 
Accordingly, on the grounds of accessibility and/or modifiability by third parties, digital platforms may 
exhibit different types of Architecture Design Profiles. 
Vertically integrated platform layers indicate a Centralized Architecture Design profile, where a digital 
platform owner has basically monopolistic power over all layers and its components. In this context, it 
suggests that third parties are largely excluded from practicing interfirm modularity or reduced to a 
minimum in non-strategic areas, as digital platforms with a Centralized Architecture Design profile are 
resourceful and adequately equipped to have an isolated system. A Hybrid Architecture Design profile, 
on the other hand, suggests a digital platform, which is willing to open up certain layers towards third 
parties to achieve competiveness, such as addressing component shortcomings (e.g., device layer 
provided by Samsung in the form of a mobile phone) or having the intent to increase its overall value 
proposition with third parties (e.g., opening the service layer to third parties in moderated fashion). At the 
same time, a Hybrid Architecture Design profile suggests the closure of strategic relevant layers (e.g., 
Apple closed the systems layer for iOS systems) to ensure control and value capture points. Lastly, a 
Distributed Architecture Design profile suggests that layers are provided by various digital platform 
actors, where there is no clear owner in control that could exercise governance rights on other 
stakeholders. These types of digital platforms are arguably highly flexible, open, and free (e.g., open-
source platforms like Android), where stakeholders with different component knowledge for different 
layers are free to join and to leave at will (see Figure 6). 
As management of organizations set the direction and boundaries for governance to achieve overall long-
term business goals, and thus strategies, it is contended that Architecture Design profiles are related to 
Business Design Profiles and vice versa. I posit that Business Design profiles influence Architecture 
Design profiles to fulfill a Defender’s need to be exploitative with its digital platform (e.g., layers 
designed for efficiency), to accommodate a Prospector’s need to be explorative with its digital platform 
(e.g., open layers designed for flexibility), and to support an Analyzer’s need to be ambidextrous with its 
digital platform (e.g., moderated layers designed for controlled flexibility). 
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Figure 6. Architecture Design Profile 
Technology Design: Strategic Boundary Resources for Interfirm Modularity   
To support interfirm modularity and open innovation from a technical viewpoint, digital platforms 
usually provide tools to third parties in the form of boundary resources (Ghazawneh et al. 2013). 
Boundary resources are typically software development kits (i.e., SDKs) and application-programming 
interfaces (i.e., APIs), which are standardized development tools for creating or accessing components 
for different layers of a digital platform. Ghazawneh et al. (2013) define boundary resources as “software 
tools and regulations that serve as the interface for the arm’s-length relationship between the [digital] 
platform owner and the application developer” (p. 175). 
I argue that the attributes and features of boundary resources that enable interfirm modularity between 
digital platform owners and third parties (e.g., flexible, controlled, limited or the lack of it) give us 
insights about the degree of open innovation capabilities of digital platforms. In this sense, I posit that 
characteristic boundary resources (or lack thereof) result in distinct interfirm modularity profiles, which 
are largely (1) Proprietary, (2) Compatible, or (3) Agnostic in their natures—labels I use for Technology 
Design profiles. 
Proprietary Technology Design 
Digital platforms that do not proactively provide boundary resources are basically closed or opaque 
systems, excluding or not welcoming third parties to practice interfirm modularity and open innovation. 
The value proposition of these proprietary digital platforms rests on having the internal resources to 
exercise monopolistic power over their platforms, which may allow the owner to reap better profit 
margins by simply excluding third parties, achieving efficiency gains, or having the market power (e.g., 
an incumbent) to dictate a (technology) standard that fits their current business and platform logic. In 
other words, enforcing the status quo of their value creation. Although digital platforms with a 
Proprietary Technology Design largely exclude third parties from their systems, these types of digital 
platforms are still technology platforms, as they still continue to be a network promoting technology 
system that mediates a network-related product (e.g., payment). 
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Compatibility Technology Design 
Digital platforms having the Compatibility Technology Design profile offer boundary resources to third 
parties that allow the practice of controlled interfirm modularity and open innovation.  Boundary 
resources, in this context, are restricted in their functionalities, which in turn guarantees a high degree of 
interoperability between standardized components offered by digital platforms (i.e., internal components) 
and third parties (i.e., external components), while having a high degree of control over third parties. I 
argue that platform APIs embody compatibility attributes, as they are purposefully designed and limited 
to provide only specific interfirm modularity features towards third parties. In case of third party 
termination, a digital platform owner can simply revoke API access in the event of incompatibilities from 
a technical or business model viewpoint. For example, payment services (e.g., Visa, MasterCard) offer 
stringent payment APIs towards financial institutions, which in turn gives great control over their 
platforms and business models. 
Agnosticism Technology Design 
Digital platforms having the Agnosticism Technology Design profile offer boundary resources to third 
parties that allow the practice of uncontrolled interfirm modularity and open innovation (cf. Zittrain 
2006). In this context, boundary resources are highly flexible and rich in their functionalities to create 
versatile components that cannot be anticipated by the digital platform owner. Compared to digital 
platforms with a Compatibility Technology Design profile, where components are predictable, a digital 
platform with an Agnosticism Technology Design profile suggests a higher degree of open innovation 
capabilities. I argue that boundary resources like SDKs adhere to the notion of agnosticism. SDKs are 
advanced boundary resources that consist of rich building blocks (i.e., libraries) to develop unpredictable 
third-party components (e.g., apps) for digital platforms (e.g., service layer). As an example, mobile 
operating systems (e.g., Android or iOS) offer SDKs that empower developers to develop novel 
components (i.e., apps), where the platform owner (i.e., Google and Apple) cannot anticipate what kind 
of apps are developed at the end. Accordingly, I posit that the deliberate choice of issuing of certain 
boundary resources may lead to distinct Technology Design profiles (i.e., Proprietary, Compatibility & 
Agnosticism). 
From a design viewpoint, Technology Design profiles are in some ways related to Architecture and 
Business Design Profiles in achieving their design principles (see Table 3). For instance, to accommodate 
the needs of an Analyzer Business Design profile, which seeks flexibility and control in its business, 
Analyzers may issue similar boundary resources that support flexibility and control. In this sense, a 
Compatibility Technology Design is considered to be a suitable design element. As Business and 
Technology Design relate to each other, industry context shapes overall Architecture Design profiles 
(Kazan et al. 2016). 
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As digital platforms consist of five interlinked layers, industry context (e.g., payment industry) 
determines which of the five layers are considered valuable (e.g., payment data presents the content 
layer) and are either guarded or shared with third parties to create value. In this case, the Analyzer 
Business Design profile, may exhibit a Hybrid Architecture Design profile, where the most valuable 
layers are guarded, and other less valued layers shared with third parties co-create components (see Table 
3). 
Table 3. Digital platform Design Elements 
Business Design Architecture Design Technology Design 
Defender 
Platform strategy profile that prefers 
control, exploitation, and efficiency in its 
operations. 
Centralized 
Platform architecture profile that has 
monopolistic power over all layers, 
where third parties are largely excluded. 
Proprietary 
Platforms do not proactively   provide 
boundary resources. Thus, largely closed 
or opaque systems. 
Prospector 
Platform strategy profile that accepts 
risk, emphasizes exploration and 
flexibility in its operations. 
Hybrid 
Platform architecture profile that shares 
certain layers with third parties, while 
guarding the most valuable ones for 
control. 
Compatibility 
Platforms offer boundary resources that 
allow controlled interfirm modularity and 
open innovation. 
Analyzer 
Platform strategy profile that emphasizes 
control while at the same time allowing 
moderated flexibility in its operations. 
Distributed 
Platform architecture profile that shares 
all layers, no clear owner that could 
exercise governance. Third parties are 
free to join & to leave at will. 
Agnosticism 
Platforms offers boundary resources that 
allow uncontrolled interfirm modularity 
and open innovation. 
 
Support for Open Innovation  
Open innovation is usually achieved in three generic stages: (1) obtaining (2) integrating, and (3) 
exploiting external sources (West et al. 2014a; Zobel 2016). Open innovation is explored as most digital 
platforms practice this type of innovation with third parties to co-create modularized innovations, which 
either maintain or change established innovations. Accordingly, it is suggested that the proposed digital 
platform design elements (i.e., business, architecture, and technology), which culminate towards open 
innovation capabilities (see Figure 5), influence the conditions for facilitating disruption. 
Obtaining  
Recognition is the act of exploring, identifying, and valuing new external sources that may have positive 
contributions within organizational boundaries (Zobel 2016). Similar to the idea of recognition, West et 
al. (2014a)  perceive obtaining external innovation through actions such as searching, sourcing, enabling, 
incentivizing, and contracting external sources. In the digital platform context, platform owners have the 
ability to source or invite external contributors (e.g., app developers) through boundary resources. A 
practical example for obtaining open innovation is that many large organizations like banks have recently 
formalized managerial processes to obtain complementary external knowledge through strategic 
collaborations (e.g., financial technology startups). Startups have the advantage of not being subject to 
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organizational inertia and are thus relatively agile in adopting and executing new emerging trends in a 
rapid fashion (e.g., minimum viable product that satisfies the needs of early adopters). Organizational 
agility is highly valued by large incumbent organizations, as they are usually pressured and constrained 
to follow sustaining innovation paths. 
Integrating  
Integration is the use of tools and activities that facilitates the acceptance and implementation of external 
sources (e.g., components) within organizations (Zobel 2016). In the same vein of absorptive capacity, 
West et al. (2014a) define integration as factors that enable or hinder integrations, with the intention of 
amplifying existing assets or methods to create value. Though literature suggests as well that 
organizations with a high degree of absorptive capacity (e.g., having established research and 
development [R&D] departments) are also inclined to be less receptive towards external ideas, 
challenging the process of integration. For organizations that have not the internal resources to operate 
their own R&D units, substitution effects occur. In this case, studies suggest that substitution effects 
come to play (i.e., increased use of external sourcing) to compensate shortcomings such as having low or 
non-existing R&D. In the digital platform context, platforms make use of boundary resources (see 
technology design section) to integrate or to be integratable into external systems at the component level.  
In other words, the practice of modularized open innovation. To exemplify and continue with the 
previous example, winners of a startup competition are provided with privileged access points to their 
digital platforms (e.g., API access), which in turn allows a startup to offer complementary services (e.g., 
mobile payment) in conjunction with the platform owner (e.g., bank).  
Exploitation  
Exploitation is the effective utilization of assets and methods to create value. In the open innovation 
context, organizations exploit external sources (e.g., components) to amplify their existing strategic 
assets and methods (Zobel 2016). In the business model context, exploitation is referred to the 
commercialization of co-created value outputs. From a digital platform perspective, platform owners 
exploit components at different layers to complement and/or expand their platform offering, which result 
in value co-capture opportunities. For instance, some digital platform owners have expertise in software 
development (i.e., service layer in the form of apps), while lacking component knowledge in other areas 
such as hardware (i.e., device layer in the form of mobile phones) to offer a holistic platform-related 
product or service. In this line, layer or modularity complementarity offers avenues for mutual co-
exploitations opportunities. 
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Payment Industry and Payment Platforms 
Payment platforms are distinct compared to other generic digital platforms (e.g., social media platforms), 
since payment platforms require access to established and highly regulated national payment 
infrastructures (e.g., UK’s Faster Payments) to transfer payments from payer to payee in a timely and 
secure fashion. Since access to national payment infrastructures is difficult to obtain, due to substantial 
technical, financial, and legal requirements, access to national payment infrastructures can be considered 
as a valuable asset for payment platforms, thus arguably presenting a competitive advantage. 
Accordingly, payment platforms are distinct compared to generic digital platforms, as the access to the 
Internet, which is basically an infrastructure for content delivery, is open and highly accessible, 
obstructing the ability to derive a competitive advantage from it. 
 
Payment is a vital service for national economies that mediates value between payers and payees. In the 
last years, payment and their stakeholders are facing unprecedented changes in the form of industry 
transformation. Regulatory changes, new technological advancements, and the ubiquity of affordable and 
digital payments instruments (e.g., mobile payment) has accelerated and shaped competition in the 
payment industry. The main actors in this highly competitive space are payment incumbents (e.g., banks) 
and payment contenders (e.g., payment startups), which both aim to protect or redefine payments to their 
advantage. One outcome of these ongoing competitive dynamics in payment industries is that payment is 
increasingly transforming into a commoditized byproduct service for other lucrative financial services, 
which exploits payment data for other business units or lucrative products. At the center of these fierce 
competitions are digital payment platforms (i.e., value creation architectures). Digital payment platforms, 
operated by incumbents or contenders, play an important role as they serve as a mean to compete and 
innovate. In the same vein, promising innovations, such as the blockchain system, are an attempt to 
redesign the architecture and components of payment platforms, which could, if successful, disrupt the 
business and platform logic of incumbent ones. 
 
For instance, new payment start-ups use blockchain systems to process and settle payments in a 
distributed and real-time fashion, whereas legacy payment platforms are rather centralized in their 
features (e.g., mainframe systems) that process and settle payments in batches, which delay settlement. 
The latter is particularly challenging for time-sensitive payments to secure a time-sensitive business trade 
or simply avoid risk such as fraud. In this context, startups with new digital payment platforms have the 
ability to offer a very competitive service, as they match and often exceed the value proposition offered 
by incumbent payment platforms. On the other hand, payment startups are challenged in growing their 
network on their own, as they have to rely on third parties such as payment infrastructure providers (i.e., 
value delivery architectures), which provide valuable access to valuable payment networks with a large 
user base consisting of payers and payees. As the abovementioned developments illustrate, competition 
in the payment industry occurs mainly in the realm of payment platforms. If we consider these platform 
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competition dynamics from a theoretical viewpoint, competitive advantage among payment platforms is 
derived from superior platform design and their configurations. For this reason, platform owners strive to 
create unique and inimitable platform design configurals to achieve their competitiveness (Kazan et al. 
2014b). Accordingly, the payment industry presents an excellent empirical context to study and uncover 
disruption innovation dynamics that are pertinent for digital platforms. 
Research Philosophy & Research Method 
Ontology 
Ontology is the study of being, which investigates the nature of reality in the world we live (Crotty 1998; 
Guba et al. 1994). Researchers distinguish here mainly two ontological assumptions about what 
constitutes reality and how its existence can be studied and understood (Burrell et al. 1979; Hirschheim 
et al. 1989): (1) objectivism and (2) subjectivism. Objectivist researchers posit a single reality that 
consists of immutable and natural law-like mechanisms and attributes. Researchers in this worldview 
maintain their objective reality and reasoning by being value free in their investigations. Reality exists 
independently, without the involvement of the researchers (Lee et al. 2003). In this sense, researchers 
with an objectivistic approach have rather an observative, passive role and utilize methodological tools of 
enquires that do not contaminate the studied reality. 
To the contrary, scholars that adhere to a subjective worldview assert that reality is subjectively, or even 
intersubjectively, constructed. Accordingly, different realties may co-exist while studying the same 
phenomenon, as researchers have their own values and interpretations of the perceived reality (Walsham 
1995). Subjectivist scholars argue that the application of objectivist’s methodologies to understand social 
realities to be inadequate. Specifically, subjectivist researchers argue that physical as well as social 
artifacts created by humans are fundamentally different compared to objective realities, as meaning is 
given through social dynamics. 
Besides subjectivism, intersubjectivisim is an understanding of reality that emerges from shared 
experiences, where several individuals derive a common understanding in an interactive manner 
(Miranda et al. 2003). Intersubjective experiences can be manifested in the form of institutionalized 
languages, interactions, routines, norms, or methods. This creates conditions for objectifying phenomena 
or realities; it even originates from different subjective mindsets. As such, the collection and sharing of 
individual subjective worldviews creates the ground for intersubjective reality.  
For instance, a business strategy is a phenomenon that resides within organizations that is shared and 
executed through different individuals. In this way, intersubjective realities or phenomena share the 
attributes of socio-instrumental and pragmatic objects (Goldkuhl 2002). Intersubjectivisim is social as it 
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is shared among two or more individuals (e.g., entire organization) to create a common reality, and they 
are pragmatic objects (e.g., artifacts) as they are translated into actions. To ensure consistency in 
explaining realities, researchers distinguish how they derive their valid knowledge from realities, known 
as epistemology. 
Epistemology  
Epistemology concerns with the study of valid knowledge (Chua 1986; Crotty 1998; Hirschheim et al. 
1989; Orlikowski et al. 1991; Walsham 1995). In this context, scholars state the question “how we know 
what we know” (Crotty 1998). As ontology deals with the observation of realities without an assessment, 
epistemology goes one step further by providing a meaning and understanding to the reality in the form 
of knowledge and especially how we obtain knowledge (Hirschheim 1985). Chua (1986) states that 
“epistemological assumptions decide what is to count as acceptable truth [i.e., knowledge] by specifying 
the criteria and process of assessing truth claims”.  
In information systems, two research philosophies for acquiring valid knowledge are largely used: 
positivism and interpretivism. A positivist researcher assumes that reality can be measured independently 
(i.e., objective ontology), without the influence of researchers to obtain valid knowledge. The positivist 
researcher uses value-free instruments to test a theory through quantifiable measures (i.e., variance 
theories) to increase the explanatory or predictive understanding and knowing of phenomena. While 
building their theories, positivist researchers formulate hypotheses or propositions that reflect the study 
subject, which consists of independent and depend variables and their relationships among them. 
Positivist researchers apply here the rule of hypothetico-deductive logic by manipulating theoretical 
propositions and the testability of theories. A positivist study approach has to fulfill four requirements of 
(1) falsifiability, (2) logical consistency, (3) relative explanatory power, and (4) survival (Lee 1991). For 
instance, falsifiability (dis)confirms a theory through divergent empirical contexts (e.g., offline versus 
online shopping), and logical consistency requires related proposition of a theory to be guided by formal 
logic or logically deducted from prior works. The relative explanatory power requires a theory to explain 
or predict the subject in a controlled setting, whereas survival aims for a theory that has attributes to 
survive continuous disconfirmation efforts.   
On the other hand, interpretivism asserts that reality (i.e., subjective ontology) and valid knowledge are 
outcomes of social constructions, which include the researcher as well during the sense-making process 
(Orlikowski et al. 1991). Specifically, valid knowledge is generated by “getting inside the world of those 
generating it, and constructing an interpretation of ‘other people’s constructions” (Rosen 1991). In this 
regard, researchers have to immerse and contextualize themselves into their empirical environments to 
understand the (co-)created meanings. In other words, the researcher has to be knowledgeable about the 
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language of studied individuals or organizations or understand the interpretation of the empirical data 
within each specific context (Orlikowski et al. 1991). 
In this dissertation, I adopt the (inter)subjective and interpretive approach as I conduct primarily text 
interpretation based on primary and secondary data. In so doing, I apply subjective and intersubjective 
interpretations for deriving knowledge. Subjective interpretation is applied to derive knowledge mainly 
from secondary sources (e.g., payment reports), whereas intersubjective knowledge is conjointly created 
with my interview partners in the areas of business, strategies (i.e., business design), structure of platform 
architecture (i.e., architecture design), and how interfirm modularity (i.e., technology design) is 
practiced. For instance, during interviews I played the role of devil’s advocate by putting forth an 
alternative interpretation about payment-related events (i.e., regulation) or features (e.g., API access 
rules) with my interviewee. In so doing, I and my interviewee create intersubjective meanings and 
interpretations for deriving knowledge. 
Theoretical Building Perspective: Systems Perspective 
Theory development serves as a measure of quality of any scientific work (Burton-Jones et al. 2015). 
Theories have the function to create logical abstractions of fuzzy phenomena, while having the attributes 
in providing either a description or understanding, explanation, prediction, or prescription (Gregor 2006). 
As researchers construct their theoretical models through inductive or deductive reasoning, theories have 
the following basic building blocks (Maxwell 1992): (1) concepts and (2) relationships. Maxwell (1992) 
states that “any theory has two components: the concepts or categories that the theory employs, and the 
relationships that are thought to exist among these theoretical validity: the validity of the concepts 
themselves as they are applied to the phenomena, and the validity of the postulated relationships among 
the concepts.” 
In this regard, theories differ in how they are assembled to provide knowledge. In information systems 
studies, variance (quantitative studies) and process (qualitative studies) are prevalent theory-building 
methods (Burton-Jones et al. 2015). The properties of variance theories exhibit varying values (e.g., 
independent variables) to explain a research phenomenon (e.g., dependent variables) from a snapshot 
perspective at a given time. Changing the values of variance theories has immediate influence on the 
properties and relationships of the theory. To the contrary, the properties of process theories are event 
driven and sequentially constructed and influenced by focal actors (e.g., organizations) to achieve a 
specific outcome (e.g., IT adoption over time). The sequences or events have here the attributes in being 
probabilistic, which may generate multiple outcomes of the same phenomenon.  
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Figure 7. Variance, Process, and System Perspectives (Burton-Jones et al. 2015) 
However, variance and process theories may have their limitations. For instance, configuration studies 
(El Sawy et al. 2010) assert a holistic view on studying systems as phenomena. Variance and process 
theories, though, are considered to be incomplete perspectives, as systems consist as holistic and 
interacting parts and not just varying values or events.  
To overcome the shortcomings of variance and process theories, the systems theory perspective presents 
a third theory-building perspective (Burton-Jones et al. 2015). The system’s perspective propagates the 
idea that certain phenomena with interconnected and recurring attributes have to be studied from holistic 
viewpoints and thus require their own appropriate theoretical perspective (see Figure 7). Systems theories 
suggest a perspective where components and relationships are emerging, interrelated, and reciprocal, 
which in turn results in new entities with their own properties and boundaries. In so doing, the systems 
perceptive exhibits a continuum from, e.g., hard, mechanistic, and closed to soft, organic, or open. This 
dissertation adopts the system perspective, as the proposed Digital Platform Disruption Model considers 
digital platforms as holistic, interconnected, and interactive IT artifacts. For instance, the three proposed 
digital platform design elements (i.e., Business, Architecture & Technology Design) are interrelated 
digital platform design elements that occur simultaneously with varying attributes (e.g., proprietary and 
open), which again culminates in characteristic open innovation capabilities (e.g., a continuum between 
high and low). 
Research Method: Case Study 
The method of enquiry for this dissertation is an interpretative multiple case study to uncover disruptive 
potential mechanisms and design elements among digital platforms (Walsham 1995; Yin 2009). In so 
doing, my study embraces an exploratory (Theory I) and prescriptive approach (Theory V) (Gregor 
2006) by synthesizing key concepts from strategic management, digital platform, and innovation 
management literature to conceptualize  an analytical lens for identifying (1) the constituent strategic 
design elements of digital platforms, and (2) configurations that create favorable conditions for open 
innovation capabilities. It is contended that the interplay between the three design elements and their 
configurations towards open innovation capabilities may create conditions for (3) facilitating disruption. 
If successful, it is basically a potential candidate for a new standard or dominant design.  
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Specifically, I argue that disruptive digital platforms are based on strategic design element configurations 
(i.e., Business Design, Architecture Design and Technology Design). The interplay among the three 
design elements may create new differentiating value creation logics within value networks such as in 
payments industries that are atypical to established innovations offered by incumbents (banks). I deem 
the case study approach to be a suitable method of enquiry for my dissertation as it can answer “how” 
and “why” questions in complex, nebulous, and contemporary research environments, where the study 
object cannot be manipulated in its real-word context (Dubé et al. 2003; Yin 2009). As this dissertation 
attempts to provide an understanding of how digital platform owners can design their systems towards 
supportive conditions that facilitate disruption (or why not), the case study approach is considered to be 
appropriate for untangling the intertwining relationships among the three design elements and its 
configurations towards open innovation capabilities. I posit that digital platforms that design towards 
open innovation capabilities diverge compared to traditional organizations and their established 
innovations, which may result in supportive conditions that facilitate disruption. 
Data Collection: Semi-Structured Interviews & Secondary Resources 
The empirical basis for this dissertation is two sources: primary (semi-structured interviews) and 
secondary data (archival records) (see Table 4). In regards to semi-structured interviews, the interview 
questions have been derived from my proposed digital platform disruption model to understand events 
and decisions on how and why digital payment platform owners design and configure platforms from a 
strategic, architectural, and interfacing point of view. I paid close attention to how digital platforms 
create and deliver their digital services through different payment infrastructures and how access to third 
parties is granted. Semi-structured interviews have the advantage of allowing the interviewer to capture 
additional insights (e.g., publicly inaccessible data) that may enrich the study further. Specifically, I was 
interested in gleaning insights about constituent design elements of digital platforms that create 
conditions for open innovation. Semi-structured interviews have been conducted largely in the Danish 
and British payment industry. Cross-country comparisons will allow me to derive country-specific as 
well as generic patterns in how digital payment platform owners design their platforms. In terms of 
interview partners, I first contacted knowledgeable industry experts within payment organizations, 
consultancies, and associations based on their job titles and job descriptions. The interviews with 
industry experts bring the benefit of gleaning insights about the structure of payment landscapes, and the 
underlying and influencing market forces, as well as identifying key actors that enable payment services 
in the first places (e.g., payment infrastructure providers). Subsequently, I contacted leading payment 
providers within Denmark and the UK. Within these organizations, I solicited interview partners (e.g., 
senior management) who are knowledgeable with regards to platform architecture, business partners, and 
strategies. Payment entrants or challengers exhibit the attributes of growth and agility while leveraging 
  
 
41 
on new and affordable technologies that replicate the services of incumbent organizations. To 
complement my primary data collection efforts, I distilled payment reports, white papers, press releases, 
and archival records from industry associations (e.g., the European and UK Payments Council), payment 
industry online news outlets (e.g., Finextra), and news aggregators (i.e., the Paypers, Techmeme), actors, 
and identifying commercially active mobile payment services. Blog aggregators have the advantage of 
serving as a filter, as they tend to highlight influential articles (Davidson & Vaast, 2009; Eaton, Elaluf-
Calderwood, Sørensen, & Yoo, 2015). 
 
More importantly, I reconstructed national payment industries with their respective actors to understand 
the current state of how digital payments are mediated. The reconstruction provides me with initial 
insights about the logic of existing payment industries and their actors, arguably many of them currently 
presenting sustaining innovation efforts by current incumbent organizations. My interview strategy was 
to understand how digital payment platform works in practice (i.e., reconstructing narratively and 
visually payment transactions) and who are the external partners that are vital in providing the required 
resources and capabilities that ultimately enable payment services. Specially, I was interested to glean 
insights about how market competition takes place on the value creation and value delivery architecture. 
Semi-structured interviews were recorded and transcribed subsequently for coding purposes. 
 
Table 4. Primary Data Sources 
Data Points Type  
(In total 27) 
Description 
Industry Experts 
 
(In total 3) 
United Kingdom:  
 Berenberg Bank [Investment Bank]—VP Equity Analyst on Financial Technology 
(61 min),  
 Consult Hyperion [Consulting Firm]—Payment Consultant (48 min),  
 IBM [IT & Software provider]—Executive Architect for Banking Industry 
Innovation (72 min). 
Payment Service 
Providers 
 
(In total 13) 
 
United Kingdom:  
 Paym [National Mobile Payment Service]—Head of Development (65 min),  
 Barclays’ Pingit [National Mobile Payment Service]—SVP of Mobile Solutions (66 
min) 
 Zapp [National Mobile Payment Service]—CEO (44 min),  
 Droplet [Mobile payment Start-Up]—CTO (68 min),  
 FirstRemit [Remittance Start-up]—CEO (113 min),  
 HSBC [British Multinational Bank]—Global Head of Digital Payments (85 min),  
 Google Wallet [Mobile Wallet Service]—Head of Payments (41 min),  
 American Express [Credit Card Firm]—Mobile Product Innovation & Strategy (113 
min),  
 Santander: [Multinational Bank]—Innovation Analyst (210 min). 
Denmark:  
 AltaPay [Payment Gateway]—CTO (80 min),  
 Beeptify [Payment Start-Up]—CFO (56 min),  
 Mobile Pay [National Mobile Payment Solution]—Head of Mobile Payment (88 
  
 
42 
min),  
 Saxo Payments [Global Payment Provider]—CEO (74 min). 
Payment 
Infrastructure 
providers 
 
(In total 7) 
 
United Kingdom:  
 Currency Cloud [Payment provider]—Forex Business Solutions (86 min),  
 Payments Council [Payment Industry Body]—Head of Innovation (64 min),  
 Vocalink [National Payment Infrastructure Provider]—Strategy Lead (125 min),  
 WorldPay [Merchant Acquirer]—Director Technology Innovation (45 min). 
Denmark:  
 Danish National Bank [Central Bank]—Head of Payments (76 min),  
 NETS [National Payment Infrastructure Provider]—Head of Corporate Strategy (84 
min). 
 Unwire: payment technology provider - VP Strategy (67 min). 
Cryptocurrency 
Providers 
(In total 4) 
 
 
United Kingdom:  
 CryptoPay [Bitcoin Payment Processor]—CEO (112 min), 
 CEX.io [Bitcoin Exchange]—CEO (45 min),  
 Blockchain.info [Bitcoin Wallet & Analytics Provider]—CEO (82 min). 
Denmark:  
 Sirious Money [Bitcoin ATM Provider]—CEO (88 min). 
Data Analysis: Theoretical Thematic Analysis 
Thematic analysis has been applied in this article based dissertation (Boyatzis 1998; Braun et al. 2006). 
Specifically, I applied theoretical thematic analysis (Braun et al. 2006). Compared to inductive thematic 
analysis, where the analysis process is data driven (i.e., bottom up approach), the theoretical thematic 
analysis process has a deductive approach (i.e., top-down approach), which is guided by concepts or 
theory. To begin with, the interviews of the studied case companies have been transcribed and imported 
to Nvivo 10, a qualitative analysis software program that allows one to collect and categorize data in a 
structured way. Coding categories and themes were predetermined by the proposed digital platform 
disruption model. In this sense, my proposed model served as a theoretical guide during the analysis 
process (see Table 5). 
Table 5. Coding Examples from Data Analysis 
 Exemplary Quote Synthesis  
B
u
si
n
es
s 
D
es
ig
n
 
“[…] I can't remember the number, and we have about 14 million consumers 
that we provide current account services and the likes to and we have an 
additional six million on top of that that we probably provide credit card 
services to. So it's a fairly significant organization here in the UK.  For us, 
innovation is a major element of our strategy.” 
Analyzer Business Design Profile: 
Platform strategy profile that 
emphasizes control as a market 
incumbent, while at the same time 
allowing moderated flexibility in its 
operations. 
A
rc
h
it
ec
tu
re
 
D
es
ig
n
 
“So the consumer side, we provide the app that runs on the different 
smartphone platforms or tablets.” 
“In terms of the support that we provide for Pingit for consumers, we're 
running on certainly iOS, on Android, on Blackberry or—and Microsoft 
now as well.” 
Hybrid Architecture Design Profile: 
Platform architecture profile that 
shares certain layers with third parties, 
while guarding the most valuable ones 
for control. 
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[…] it will be a lot of rigor around analyzing what those API's and what 
information they have access to […]  
[…] It has to be, of course, then commercially relevant to be disclosing any 
API's to that party… […] 
Compatibility Technology Design 
Profile: 
Platforms offer boundary resources 
that allow controlled interfirm 
modularity and open innovation. 
Findings on Strategic Digital Platform Design Elements 
To date, this article-based dissertation is based on nine published papers to build the digital platform 
disruption model (see Figure 8). 
 
 
Figure 8. Publications 
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Figure 9. Publication and Model 
 
Figure 9 illustrates the relevance of each paper for each design element. The studied digital platform 
cases exhibit characteristic interrelated platform design elements (1) Business Design, (2) Architecture 
Design, and (3) Technology Design. Based on observable long-term management decisions, digital 
platforms provide insights about their strategic postures (i.e., Business Design), the way platform layers 
are outsourced or protected (i.e., Architecture Design), and how interfirm modularity is established (i.e., 
Technology Design). Figure 9 illustrates  my nine publications, which culminate into: 
First Study: CAIS 
In this study, we performed a multiple and comparative-case study among eight mobile payment 
platforms (i.e., banks, retailers, mobile network operators, and startups), which either protect or enter the 
payment market. Market entry is a strategic and costly long-term decision, reflecting management’s 
attitude towards risk taking, where entries to platform markets are particularly challenging to enter 
(Eisenmann et al. 2011). Accordingly, market entry is a suitable event to analyze the strategic posture 
(i.e., Business Design) of digital platforms.  
The findings suggest that platform owners exhibit two types of market entry modes; first, an aggressive 
market entry mode that attempts to challenge the existing business and technology logic in payments 
(e.g., mobile network operators and startups), thus presenting innovation attempts that aim to replace 
established innovations. Secondly, a conservative market entry that introduces gradual improvements 
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into payments, which leverages on existing technologies in an evolutionary way (i.e., retailers), thus 
having the properties of causing less friction, as the switching costs are lower compared to new 
incompatible new payment instruments.  
For instance, mobile network operators (i.e., MNO) launched proprietary mobile payment services that 
were advanced in their technical features (proprietary mobile phones with), which could host 
selective/permissioned contactless services, after third parties entered into formal contractual agreements. 
In this setup, MNOs did not publicly disclose access points, which suggest opaque conditions for 
practicing interfirm modularity with third parties. Startups, on the other hand, offered documented and 
moderated access points and tools towards third parties. MNOs and startups followed a risky market 
entry strategy into the mobile payment market, as their mobile payment instruments were largely 
incompatible with the existing payment card-based infrastructure (e.g., payment terminals). Moreover, it 
presents an effort to disintermeditate the payment instruments offered by incumbents (e.g., plastic 
payment card). MNOs, however, faced resistance, as most businesses were not willing to replace existing 
payment terminals just to offer contactless payments. Secondly, payment incumbents like banks were not 
keen to have a new additional intermediary between payer and payees, which would weaken payment 
data collection efforts and the sustainability of customer relationships. To the contrary, mobile payment 
solutions offered by retailers were causing less friction from a technology viewpoint, especially on the 
merchant side. Retailers leveraged on existing payment terminals (i.e., payee) and mobile phones (i.e., 
payers) for conducting payments, which were simply updated with new software to display or read 
barcodes. In so doing, retailers were more careful and considerate in their service roll-out. Banks, on the 
other hand, were favoring contactless cards that were meant to continue to sustain the existing business 
logic and technology standard for doing payments (e.g., plastic payment cards, ATMS). 
Business Design Findings  
If I synthesize the aforementioned observations from a Business Design viewpoint, I identify the traits of 
Defender Prospector, and Analyzer. MNOs and startups exhibit the attributes of the Prospector 
Business Design profile by pursuing a risky and aggressive market entry strategy that attempted to 
replace the existing business and technology logic of payment incumbents. Startups and MNOs, both 
fairly novices in payments, accept high risk by deliberately reconfiguring predominant payment value 
streams to their advantage. They do this by forcefully creating new user relationships by equipping 
payers and payees with new payments instruments. The retailers, on the other hand, showcase the 
attributes of an Analyzer Business Design profile by carefully entering the payment market with fewer 
frictions for the existing payment infrastructure. Lastly, banks as the incumbents of payments typically 
portray the Defender Business Design by protecting their market against new entrants. Market protection 
occurred in the form of sustaining innovation (Christensen et al. 1996) by issuing payment instruments 
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that sustains their existing payment logic. In this context, payment cards were gradually improved with 
contactless payment features that promise a faster checkout times. 
Architecture Design Findings  
From an Architecture Design viewpoint, mobile payment solution showcased either a Centralized or 
Hybrid Architecture Design profile. Looking at the bank’s Architecture Design profile (i.e., Defender), 
all layers are proprietary, which allows the Defender to exercise monopolistic power over its digital 
platform in how payments are processed and delivered. In this sense, a Centralized Architecture Design 
profile assists the Defender in achieving its Business Design attributes (e.g., exploitation, efficiency, high 
volume) in doing one task very well: payments. Looking at MNOs, retailers, and startups, they exhibit a 
Hybrid Architecture Design profile. The service layers are shared by all three actors, while the device 
and content layers were largely proprietary. At the time of writing, the device layer among MNOs and 
startups was especially proprietary as they issued their own new payment instruments that offered a 
better proposed value proposition (e.g., mobile and contactless), whereas the retailers were more 
practical by using standard retail payment terminals, hence primarily controlling the service and content 
layers to offer their mobile payment services. 
Technology Design Findings  
From a Technology Design viewpoint, the banks (i.e., Defender) and MNOs (i.e., Prospector) present a 
Proprietary Technology Design profile, which treats interfirm modularity with third parties closed or 
opaque fashion, as they are not disclosed to the public. In this sense, increasing barriers and transaction 
costs for exchange components or open innovation. The retailers and startups, on the other hand, exhibit 
a Compatibility Technology Design profile, which invites third parties to use their service layers by 
offering APIs or publicly available documentation to integrate their payment services into third-party 
systems. As third parties access these services, they are, however, limited in their functionalities and use 
cases to fulfill legal and technical requirements, as the payment industry is highly regulated. 
Second Study: JTAER  
In the JTAER study, we contrasted two mobile payment platforms (i.e., Pingit and Paym) (see Table 6). 
Both platforms are market leaders in terms of brand recognition, user base, and the stakeholders behind 
these services. Pingit, which is operated by UK’s largest bank, Barclays, is to a large degree an internally 
developed service (i.e., user experience and software development) to extend Barclays’ portfolio and to 
preemptively occupy the growing mobile payment market segment to maintain and establish new user 
relationships. Barclays was considerably successful with Pingit’s rollout, and its (bank) competitors were 
pressured into launching a rival solution (i.e., Paym) to avoid future relationship disintermediation. Paym 
is a collaborative industry solution, where multiple financial institutions and technology providers 
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conjointly developed the service. Compared to Pingit, Paym is arguably less agile regarding strategic 
decisions such as innovation rollouts, as several stakeholders need to agree and to be considered with 
their idiosyncratic needs. 
The findings indicate that Pingit achieves its competitive advantage by creating monopolistic structures 
in its platform architecture by developing and controlling the most important platform layers to its 
advantage to ensure optimal value creation opportunities (i.e., content, network layer and service layer). 
With its highly integrated and superior mobile payment service, which works as a standalone application, 
Pingit has the ability to attract and choose a network of select third parties (i.e., proprietary API access), 
which helps to grow Pingit further. The industry consortium solution (i.e., Paym), on the other hand, is 
less advanced at the time of writing. Because of being a more fragmented service (Paym is a payment 
feature in mobile banking apps, not a standalone application), each financial institution had its own 
strategy and responsibility in how Paym was offered towards end users. This ultimately undermines the 
ability to offer a unified mobile payment service, such as obstructing to deliver a standardized user 
experience or impeding to offer APIs across all financial institutions. In other words, Paym does not have 
its own standalone application. 
Business Design Findings  
If we consider both digital platforms from a Business Design theoretical perspective, both platforms 
portray an Analyzer Business Design profile. Pingit and Paym are carefully launched payment 
innovations (i.e., mobile payment), which complement the core businesses (i.e., banking) and products 
(i.e., payment in general) of their respective owners. Banks, in this context, have carefully studied the 
startups, as they have managed to identify and create a new sustainable market (segment) within the 
payment industry. Accordingly, as the Analyzer Business Design profile prescribed, they acted as (fast) 
second movers in the mobile payment market. 
Architecture Design Findings  
In this study, I observe Hybrid Architecture Design profiles. Both mobile payment platforms leverage 
on consumer devices (i.e., device and system layers) to offer their payment services, as they cannot not 
exercise control mobile phone vendors (e.g., Apple)—in this sense, treating the device and system layers 
as commodity or distribution channels to achieve ubiquity for their mobile payment services. In regards 
to the remaining layers (i.e., network, service, and content), both mobile payment services have indeed 
monopolistic power with varying degrees. For instance, the network layer is owned and shared among 
payment incumbents (i.e., banks), whereas the service layer is not available for third parties (i.e., Paym) 
or opaque (i.e., Pingit), where few selective third parties are granted with non-publically available APIs. 
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Technology Design Findings  
Both mobile payment platforms have a Proprietary Technology Design profile. Third parties engaging 
in interfirm modularity is not possible, as observed with Paym, which does not offer any boundary 
resources (e.g., APIs) to exchange components at the service layer. Alternatively, boundary resources 
exist, but they are not disclosed to the public (i.e., Pingit), as access is granted through selective 
invitations to suitable third parties. In the latter case, it arguably reduces proactiveness among third 
parties, as they cannot assess the infirm modularity conditions due to intransparency. 
Table 6.  Comparative Cross-Platform Analysis (JTAER) 
Platform Layers Paym Pingit Competitive Principles within Layers 
Content Layer 
(Value Layer) 
Protected  
Paym adopts a guarded content 
layer approach by preserving 
existing data collection rights for 
each financial institution within 
heterogeneous mobile banking 
applications 
Protected & Absorptive 
Pingit, like Paym, adopts a guarded 
content strategy that does not share the 
payment data of Pingit users with third 
parties.  The Pingit app, though, is 
inclusive, serving non-Barclays 
customers as well and creating data-
collection opportunities. 
Guarded vs. Infiltrative 
Both mobile payment platforms showcase 
protective behavior on their content layer 
as payment data serves as a valuable 
industry resource to create value. By 
releasing a dedicated mobile payment 
application, Pingit performs a Trojan 
horse strategy that collects customer and 
payment data from rival institutions. 
Service Layer 
(Value Layer) 
Federated and Isolative  
Paym is a federated mobile 
payment platform that attempts to 
augment the individual resources 
of various financial institutions. In 
so doing, it preserves existing 
market structures and payment by 
being a mobile payment feature 
within existing mobile banking 
applications. 
Monopolistic and Breaching 
Like Paym, Pingit has a protective 
service layer approach, moderating and 
shielding its platform from third parties. 
Access is granted if these services 
enhance the value proposition of Pingit. 
Lastly, Barclays uses the Pingit app as a 
mean enter in to the territory of rivals to 
build customer relationships with non-
Barclays customers. 
Orchestration vs. Germination  
Paym has on its service layer the strategy 
to offer a competitive industry consortium 
driven mobile payment application that 
solidifies existing market structures and 
data sovereignties. Barclays has the 
strategy nurture its own Pingit ecosystem 
but leverages on Pingit as a Trojan horse 
to challenge rivals on their content layer. 
Network Layer 
(Commodity 
Layer) 
Inclusive  
Both mobile payment platforms have non-discriminatory access to the Faster 
Payment or Link payment network to clear mobile payments. Thus, not 
presenting a competitive advantage between these two mobile services. 
Accessibility 
Network layer for both payment services 
shares the traits of a commodity layer due 
to the inability to create access constrains.  
System Layer 
(Commodity 
Layer) 
Availability  
Both mobile payment platforms leverage on widely available and 
standardized mobile operating systems. Competiveness may occur by 
developing the mobile payment application that makes the best use of the 
system resources to ensure best application experience. 
Interoperability 
System layer shares the attributes of a 
commodity layer, as the control and 
governance are not the realm of financial 
institutions but rather controlled by the 
smartphone vendor.  
Device Layer 
(Commodity 
Layer) 
Affordability  
Both mobile payment platforms leverage on standardized smartphones in 
delivering their mobile payment services to end customers. 
Ubiquity 
Device layer has the attributes of a 
commodity layer, as the mobile phone as 
a new payment instrument is now owned 
by end user and designed by the 
smartphone vendor. 
Competitive 
Principle across 
Platform Layers 
Value Layers: Content and Service  
Both mobile payment platforms treat the content and service layer as value 
layers, as they serve as industry specific resource to create and capture value. 
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Commodity Layers: Network, System and Device. 
Contrary to the content and service layers, the remaining layers serve merely 
as a means to deliver the mobile payment service to the market.  
Third Study: ICMB  
In this study, I compared two mobile payment services: Apple Pay and Google Wallet (now Google Pay). 
The paper has the research goal to contrast two different mobile payment platforms in regards to their 
open innovation capabilities. Specifically, the aim is to understand third-party integrations into digital 
platforms as well as the generic principles of how innovations (e.g. applications) are commercialized. 
Apple Pay and Google Wallet are distinct mobile payment platforms, as their corresponding owners (i.e., 
Apple and Google) have different technology philosophies on how value is created. Apple is known for 
its proprietary nature and exercises control over its highly integrated systems such as Apple Pay. In this 
sense, Apple exercises its house rules in being selective towards third-party developers in these third 
parties interact with Apple’s products and services. Google, on the other hand, is known for its open 
approach (Android is open-source), which gives more leeway to third parties in how third-party 
developers make use of Google products and services to expand its service research (e.g., Google 
search). The findings suggest that the studied mobile payment services make use of strategic boundary 
resources to become either highly (1) integrative or (2) integratable. Integrative platforms like Apple Pay 
propagate the idea of channeling and anchoring (open) innovation (e.g., third-party apps) into Apple’s 
ecosystem to enhance its products and services with selective third parties. In this scenario, Apple 
absorbs selective innovations from its business network and has the strategy of enforcing a selective 
commercialization. Integratable platforms like Google Wallet, on the other hand, have the strategy to 
distribute their digital platform—in this case, the service layer—into as many third-party systems as 
possible. Accordingly, Google Wallet practices inclusive innovations with its business network and has a 
strategy of indiscriminate commercialization with its third parties (see Table 7). 
Table 7. Findings from Solo Article Published in ICMB Proceedings 
Apple Pay Google Wallet 
Open Innovation: Integrative  
Apple Pay makes use of SDKs and APIs to be highly 
integrative into Apple’s platform (i.e., device and service 
layer). 
Commercialization: Selective 
Apple Pay performs with its integrative approach on open 
innovation an exclusion strategy to access value. 
Open Innovation: Integratable 
Google Wallet makes used of SDKs and APIs to be highly 
integratable into various external third-party systems. 
Commercialization: Inclusive 
Google performs with its integratable approach on open innovation 
an inclusion strategy to access value. 
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Business Design Findings 
On the first glance, Apple and Google, known for having different technology strategies (i.e., closed and 
proprietary) would suggest similar Business Design profiles for their mobile payment platforms as well. 
But surprisingly, Apple Pay and Google Wallet exhibit the same Business Design profile: an Analyzer 
Business Design profile. Both services complement core products (e.g., iPhone) or services (e.g., Google 
search) of their respective owners. Nevertheless, the payment context sets boundaries for both services as 
to how flexible and explorative they can offer their payment services, which obstructs to achieve a 
Prospector Business Design profile. Specifically, payment is largely controlled by credit card networks 
(i.e., MasterCard, Visa), which have stringent rules how their services and networks are used. Clearly 
limiting mobile payment services like Apple Pay and Google Wallet in being flexible and explorative, as 
the Prospector Business Design profile prescribes. 
Architecture Design Findings 
Both mobile payment platforms exhibit Hybrid Architecture Design profiles with varying degrees, 
where Apple Pay, however, tends towards having a Centralized Architecture Design profile. If we 
consider Apple Pay layers, the service layer is the only avenue that is shared with third parties in a highly 
controlled fashion (see Technology Design findings section), whereas the remaining layers are entirely 
controlled by its owner Apple. To the contrary, Google Wallet limits its control over its service and 
content layers, whereas the remaining layers are either owned by third-party mobile vendors (i.e., device 
layer), open-source (e.g., system layer), or controlled by credit card firms (i.e., network layer). 
Technology Design Findings  
Both mobile payment services exhibit the Compatibility Technology Design profile. Apple Pay and 
Google Wallet issue APIs and SDKs for third parties to integrate payment functionalities into their own 
applications. A Compatibility Technology Design profile is suggested, because both mobile payment 
services restrict third parties in how their services are used to fulfill legal or technical requirements 
demanded by credit card networks. In this case, limiting the conditions to achieve an Agnosticism 
Technology Design profile, which prescribes that third parties can create unpredictable or uncontrolled 
applications, which, however, contradicts with credit card networks’ use requirements. 
Fourth Study: JMIS 
In this fourth and last study, the study JMIS working paper contrasts six traditional and new payment 
providers in regards to their architectural setup and discusses how platform architecture results in 
competitive advantages. Although all studied services offer similar services, which is the secure 
movement of value (i.e., payment), the findings reveal that the six cases differ significantly in how they 
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create and deliver payments, which provide cues about their competitiveness. To be specific, new 
payment services exploit differentiating configurations that are atypical to established payment services; 
however, they have similar value propositions as to established ones. Changing the interworking of 
services shares the notion of architectural innovation (Henderson et al. 1990). As previously discussed in 
the theory section, architectural innovation maintains product and service value propositions (e.g., 
payment) while it alters their blueprint and composition, which may in turn dilute the knowledge base of 
established organizations. Put it differently, the same value output based on a different configuration 
base, which echoes with the findings of Pagani (2013), stating that “the ability to coordinate among the 
modules will become the most valuable business skill” to achieve competitive advantages. 
In the payment context, digital payment platforms would practice process innovation to deliver payments 
in a cost-effective manner. At the end, these differentiating value configurations broadly adopted may 
create conditions to disrupt predominant creation and capture logics. In regards to the theoretical footing, 
the JMIS study combined strategic groups (Hunt 1972; Porter 1980) and layered modular architecture 
(Yoo et al. 2010) theories to identify and classify payment platform in the UK payment market. In 
general, strategic groups can be perceived as a collection of firms that compete with one another within 
the same market environment while exhibiting similar strategies and possessing comparable industry-
specific resources (e.g., architecture/technology design attributes, configurations), which is useful for 
firm classification purposes. For this study, we selected six different mobile payment platforms in the 
UK market. In so doing, the study derives six characteristic profiles that are grounded on two strategic 
dimensions of (1) digital platforms (i.e., focus on the service layer) and (2) digital infrastructures (i.e., 
focus on the network layer). Digital platforms are innovation hubs, where value (i.e., payments) is 
created, and the latter relies on digital infrastructures to deliver value to their respective platform 
stakeholders. Similar to my ICMB study, the study discovered that mobile payment platforms can be 
described as (1) integrative, or integratable digital platforms, and (2) having direct, indirect, or open 
access to digital infrastructures to deliver their payment services (see Figure 9). Integrative digital 
platforms have the tendency to be single entities that have the assets and methods to exercise 
monopolistic power over their services and can decide whether or not access to third parties is disclosed 
(opaque or documented), whereas integratable digital platforms in this study achieve competitiveness by 
inviting similar partners (e.g., banks) to compensate shortcomings. Based on these attributes, we 
identified three generic competitive platform strategies: (1) germination, (2) orchestration, or a (3) 
transformation strategy. The germination strategy by a mobile payment platform aims to grow isolated 
and private networks by capturing value without third parties. In this sense, possessing the assets and 
methods to operate a self-sufficient service with no third parties, which in turn promises higher value 
capture possibilities. Orchestration strategy relies on third parties (e.g., joint venture) at the platform 
level to orchestrate a unified mobile payment service based on different platform stakeholders. Lastly, 
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mobile payment platforms with a transformation strategy practice process innovation to deliver payment 
or value through open digital infrastructures (i.e., Bitcoin blockchain). Mobile payment platforms with 
open access achieve their competitiveness by leveraging on new and emerging digital infrastructures that 
imitate direct access rights—but in a permissionless manner. In this study, the Bitcoin blockchain vies 
with legacy digital infrastructures (i.e., Faster Payments Network) to deliver payments in an unobstructed 
fashion. If payment industries are tipping towards digital infrastructures based on blockchain logic, it 
presents architectural innovation that reconfigures payment services at the network layer of a digital 
platform (Henderson et al. 1990; Pagani 2013). 
 
Figure 10.  Findings from Published Article in Journal of Management Information Systems (JMIS) 
Business Design Findings 
This study exhibits Analyzer and Prospector Business Design profiles. Banks (i.e., Pingit, Paym) 
showcase the Analyzer Business Design profile, as both mobile payment platforms aim to complement 
and strengthen their existing core services (i.e., banking, payment) while maintaining/increasing the 
customer base with new innovations. Banks have entered the mobile payment market as fast second 
movers, after carefully studying mobile payment startups. In regards to startups, they fulfill the criteria of 
a Prospector Business Design profile (i.e., explorative and risk takers). Startups in this study are peculiar, 
as I observe two types of startups: startups that leverage on legacy payment infrastructures (e.g., Faster 
Payments) while imitating the service offered by banks while using simpler means (e.g., cloud 
computing) at the platform level and startups that leverage on new payment infrastructures (i.e., Bitcoin 
Blockchain), which achieve similar service attributes (e.g., efficient payments)—new payment 
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infrastructures are not established compared to legacy ones. In this light, startups deviate from 
established innovations by exploring alternative or untested means (cloud computing, or blockchain) in 
the hope that it may result in competitive advantages that match incumbent ones.  
Architecture Design Findings 
As the abovementioned observations illustrate, mobile payment platforms in this study display largely a 
Hybrid Architecture Design profile. All mobile payment platforms leverage consumer devices (i.e., 
device & system layers), which reduce the value creation and capture opportunities on (1) network, (2) 
service, and (3) content layers. Mobile payment platforms using legacy payment infrastructures (i.e., 
network layers) protect their content layers against third parties as payment data is utilized to derive 
business value. In regards to service layers, they are opaquely treated (i.e., Pingit) or basically not 
available (i.e., Paym) to third parties. As mobile payment startups leveraging on new payment 
infrastructures, the platform layer dynamics are different. Organizations using the Bitcoin blockchain as 
their payment infrastructure to deliver payments cannot impose strategic resource constraints, as the 
network and content layers are open. Accordingly, the competitive ground is located on the service layer, 
where (Bitcoin) startups invite third parties to expand their platform reach (e.g., blockchain.info) or don't 
have a third-party developer program at all (e.g., Circle), as they are adequately equipped with assets and 
methods to operate isolative service. 
Technology Design Findings  
In regards to boundary resources to facilitate component exchanges between third parties, I observe 
Proprietary and Agnosticism Technology Design profiles. Among all mobile payment platforms, which 
use legacy payment infrastructures, they do not promote third-party developer programs as known by 
Google or Apple, because access points do not exist (e.g.., Paym) or are not disclosed (Pingit) to the 
public as they are based on selective invitations—in this sense, reducing collaboration opportunities in a 
significant manner. An Agnosticism Technology Design profile was observed by one mobile payment 
platform: blockchain.info. The Bitcoin startups operate in an open financial network and provides 
unrestricted boundary resources in the form of unmoderated APIs for creating Bitcoin wallets or 
accessing blockchain data. In so doing, blockchain.info cannot anticipate which services third parties will 
create. 
Open Innovation 
To answer my SRQ2, digital platforms strategically open up platforms to mobilize third parties to 
complement platforms in areas such as service reach and innovation (Kazan et al. 2014b). In so doing, 
digital platforms with Compatibility and Agnosticism Technology Design profiles are favorable design 
elements to obtain open innovation. Secondly, digital platforms apply two modes of open innovation 
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integrations: (1) integrative and (2) integratable. Lastly, the studied digital platforms practice open 
innovation exploitation (i.e., commercialization) in a (1) selective or (2) inclusive fashion. 
Obtaining Open Innovation 
Apparent form the abovementioned studies, digital payment platforms with a Proprietary Technology 
Design profile (e.g., Pingit, Paym) do not have the priority to obtain open innovation from third parties, 
as they have the assets and methods to develop their own isolative services. Although Pingit indeed has 
boundary resources (e.g., APIs), they are not advertised to the public compared to Apply Pay. Thus, 
acting opaque to third-party developers, which reduces open innovation efforts in a significant manner. 
In this context, circumventing or reducing interfirm modularity with third parties has the benefit of 
higher control over value creation and capture streams. On the contrary, digital payment platforms with a 
Compatibility and Agnosticism Technology Design (e.g., Apple Pay or Blockchain.info, do indeed 
actively seek out third parties to obtain open innovations, which is manifested in the form of having 
active developer programs and providing documentations to facilitate favorable collaborations condition. 
Integrating and Exploiting Open Innovation 
Integrative Open Innovation & Selective Commercialization.  
Digital platforms that are rich in their assets and methods (e.g., Apple, Pingit) can exercise higher control 
over their layers and architecture overall. Hence, they have the choice to be more independent or to be 
more selective with third parties, which suggests a more verticalized architecture setup (e.g., 
Hybrid/Centralized Architecture Design). To put it differently, these platforms exhibit an integrative 
open innovation approach that positions their digital platforms first and at the center of the value creation 
process. By positioning themselves in the center of value creation, integrative platforms have the ability 
to dictate the conditions, which value layers are shared, and which third parties are invited for 
commercialization opportunities. If we take Apple Pay as an example, Apple exercises monopolistic 
power over its NFC chips that are embedded on Apple’s device layers, such as iPhone or Apple Watch. 
To obtain NFC chip access, usually reserved for large commercial entities such as banks, third parties 
have to enter into contractual negotiations as NFC access is opaque towards external actors. In this way, 
Apple demonstrates a highly selective procedure towards potential business and innovation partners to 
co-create and capture value. On the service layer, though, Apple is more accommodative to third parties. 
Apple provides third-party documented boundary resources, which grants access to Apply Pay functions 
(i.e., Touch ID), excluding NFC access. After an internal and automated review process, third-party 
applications with built-in Apple Pay functionality are hosted on Apple’s App Store, which functions only 
on Apple devices. Considering Apple’s open innovation and commercialization efforts on its payment 
device and service layers, Apple practices selective commercialization with its business partners, whereas 
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open innovation efforts are largely anchored within Apple’s platform boundaries, which absorb and 
integrate external innovation streams within Apple Pay. 
Integratable Open Innovation & Inclusive Commercialization.  
For digital platforms that do not have needed resources at their disposal, they have to engage with third 
parties to achieve comparable service reach and innovation outputs. In this case, it suggests an 
integratable approach towards open innovation, where a digital platform has to be proactive and 
distribute platform layers among many suitable third parties to establish an interorganizational platform 
(e.g., Google). As this type of open innovation depends more on third-party collaborations, it depicts an 
inclusive approach towards commercialization efforts, where value capture is shared and circulated 
within and beyond platform boundaries. To exemplify, Google Wallet has a reversed approach towards 
integrating and commercializing open innovation. With Google’s HCE solutions, which store and 
administer payment-sensitive data in the cloud, Google has basically opened up the device layer to any 
third party, which allows the operation of Google’s payment service on any NFC Android device. On 
Google Wallet’s service layer, Google offered like Apple boundary resources (i.e., SDK and API) to 
integrate Google’s payment service into various third-party apps. However, Google’s payment service 
exceeds Apple Pay by being highly integratable into various external systems such as email, mobile, and 
desktop webpages, which give third parties the freedom to install Google’s mobile payment service on 
various external systems without major interferences from Google’s side. Regarding open innovation 
integration, Google designed its payment systems in a way to be highly integratable into external 
systems, spreading Google Wallet beyond platform boundaries with the help of external systems. 
Considering Google’s open innovation commercialization efforts on its payment device and service 
layers, Google practices an inclusive commercialization strategy with its business partners, which 
includes even rival payment services.  
Discussion 
The findings from this dissertation support the proposed three digital platform design elements for digital 
platforms for achieving supportive conditions for facilitating disruption. Specifically, the proposed three 
interrelated design elements share the attributes of being strategic (i.e., business design), tactical (i.e., 
architecture design), and operational (i.e., technology design) in how digital platforms operate within 
competitive business environments. Conjointly considered, these three design elements and their 
resulting configurations culminate in new and differentiating value creations logics that are atypical to 
incumbent digital (payment) platforms. Having a supply perceptive on digital platforms, this dissertation 
offers in the following evidence of the applicability of my proposed Digital Platform Disruption Model, 
which illustrates design principles (cf. Hevner et al. 2004) in how digital platforms can be designed and 
configured towards supportive conditions that facilitate disruption. 
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Business Design Element 
Digital platforms with an Analyzer & Prospector Business Design have the conditions and readiness to 
support market-changing dynamics in their strategic posture (e.g., see JMIS study). Both Business 
Design profiles embrace new business endeavors, either in a conservative and ambidextrous fashion that 
balances exploitative and explorative business opportunities (i.e., Analyzer) or in a more aggressive 
fashion (i.e., Prospector) that emphasizes exploration and the acceptance of high risk. For instance, 
Prospectors feel comfortable in causing introducing technology compatibilities and frictions (e.g., see 
telcos in the CAIS study) that challenge the business logic of existing business environments. To 
illustrate (see JMIS study), blockchain startups leverage on alternative component innovations on their 
network layer (i.e., bitcoin network) to move value between payer and payee. In this setup, no 
established innovations (e.g., payment infrastructures by incumbents) are used. If this type of 
(component) innovation gains popularity, it could potentially challenge and disrupt incumbents and their 
existing network layers (i.e., legacy payment infrastructures).  
This is in alignment with the disruptive innovation literature (Christensen et al. 1996) that suggests that 
organizations leveraging on niche and unproven technologies (e.g., the use of open blockchain networks) 
create initially inferior services compared to established ones, thus not matching the value proposition of 
established innovations offered by incumbent ones. However, these inferior innovations improve and 
exceed established innovations over time, thus having supportive conditions for facilitating disruption. 
Those that get disrupted are usually Defenders (e.g., banks). Defender digital platforms (e.g., see CAIS 
study) pursue the strategy of maintaining the status quo to exploit existing knowledge, assets, and 
methods (e.g., contactless payment cards) to defend the current business logic in how value is created 
(e.g., using existing payment infrastructures and bank ATMs). In this line, a Defender follows the path of 
established innovations to exploit and refine its existing assets and methods to offer a standardized high 
quality and volume service, which is (retail) payments (Christensen et al. 1996).  
I therefore propose that Analyzer and Prospector Business Design profiles are suitable digital platform 
design elements that facilitate disruption. 
Architecture Design Element 
As the Analyzer and Prospector Business Design Profiles propagate strategic readiness for disruption, 
their profiles suggest adequate equipment with regards to strategic resources and dynamic capabilities to 
pursue new business endeavors (Teece et al. 1997). Strategic resources and dynamic capabilities, 
however, are theoretical concepts that have their roots in value chain economies. If we translate these 
concepts into network economies, network promoting organizations, such as digital platforms, achieve 
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their competitiveness through strategic modularity (Pagani 2013), which are superior configurations of 
digital components across platform layers.  
In so doing, it impacts the overall platform architecture structure in being either vertical (i.e., Centralized 
Architecture Design) or to a platform structure leaning towards being more horizontal (e.g., Hybrid or 
Distributed Architecture Design). As the JMIS and CAIS studies suggest, digital platforms with an 
Analyzer (e.g., retailer) or Prospector (e.g., Blockchain.info) Business Design profile are inherently 
willing use different digital components for their platform layers compared to Defenders (i.e., banks). To 
be specific, the Analyzer and Prospectors are willing to share or outsource platform layers by either 
using alternative and unproven components at their network layers (e.g., bitcoin blockchain) or using 
different but ubiquitously available components at the device layer, such as mobile phones owned by end 
users, to achieve a competitive edge (see JTAER study). At the time of writing, payment cards were the 
dominant payment instrument within Europe, where payments with mobile phones were uncommon (see 
CAIS study). Accordingly, if we contrast Architecture Design and Business Design Profiles, Analyzers 
and Prospectors exhibit both a Hybrid Architecture Design profile with varying degrees towards leaning 
centralization to control more value layers (i.e., the Analyzer) or leaning towards being more distributed 
to share value layers with third parties to a greater extent (i.e., the Prospector).  
In regards to open innovation, which is the exchange or providing access to platform layers with third 
parties, a Hybrid Design Architecture Design suggests a minimum condition to support open innovation 
capabilities. The quantity, quality, and freedom of open innovation are again shaped by Technology 
Design Profiles, which determines the level of freedom in how third parties access or integrate platform 
layers. A Distributed Architecture Design profile has not been observed, as this would indicate a digital 
payment platform without an owner, who could exercise governance on platform layers. Moreover, 
payment as my empirical context of my study requires control by the platform owner to enforce legal 
requirements (e.g., laws to avoid anti-money laundering). Nevertheless, digital platforms in open 
blockchain economies have the technical conditions to exhibit a Distributed Architecture Design profile 
(e.g., autonomous organizations) not observed in my studies. 
I therefore propose that a Hybrid Architecture Design profile is a suitable and minimum design element 
for digital platforms that facilitates disruption. 
Technology Design Element 
As the Analyzer and Prospector both exhibit a Hybrid Architectures Design profile, Technology Design 
determines how platform layers are accessed or distributed among third parties, which is done either in 
an integrative or integratable fashion (see JMIS or ICMB studies). The studied Analyzers' (e.g., Apple) 
and Prospectors’ (e.g., Blockchain.info) platforms practice interfirm modularity for layers that expand 
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their platform reach and growth, while guarding the most precious ones for themselves to maintain 
control. For instance, Prospectors platforms are generous with their service layers, by being integratable 
into heterogeneous external systems (e.g., Google Wallet). As these external systems are controlled by 
third parties, it would usually create conditions for generativity, which usually leads to unknown or 
unpredictable innovations (Zittrain 2006). But the payment context requires stricter control on third-party 
innovations.  
In legacy payment networks, unknown or unpredictable innovations are less likely to occur due to strict 
regulations imposed on payment platforms by credit card firms (e.g., Visa), which leave little room for 
digital platforms to allow unpredictable innovations by third parties (e.g., services that are against the 
law). Unpredictable or undesired innovations could result in penalties for the platform owner or, more 
severely, the revocation of access rights to legacy payment infrastructures. In this sense, exercising 
control over third-party innovations suggests a Compatibility Technology Design profile for Analyzer and 
Prospector platforms that operate in legacy payment networks. Though to illustrate an Agnosticism 
Technology Design profile, which supports unpredictable innovations by third parties, Agnosticism 
Technology Design has been observed by Prospectors (i.e., Blockchain.info). However, an Agnosticism 
Technology Design profile has been identified by Prospectors that operate in an open and unregulated 
payment network (e.g., Bitcoin), which grants third parties the freedom to create unpredictable 
innovations. 
I therefore propose that Agnosticism and Compatibility Technology Design profiles are suitable design 
elements for digital platforms that facilitate disruption.  
Figure 10 illustrates the observed design element configurations that have supportive conditions for 
facilitating disruption. They facilitate disruption, as they present new emerging design principles for 
digital platforms that deviate from established ones used by incumbents or Defender digital platforms. 
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Figure 11. Observed Digital Platform Configurations 
 
Implications for Theory and Practice 
This thesis contributes to the disruptive innovation literature from a supply perspective (Henderson et al. 
1990) that provides prescriptive knowledge about how to design and configure digital platforms towards 
supportive conditions for facilitating disruption. Apparent from the Blockchain.info case, modularity 
allows digital payment platforms to practice architectural innovations by leveraging on new network 
layer components (e.g., bitcoin blockchain network). The integration and use of a new network layer 
component with a different knowledge base (e.g., open blockchain), but with a similar value proposition 
(i.e., moving payments), could indeed overturn the network layer of incumbent platforms (i.e., legacy 
payment infrastructures) in the event of broader adoptions (Christensen et al. 1996; Henderson et al. 
1990). Furthermore, the integration of new components into digital platforms may cause additional ripple 
effects across platform layers with transformative consequences (Yoo et al. 2010). 
For instance, the nature of blockchain technologies, which are digital, decentralized or distributed, have 
the ability to transform digital services into being more granular in their feature set (e.g., nano smart 
contract payments). These new features in turn could impact and decompose other platform layers (e.g., 
service layer), which may create favorable conditions for radical innovations (Henderson et al. 1990). 
Radical innovation overturns established architectures and components of predominant products and 
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services. In the digital platform context, radical innovation would share the notion of autonomous digital 
platforms, where platform owners are not identifiable and non-existent.  
This thesis bridges knowledge gaps between platform and management research streams by deriving a 
taxonomy of interrelated strategic design elements, which, properly configured, give rise to supportive 
conditions for facilitating disruption. Specifically, this study aims to contribute to extant literature on 
digital platforms (Gawer et al. 2002; Ghazawneh et al. 2013; Iyer et al. 2010; Thomas et al. 2014; Yoo et 
al. 2010) and open innovation (Chesbrough 2003; Chesbrough et al. 2006; West et al. 2014a). By 
applying configuration theory (El Sawy et al. 2010), this study bears managerial implications for digital 
platform owners and researchers as well as specific theoretical contributions. 
First, this study extends the strategic typology of organizations by the seminal works of Miles et al. 
(1978) and Sabherwal et al. (2001) to the context of digital platforms. To my knowledge, the application 
of strategy typologies specifically on digital platforms has not been done previously. Second, this 
research contributes to the IS strategy literature (Chen et al. 2010). Past studies have investigated the 
attributes of internal IT systems of organizations and their strategic implications (cf. Henderson et al. 
1993). This research aims to extend this research stream by exploring the implications of intertwined and 
interdependent internal (i.e., platform owner) and external information systems (i.e., third parties). 
Lastly, as we have a good understanding about organizations operating in value chain economies, and 
how internal assets and methods translate to strategy profiles (Porter 1980; Porter 1985; Teece et al. 
1997), less was known about organizations in network economies (Stabell et al. 1998). In this regard, this 
thesis presents a first attempt to explain how organizations in network economies strategically design and 
configure their digital platforms that result into characteristic platform strategies (see Table 8). 
Table 8. Competitive Advantage in Value Chain & Value Network Economies 
 Value Chain Economies Value Network Economies Digital Platforms 
Source of 
Innovation 
Schumpeterian Innovation 
Innovation emerges within 
organizational boundaries. 
Open Innovation 
Innovation emerge inside & 
outside organizational 
boundaries. 
Coupled Open Innovation 
Innovation emerge inside & 
outside in a continuous fashion. 
Assets Resource-Based View Strategic Linkages Strategic Interfirm Modularity 
Method Dynamic Capabilities Network Orchestration 
Configuration of Digital 
Platform Design Elements 
Business 
Strategy 
 Cost Leadership 
 Differentiator 
Research Gap 
Research Contribution 
 Defender 
 Analyzer 
 Prospector 
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Conclusion 
This thesis presents a fitting response to Bharadwaj et al.’s (2013) and de Reuver et al.’s (2017) call and 
research agenda for more digital platform studies to better compare and understand transformative digital 
platforms. In the same vein, this dissertation provides prescriptive knowledge in the form of design 
principles for digital platform practitioners and researchers to strategically design and configure digital 
platforms towards supportive conditions that facilitate disruption. Findings suggest that digital platforms 
with an Analyzer and Prospector strategy profile (i.e., Business Design) have supportive conditions to 
facilitate disruption. This dissertation is constrained in its generalizability, as the studied cases were 
primarily originating from European payments markets with an emphasis on the UK. Nevertheless, these 
limitations are future research avenues for replicating the study in other geographies and empirical 
contexts (e.g., social media or mobile computing platforms) to test its applicability. Another interesting 
avenue for future research would be to measure the performances of certain design principles and their 
configurations (e.g., revenue or market share growth), or identifying tipping points points towards a new 
dominant design or standard that would indeed replace established innovations. Lastly, as more 
organizations and individuals join open blockchain economies, future research could explore further 
open and distributed digital platforms to derive pertinent knowledge and characteristic design principles. 
References 
Abernathy, W. J., and Clark, K. B. 1985. "Innovation: Mapping the winds of creative destruction," 
Research Policy (14:1) 2//, pp 3-22. 
Ansari, S. S., Garud, R., and Kumaraswamy, A. 2015. "The disruptor's dilemma: TiVo and the US 
television ecosystem," Strategic Management Journal). 
Assink, M. 2006. "Inhibitors of disruptive innovation capability: a conceptual model," European Journal 
of Innovation Management (9:2), pp 215-233. 
Baldwin, C. Y., and Clark, K. B. 2000. Design rules: The power of modularity, (MIT press. 
Baldwin, C. Y., and Woodard, C. J. 2008. "The architecture of platforms: A unified view," Harvard 
Business School Finance Working Paper:09-034). 
Benlian, A., Hilkert, D., and Hess, T. 2015. "How open is this platform&quest; The meaning and 
measurement of platform openness from the complementors’ perspective," Journal of 
Information Technology). 
Besen, S. M., and Farrell, J. 1994. "Choosing How to Compete: Strategies and Tactics in 
Standardization," The Journal of Economic Perspectives (8:2), pp 117-131. 
Boudreau, K. 2010. "Open platform strategies and innovation: Granting access vs. devolving control," 
Management Science (56:10), pp 1849-1872. 
Boudreau, K. J. 2012. "Let a Thousand Flowers Bloom? An Early Look at Large Numbers of Software 
App Developers and Patterns of Innovation," Organization Science (23:5), pp 1409-1427. 
Boyatzis, R. E. 1998. Transforming qualitative information: Thematic analysis and code development, 
(Sage. 
Braun, V., and Clarke, V. 2006. "Using thematic analysis in psychology," Qualitative research in 
psychology (3:2), pp 77-101. 
  
 
62 
Burgelman, R. A., and Grove, A. S. 2007. "Cross-boundary disruptors: powerful interindustry 
entrepreneurial change agents," Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal (1:3-4), pp 315-327. 
Burrell, G., and Morgan, G. 1979. Sociological paradigms and organisational analysis, (london: 
Heinemann. 
Burton-Jones, A., McLean, E. R., and Monod, E. 2015. "Theoretical perspectives in IS research: from 
variance and process to conceptual latitude and conceptual fit," European Journal of Information 
Systems (24:6), pp 664-679. 
Ceccagnoli, M., Forman, C., Huang, P., and Wu, D. J. 2012. "Cocreation of value in a platform 
ecosystem: the case of enterprise software," MIS Q. (36:1), pp 263-290. 
Cennamo, C., and Santalo, J. 2013. "Platform competition: Strategic trade-offs in platform markets," 
Strategic Management Journal (34:11), pp 1331-1350. 
Chen, D. Q., Mocker, M., Preston, D. S., and Teubner, A. 2010. "Information systems strategy: 
reconceptualization, measurement, and implications," MIS quarterly (34:2), pp 233-259. 
Chesbrough, H. 2003. Open innovation: The new imperative for creating and profiting from technology, 
(Harvard Business Press. 
Chesbrough, H., Vanhaverbeke, W., and West, J. 2006. Open innovation: Researching a new paradigm, 
(Oxford university press. 
Christensen, C., and Raynor, M. 2013. The Innovator's Solution: Creating and Sustaining Successful 
Growth, (Harvard Business Review Press. 
Christensen, C. M., Anthony, S. D., Berstell, G., and Nitterhouse, D. 2007. "Finding the right job for 
your product," MIT Sloan Management Review (48:3), p 38. 
Christensen, C. M., and Bower, J. L. 1996. "Customer Power, Strategic Investment, And The Failure Of 
Leading Firms," Strategic Management Journal (17:3), pp 197-218. 
Chua, W. F. 1986. "Radical developments in accounting thought," Accounting review), pp 601-632. 
Cohen, W. M., and Levinthal, D. A. 1990. "Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning and 
Innovation," Administrative Science Quarterly (35:1), pp 128-152. 
Crossan, M. M., and Apaydin, M. 2010. "A multi‐dimensional framework of organizational innovation: 
A systematic review of the literature," Journal of management studies (47:6), pp 1154-1191. 
Crotty, M. 1998. The foundations of social research: Meaning and perspective in the research process, 
(Sage. 
Damanpour, F., and Wischnevsky, J. D. 2006. "Research on innovation in organizations: Distinguishing 
innovation-generating from innovation-adopting organizations," Journal of engineering and 
technology management (23:4), pp 269-291. 
Danneels, E. 2004. "Disruptive technology reconsidered: A critique and research agenda," Journal of 
product innovation management (21:4), pp 246-258. 
Darlin, D. 2005. "Bargains in a Flash," The New York Times. 
David, P. A. 1985. "Clio and the Economics of QWERTY," The American Economic Review (75:2), pp 
332-337. 
de Reuver, M., Sørensen, C., and Basole, R. C. 2017. "The digital platform: a research agenda," Journal 
of Information Technology), pp 1-12. 
Dougherty, D., and Hardy, C. 1996. "Sustained product innovation in large, mature organizations: 
Overcoming innovation-to-organization problems," Academy of Management Journal (39:5), pp 
1120-1153. 
Dubé, L., and Paré, G. 2003. "Rigor in information systems positivist case research: current practices, 
trends, and recommendations," Mis Quarterly), pp 597-636. 
  
 
63 
Eaton, B., Elaluf-Calderwood, S., Sørensen, C., and Yoo, Y. 2015. "Distributed Tuning of Boundary 
Resources: The Case of Apple’s iOS Service System," MIS Quarterly (39:1), pp 217-243. 
Eisenmann, T., Parker, G., and Van Alstyne, M. 2006. "STRATEGIES FOR TWO- SIDED 
MARKETS," Harvard Business Review (84:10), pp 92-101. 
Eisenmann, T., Parker, G., and Van Alstyne, M. 2011. "Platform envelopment," Strategic Management 
Journal (32:12), pp 1270-1285. 
El Sawy, O. A., Malhotra, A., Park, Y., and Pavlou, P. A. 2010. "Research Commentary-Seeking the 
Configurations of Digital Ecodynamics: It Takes Three to Tango," Information Systems 
Research (21:4), pp 835-848. 
Farrell, J., and Saloner, G. 1985. "Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation," The RAND Journal of 
Economics (16:1), pp 70-83. 
Gassmann, O., and Enkel, E. Year. "Towards a theory of open innovation: three core process 
archetypes," R&D management conference2004. 
Gawer, A., and Cusumano, M. A. 2002. Platform leadership, (Harvard Business School Press Boston. 
Ghazawneh, A., and Henfridsson, O. 2013. "Balancing platform control and external contribution in 
third-party development: the boundary resources model," Information Systems Journal (23:2), pp 
173-192. 
Ghazawneh, A., and Henfridsson, O. 2015. "A paradigmatic analysis of digital application 
marketplaces," Journal of Information Technology). 
Goldkuhl, G. Year. "Anchoring scientific abstractions–ontological and linguistic determination following 
socio-instrumental pragmatism," Proceedings of European Conference on Research Methods in 
Business, Reading2002. 
Govindarajan, V., and Kopalle, P. K. 2006. "Disruptiveness of innovations: measurement and an 
assessment of reliability and validity," Strategic Management Journal (27:2), pp 189-199. 
Gregor, S. 2006. "The Nature of Theory in Information Systems," MIS Quarterly (30:3), pp 611-642. 
Guba, E. G., and Lincoln, Y. S. 1994. "Competing paradigms in qualitative research," Handbook of 
qualitative research (2:163-194), p 105. 
Gulati, R., Nohria, N., and Zaheer, A. 2000. "Strategic networks," Strategic Management Journal (21:3), 
pp 203-215. 
Hagiu, A., and Wright, J. 2011. "Multi-Sided Platforms," Working Papers -- Harvard Business School 
Division of Research), pp 1-37. 
Hanseth, O., and Lyytinen, K. 2010. "Design theory for dynamic complexity in information 
infrastructures: the case of building internet," Journal of Information Technology (25:1), pp 1-19. 
Hanseth, O., Monteiro, E., and Hatling, M. 1996. "Developing Information Infrastructure: The Tension 
between Standardization and Flexibility," Science, Technology, & Human Values (21:4), pp 407-
426. 
Harrigan, K. R. 1984. "Formulating vertical integration strategies," Academy of management review 
(9:4), pp 638-652. 
Henderson, J. C., and Venkatraman, N. 1993. "Strategic alignment: Leveraging information technology 
for transforming organizations," IBM systems journal (32:1), pp 4-16. 
Henderson, R. M., and Clark, K. B. 1990. "Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing 
Product Technologies and the Failure of Established Firms," Administrative Science Quarterly 
(35:1), pp 9-30. 
Henfridsson, O., and Bygstad, B. 2013. "THE GENERATIVE MECHANISMS OF DIGITAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE EVOLUTION," MIS Quarterly (37:3), pp 907-A905. 
  
 
64 
Hevner, A. R., March, S. T., Park, J., and Ram, S. 2004. "Design Science in Information Systems 
Research," MIS Quarterly (28:1), pp 75-105. 
Hill, C. W. L., and Rothaermel, F. T. 2003. "The Performance of Incumbent Firms in the Face of Radical 
Technological Innovation," The Academy of Management Review (28:2), pp 257-274. 
Hirschheim, R. 1985. "Information systems epistemology: An historical perspective," Research methods 
in information systems), pp 13-35. 
Hirschheim, R., and Klein, H. K. 1989. "Four paradigms of information systems development," 
Communications of the ACM (32:10), pp 1199-1216. 
Hunt, M. 1972. "Competition in the Major Home Appliance Industry," Harvard University). 
Iansiti, M., and Levien, R. 2004. "The keystone advantage," Harvard Business School Press, Boston). 
Iyer, B., and Henderson, J. C. 2010. "PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE: UNDERSTANDING THE 
SEVEN CAPABILITIES CLOUD COMPUTING," MIS Quarterly Executive (9:2), pp 117-131. 
Katz, M. L., and Shapiro, C. 1986. "Product Compatibility Choice in a Market with Technological 
Progress," Oxford Economic Papers (38), pp 146-165. 
Kazan, E., and Damsgaard, J. 2013. "A Framework For Analyzing Digital Payment As A Multi-Sided 
Platform: A Study Of Three European NFC Solutions," in ECIS 2013: Utrecht. 
Kazan, E., and Damsgaard, J. Year. "An Investigation Of Digital Payment Platform Designs: A 
Comparative Study Of Four European Solutions," Proceedings of the European Conference on 
Information Systems (ECIS) 2014, Tel Aviv, Israel, Association for Information Systems2014a, 
p. 15. 
Kazan, E., Tan, C.-W., and Lim, E. T. K. 2014b. "Towards a Framework of Digital Platform Disruption: 
A Comparative Study of Centralized & Decentralized Digital Payment Providers," in 
Proceedings of the Australiasian Conference on Information Systems ACIS 2014: Auckland New 
Zealand. 
Kazan, E., Wee Tan, C., and Lim, E. T. 2016. "Towards a Framework of Digital Platform Competition: 
A Comparative Study of Monopolistic & Federated Mobile Payment Platforms," Journal of 
theoretical and applied electronic commerce research (11:3), pp 50-64. 
Krotov, V., and Junglas, I. 2008. "RFID as a disruptive innovation," Journal of theoretical and applied 
electronic commerce research (3:2), pp 44-59. 
Lee, A. S. 1991. "Integrating Positivist and Interpretive Approaches to Organizational Research," 
Organization Science (2:4), pp 342-365. 
Lee, A. S., and Baskerville, R. L. 2003. "Generalizing generalizability in information systems research," 
Information systems research (14:3), pp 221-243. 
Lucas, H. C., and Goh, J. M. 2009. "Disruptive technology: How Kodak missed the digital photography 
revolution," The Journal of Strategic Information Systems (18:1), pp 46-55. 
Makadok, R., and Coff, R. 2009. "Both market and hierarchy: An incentive-system theory of hybrid 
governance forms," Academy of Management Review (34:2), pp 297-319. 
Maxwell, J. 1992. "Understanding and validity in qualitative research," Harvard educational review 
(62:3), pp 279-301. 
Miles, R. E., Snow, C. C., Meyer, A. D., and Coleman, H. J., Jr. 1978. "Organizational Strategy, 
Structure, and Process," The Academy of Management Review (3:3), pp 546-562. 
Miranda, S. M., and Saunders, C. S. 2003. "The social construction of meaning: An alternative 
perspective on information sharing," Information systems research (14:1), pp 87-106. 
Ondrus, J., Gannamaneni, A., and Lyytinen, K. 2015. "The impact of openness on the market potential of 
multi-sided platforms: a case study of mobile payment platforms," Journal of Information 
Technology). 
  
 
65 
Orlikowski, W. J., and Baroudi, J. J. 1991. "Studying information technology in organizations: Research 
approaches and assumptions," Information systems research (2:1), pp 1-28. 
Pagani, M. 2013. "DIGITAL BUSINESS STRATEGY AND VALUE CREATION: FRAMING THE 
DYNAMIC CYCLE OF CONTROL POINTS," MIS Quarterly (37:2), pp 617-632. 
Pfeffer, J., and Salancik, G. R. 2003. The external control of organizations: A resource dependence 
perspective, (Stanford University Press. 
Pil, F. K., and Cohen, S. K. 2006. "Modularity: Implications for Imitation, Innovation, and Sustained 
Advantage," The Academy of Management Review (31:4), pp 995-1011. 
Pon, B., Seppälä, T., and Kenney, M. 2014. "Android and the demise of operating system-based power: 
Firm strategy and platform control in the post-PC world," Telecommunications Policy (38:11) 
12//, pp 979-991. 
Porter, M. E. 1980. "Competitive strategy: Techniques foranalyzing industries and competitors," 
FreePress, New York). 
Porter, M. E. 1985. Competitive advantage: Creating and sustaining superior performance, (Free Press: 
New York. 
Porter, M. E. 1991. "Towards a dynamic theory of strategy," Strategic Management Journal (12:S2), pp 
95-117. 
Rochet, J. C., and Tirole, J. 2002. "Cooperation among competitors: Some economics of payment card 
associations," Rand Journal of economics), pp 549-570. 
Rochet, J. C., and Tirole, J. 2003. "Platform competition in two‐sided markets," Journal of the European 
Economic Association (1:4), pp 990-1029. 
Rosen, M. 1991. "Coming To Terms with the Field: Understanding And Doing Organizational 
Ethnography*," Journal of Management Studies (28:1), pp 1-24. 
Sabherwal, R., and Chan, Y. E. 2001. "Alignment Between Business and IS Strategies: A Study of 
Prospectors, Analyzers, and Defenders," Information Systems Research (12:1), pp 11-33. 
Saloner, G. 1990. "Economic Issues In Computer Interface Standardization," Economics of Innovation 
and New Technology (1:1-2) 1990/01/01, pp 135-156. 
Sanchez, R., and Mahoney, J. T. 1996. "Modularity, flexibility, and knowledge management in product 
and organization design," Strategic Management Journal (17:S2), pp 63-76. 
Sandström, C., Magnusson, M., and Jörnmark, J. 2009. "Exploring factors influencing incumbents' 
response to disruptive innovation," Creativity and Innovation Management (18:1), pp 8-15. 
Sarker, S., Sarker, S., Sahaym, A., and Bjørn-Andersen, N. 2012. "Exploring value cocreation in 
relationships between an ERP vendor and its partners: a revelatory case study," MIS quarterly 
(36:1), pp 317-338. 
Schilling, M. A. 2000. "Toward a General Modular Systems Theory and Its Application to Interfirm 
Product Modularity," The Academy of Management Review (25:2), pp 312-334. 
Schumpeter, J. A. 1934. The theory of economic development: An inquiry into profits, capital, credit, 
interest, and the business cycle, (Transaction Publishers. 
Schumpeter, J. A. 1962. Capitalism, socialism and democracy, (Harper & Row New York. 
Shamsie, J., Phelps, C., and Kuperman, J. 2004. "Better late than never: A study of late entrants in 
household electrical equipment," Strategic Management Journal (25:1), pp 69-84. 
Shapiro, C., and Varian, H. R. 1998. "Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy," 
Harvard Business School Press Books), p 1. 
Shapiro, C., and Varian, H. R. 1999. "The Art of Standards Wars," California Management Review 
(41:2) Winter99, pp 8-32. 
  
 
66 
Stabell, C. B., and Fjeldstad, Ø. D. 1998. "Configuring value for competitive advantage: On chains, 
shops, and networks," Strategic Management Journal (19:5), p 413. 
Star, S. L., and Ruhleder, K. 1996. "Steps toward an ecology of infrastructure: Design and access for 
large information spaces," Information systems research (7:1), pp 111-134. 
Staudenmayer, N., Tripsas, M., and Tucci, C. L. 2005. "Interfirm Modularity and Its Implications for 
Product Development*," Journal of Product Innovation Management (22:4), pp 303-321. 
Suárez, F. F., and Utterback, J. M. 1995. "Dominant designs and the survival of firms," Strategic 
Management Journal (16:6), pp 415-430. 
Tan, B., Pan, S. L., Lu, X., and Huang, L. 2015. "The Role of IS Capabilities in the Development of 
Multi-Sided Platforms: The Digital Ecosystem Strategy of Alibaba. com," Journal of the 
Association for Information Systems (16:4), pp 248-280. 
Teece, D. J. 1986. "Profiting from technological innovation: Implications for integration, collaboration, 
licensing and public policy," Research policy (15:6), pp 285-305. 
Teece, D. J., Pisano, G., and Shuen, A. 1997. "Dynamic capabilities and strategic management," 
Strategic Management Journal (18:7), pp 509-533. 
Thomas, L., Autio, E., and Gann, D. 2014. "Architectural leverage: Putting platforms in context," The 
Academy of Management Perspectives), p amp. 2011.0105. 
Tilson, D., Lyytinen, K., and Sørensen, C. 2010. "Research Commentary—Digital Infrastructures: The 
Missing IS Research Agenda," Information Systems Research (21:4), pp 748-759. 
Tilson, D., Sorensen, C., and Lyytinen, K. Year. "Platform Complexity: Lessons from the music 
industry," System Sciences (HICSS), 2013 46th Hawaii International Conference on, IEEE2013, 
pp. 4625-4634. 
Tiwana, A., and Konsynski, B. 2010a. "Complementarities Between Organizational IT Architecture and 
Governance Structure," Information Systems Research (21:2), pp 288-304. 
Tiwana, A., Konsynski, B., and Bush, A. A. 2010b. "Research commentary-Platform evolution: 
Coevolution of platform architecture, governance, and environmental dynamics," Information 
Systems Research (21:4), pp 675-687. 
Tushman, M. L., and Anderson, P. 1986. "Technological Discontinuities and Organizational 
Environments," Administrative Science Quarterly (31:3), pp 439-465. 
Utterback, J. M., and Suárez, F. F. 1993. "Innovation, competition, and industry structure," Research 
Policy (22:1) 2//, pp 1-21. 
Walsham, G. 1995. "Interpretive case studies in IS research: nature and method," European Journal of 
information systems (4:2), pp 74-81. 
Wareham, J., Fox, P. B., and Giner, J. L. C. 2014. "Technology Ecosystem Governance," Organization 
Science (25:4), pp 1195-1215. 
Wernerfelt, B. 1984. "A resource-based view of the firm," Strategic Management Journal (5:2), pp 171-
180. 
West, J. 2003. "How open is open enough?: Melding proprietary and open source platform strategies," 
Research policy (32:7), pp 1259-1285. 
West, J., and Bogers, M. 2014a. "Leveraging External Sources of Innovation: A Review of Research on 
Open Innovation," Journal of Product Innovation Management (31:4), pp 814-831. 
West, J., and Dedrick, J. 2000. "Innovation and Control in Standards Architectures: The Rise and Fall of 
Japan's PC-98," Information Systems Research (11:2), pp 197-216. 
West, J., Salter, A., Vanhaverbeke, W., and Chesbrough, H. 2014b. "Open innovation: The next decade," 
Research Policy (43:5) 6//, pp 805-811. 
Yin, R. K. 2009. Case study research: Design and methods, (Sage. 
  
 
67 
Yoo, Y., Boland, R. J., Lyytinen, K., and Majchrzak, A. 2012. "Organizing for Innovation in the 
Digitized World," Organization Science (23:5), pp 1398-1408. 
Yoo, Y., Henfridsson, O., and Lyytinen, K. 2010. "Research commentary-The new organizing logic of 
digital innovation: An agenda for information systems research," Information Systems Research 
(21:4), pp 724-735. 
Zittrain, J. L. 2006. "The Generative Internet," Harvard Law Review (119:7), pp 1974-2040. 
Zobel, A.-K. 2016. "Benefiting from Open Innovation: A Multidimensional Model of Absorptive 
Capacity*," Journal of Product Innovation Management), pp n/a-n/a. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
68 
Collection of Papers 
 
Paper 1 – CAIS 
 
Towards a Market Entry Framework for 
Digital Payment Platforms 
 
Abstract 
This study presents a framework to understand and explain the design and configuration of digital 
payment platforms and how these platforms create conditions for market entries. By embracing the 
theoretical lens of platform envelopment, we employed a multiple and comparative-case study in a 
European setting by using our framework as an analytical lens to assess market-entry conditions. We 
found that digital payment platforms have acquired market entry capabilities, which is achieved through 
strategic platform design (i.e., platform development and service distribution) and technology design 
(i.e., issuing evolutionary and revolutionary payment instruments). The studied cases reveal that digital 
platforms leverage on payment services as a mean to bridge and converge core and adjacent platform 
markets. In so doing, platform envelopment strengthens firms’ market position in their respective core 
markets. This study contributes to the extant literature on digital platforms, market entries, and payment. 
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Introduction 
The digital-payment landscape is a crowded place. New payment actors with different industry 
backgrounds (e.g., retail) and novice start-ups are attempting to gain a foothold in the once-protected 
payment market. In so doing, new payment actors are betting on various technologies (e.g., near field 
communication (NFC)) to connect payers and payees in novel ways. These new dynamics in the payment 
market are largely driven by falling operating costs, as new payment actors leverage on agile and 
affordable cloud systems. But more importantly through regulation. European policymakers introduced 
new regulations to reduce market-entry barriers for new payment actors to foster competition, 
innovation, and consumer welfare (European Commission, 2009).  
To illustrate the competitive market space, AngelList, a well-known service for connecting start-ups with 
investors, lists about 996 U.S. and European mobile payment start-ups (AngelList, 2015) without 
including established actors such as MasterCard, PayPal or Visa. As more actors enter the payment 
market to diversify risk and tap into new business opportunities, payment actors increasingly find 
themselves in a saturated market space. This in turn transforms payment into a commoditized service. 
For instance, new actors (e.g., start-ups) deconstruct existing payment value streams (e.g., customer 
relationships) to their own benefit. This clearly challenges the business logic of incumbents in their own 
core markets.  
As existing payment business models become less profitable (e.g., payment fee business models), 
payment actors have to explore new revenue sources. One avenue lies in creating entirely new markets 
by creating new products and services that have not existed before (Christensen & Bower, 1996; 
Schumpeter, 1962). Another way is the entry into existing markets, where products and services are 
based on proven business logics. Creating new markets, however, bears many risk factors (e.g., 
predicting demand). On the contrary, risk-averse organizations generally find entering existing markets 
more amenable since they can more easily predict risk, market size, and competitive positioning. In 
platform-driven markets (e.g., payment markets), a predominant way to enter other existing markets is 
via platform envelopment (Eisenmann, Parker, & Van Alstyne, 2011). Platform envelopment prescribes 
that owners of digital platforms equip their existing user bases (e.g., payers, payees) with new services 
(e.g., mobile ticketing) to bridge them into other existing platform markets (e.g., public transportation). 
In other words, platform envelopment refers to leveraging an installed user base and complementary 
services to enter other existing platform markets. 
Digital platforms drive many markets, such as the payment market. Digital platforms are layered, 
modular technology artifacts (Yoo, Henfridsson, & Lyytinen, 2010) that have the logic to match different 
users (e.g., payers and payees) to derive business value (Eisenmann, Parker, & Van Alstyne, 2006; 
Stabell & Fjeldstad, 1998). Because these layered, modular IT artifacts create value through mediation, 
digital platforms are considerably sophisticated in their technology attributes. Contemporary digital 
platforms (e.g., PayPal) are equipped with application programming interfaces (APIs), which are access 
and distribution points for internally or externally developed services. Furthermore, digital platforms 
deliver services increasingly through physical means (e.g., mobile phones), which, in essence, represent 
physical proxies of digital platforms. Take PayPal as an example of a digital payment platform owner: 
PayPal offers APIs to third parties (e.g., app developers) to integrate payment functionalities into their 
own mobile services. In this way, PayPal empowers third parties’ business, which ultimately supports 
PayPal’s goal to increase its footprint in the payment market. 
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Based on the abovementioned observations, payment platforms comprise various components (e.g., APIs 
and mobile phones) in delivering their services. Accordingly, to support conditions for platform 
envelopment, one has to accordingly design and configure platforms and their corresponding components 
in the first place. Platform envelopment, however, is a complex task and novel for some prior protected 
markets, such as the traditional payment market. As new payment actors with different industry 
backgrounds encroach the payment market and, thereby, disturb market equilibrium, established payment 
actors in their core markets are compelled to respond to remain relevant. To shed light on platform 
envelopment in the payment market, we study and explain how digital platforms leverage payment 
services as a mean to enter other existing platform markets. Thus, we investigate:  
RQ:  How are digital payment platforms designed and configured to create conditions for platform 
envelopment? 
To answer the research question, we draw on pertinent literature on 1) multi-sided platforms (Eisenmann 
et al., 2006; Hagiu & Wright, 2011; Rochet & Tirole, 2003b), 2) technology standards (Besen & Farrell, 
1994; Shapiro & Varian, 1999; West & Dedrick, 2000), and 3) platform envelopment (Eisenmann et al., 
2011). Accordingly, we provide insights and conceptual clarity on different design and configuration 
options to acquire platform envelopment capabilities to enter other existing platform markets. 
Our findings suggest that digital platforms create conditions for platform envelopment by leveraging 
payment services as a mean to bridge and converge core and adjacent platform markets. In so doing, the 
design and configuration of digital platforms and their corresponding components (e.g., payment 
instruments) have an impact on their market-entry capabilities. Because we have a platform-envelopment 
(i.e., the entry into existing markets) and platform-centric approach, we exclude end users and new 
market creation from our analysis. 
In providing a framework to study the design and configuration of digital payment platforms, we 
contribute to the digital platform and payment literature by creating a descriptive and explanatory theory 
(Gregor, 2006). Specifically, this paper contributes to the platform market-entry literature (Eisenmann et 
al., 2011) by demonstrating how one can achieve the conditions for platform envelopment in the payment 
market. We are not aware of prior research that studies specifically the design and configuration of 
digital payment platforms to acquire platform-envelopment conditions.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide the study’s theoretical background. In Section 3, 
we present our framework by synthesizing key concepts that others have identified as being important in 
designing multi-sided payment platforms and how one can successfully enter platform markets. In 
Section 4, we present our research method. In Section 5, we analyze eight different European payment 
platforms. In Section 6, we synthesize our findings, discuss our limitations, and propose promising areas 
for further research. Finally, in Section 7, we conclude the paper. 
Theoretical Background 
In this section, we review pertinent literature to study and understand platform market entries. We focus 
specifically on the concept of platform envelopment (Eisenmann et al., 2011). Platform envelopment is a 
theoretical lens that originates from studies on network theory in industrial organization economics (Katz 
& Shapiro, 1985). Platform envelopment prescribes that firms in value networks (Stabell & Fjeldstad, 
1998) enter into other platform markets by leveraging service-bundling and network effects. We also 
discuss the payment literature through the conceptual lens of multi-sided platforms (Hagiu & Wright, 
2011; Rochet & Tirole, 2003b). We selected the multi-sided platform literature based on the notion that 
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payment services (e.g., PayPal) are, in essence, manifestations of multi-sided platforms that have the 
function to connect and equip various platform stakeholders. Moreover, multi-sided payment platforms 
have the technological capability to provide bundled services, which is amenable with the concept of 
platform envelopment to enter other platform markets. 
Business Design: Platform Market Entry 
Firms constantly face complex and hyper-competitive business environments (D'Aveni, Canger, & 
Doyle, 1995) in gaining or maintaining market leadership. Firms enter markets to increase business 
value, reduce competitive pressure, or diversify risk (Porter, 1980; Stabell & Fjeldstad, 1998). Eisenhardt 
and Martin (2000, p. 1107) define dynamic capabilities as “organizational and strategic routines by 
which firms achieve new resource configurations as markets emerge, collide, split, evolve, and die”. In 
this sense, firms’ dynamic capabilities play a vital role, as it enables the reconfiguration of existing 
resources and capabilities to achieve organizational goals, such as market entry (Eisenhardt & Martin, 
2000; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997).  
In value chain-dominated markets (e.g., manufacturing), firms enter and compete by converting inputs 
into valued market outputs in a sequential manner (e.g., outputs based price or quality) (Porter, 1985). In 
platform-driven markets (e.g., payment), however, firms create value and compete through efficient 
mediated products or services (Eisenmann et al., 2006; Stabell & Fjeldstad, 1998). Industrial 
organization research (Katz & Shapiro, 1985; Rochet & Tirole, 2003b) suggests that firms in platform 
markets obtain their competitiveness by having the capability to induce positive network effects. 
Specifically, competitive platform firms design their offerings in a way that creates reciprocal business 
value among different types of users (e.g., payer and payee) that, in turn, creates a self-reinforcing and 
expanding network effects. In other words, the stronger and durable the network effects are, the more 
dominant the firm becomes. In this sense, aspiring and existing platform firms need to strategically 
design their platform resources to ensure conditions for positive network effects in markets. 
Few studies have focused on entering the platform market (Eisenmann et al., 2011). Gawer and 
Henderson (2007) studied the chip manufacturer Intel and its decision about whether or not to enter the 
adjacent markets of third party providers. It decided to do so because 1) it had the organizational 
capabilities to serve these markets and 2) the adjacent markets were characterized by high growth, which, 
in turn, could support Intel’s business in its core market (i.e., computer chips). Intel was concerned about 
losing its market leadership towards upcoming and dominating third parties. These upcoming third 
parties could, in turn, dictate a new PC design (e.g., support of other chips) that could challenge Intel’s 
business in its core market. In this sense, Intel entered into adjacent platform markets to solidify its 
position in its core market.  
Besides protecting core markets, market saturation is another driver to enter (platform) markets. 
Burgelman and Grove (2007), who studied Apple as a “cross-boundary disrupter” (i.e., from the 
computer to the music and mobile phone industry), suggest that Apple was compelled to explore new 
revenue sources as its high-end computer market became increasingly saturated. Apple recognized 
opportunities in the music and mobile phone industry, which, in turn, could indirectly support Apple’s 
computer business line. Literature on platform market entry illustrates that firms enter into adjacent (e.g., 
Intel) or unrelated markets (e.g., Apple) to remain competitive. Platform firms that may lose the ability to 
define and protect their core markets could share IBM’s fate. IBM was once the dominant actor in the PC 
market but failed to defend its core business as third parties (e.g., Microsoft) originating from other 
markets (e.g., operating systems) took the lead to define what a PC constitutes (Gawer & Cusumano, 
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2002, p. 29). History demonstrates that digital platforms likewise have to evaluate their organizational 
resources and capabilities as markets change, emerge, or collide. 
Market Entry through Platform Envelopment 
Entering platform markets is particularly challenging for platform firms. Platform markets are sheltered 
by switching costs and network effects that enact barriers for other platform firms to enter markets (Chen 
& Hitt, 2002; Eisenmann et al., 2006, 2011; Katz & Shapiro, 1985). One way for platform firms to 
overcome market-entry barriers is in platform envelopment. Platform envelopment refers to leveraging 
an existing user base (e.g., payers, payees) by bundling a current platform service (e.g., mobile payment) 
with another service (e.g., mobile ticketing) (Eisenmann et al., 2011). In this sense, previously single-
purpose platforms convert into multi-purpose platforms and, thus, simultaneously serve users with 
different needs (e.g., commuting). Compared to single-purpose platforms, multi-purpose platforms have 
the competitive advantage to entice new users from other platform services that are designed for a single 
purpose (see Figure 1). Specifically, multi-purpose platforms provide function overlaps, which may 
entice users to join multi-purpose platforms and abandon prior single-purpose platforms (Eisenmann et 
al., 2011). Nevertheless, single-purpose platforms can counteract platform envelopment by offering a 
matching service to increase market-entry barriers (Nalebuff, 2004). 
 
Figure 1. Platform Envelopment 
Platform envelopment is already pervasive in the payment industry. Take PayPal as an example: in the 
beginning, PayPal was purely on online payment service provider that connected payers and payees on 
ecommerce websites (e.g., eBay). However, PayPal started to evolve by entering the physical payment 
market by bundling existing payment terminals with PayPal software (Verifone, 2012). By leveraging its 
large user base, PayPal attempted to encroach the retail payment market in brick-and-mortar stores. In 
addition, PayPal collects highly valuable payment data to provide additional value-added services (e.g., 
customer analytics), an area dominated by credit card firms. With its large user base, PayPal has the 
attributes to be a platform enveloper for large credit card networks.  
Payment as Multi-sided Platforms 
Most payment services are based on a four-party scheme (i.e., payer, payee, acquirer, card issuer), where 
these actors process payment transactions through orchestrated business models. To have access to these 
payment services, payment actors are technically and commercially affiliated to a digital payment 
platform (e.g., VISA) that prescribes authorized payment instruments (e.g., NFC payment cards) and 
binding business agreements (e.g., payment fees). Scholars have studied payment services through the 
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theoretical lens of two-sided platforms or markets that need to attract and match two types of users to 
create value (Evans, 2003; Rochet & Tirole, 2002, 2003b).  
In the payment context, these user types are typically payers (e.g., cardholders) and payees (e.g., 
merchants). We adopt Hagiu and Wright’s (2011, p. 2) definition for a multi-sided platform: “an 
organization that creates value primarily by enabling direct interactions between two (or more) distinct 
types of affiliated customers”. Primarily, platforms coordinate and facilitate direct interactions in a 
controlled manner that provides the architecture and a set of rules (Eisenmann et al., 2006). In the 
payment context, these are efficient connections between payers and payees, which is achieved through 
the technical means of digital payment platforms (Evans, 2003; Rochet & Tirole, 2003a, 2003b, 2006). 
Research has emphasized that a payment platform’s viability largely depends on whether it creates 
positive network effects whereby each additional user on one side (e.g., payer) adds demand on the other 
side (payee) (Rochet & Tirole, 2002). To ensure that initial positive network effects can occur, payment 
platforms mostly subsidize one side (e.g., payers with free payment instruments) to create a critical user 
base, which, in turn, attracts the revenue side (e.g., payees) (Eisenmann et al., 2006; Evans & 
Schmalensee, 2005). Figure 2 demonstrates the notion and logic of a two-sided (single-purpose) and 
multi-sided (multi-purpose) digital payment platform. 
 
Figure 2. Two Types of Digital Payment Platforms 
Evans, Hagiu, and Schmalensee (2006, p. 347) were among the first scholars to coin the term multi-sided 
payment platforms in studying the historical failure of “smart cards” in the U.S. payment market. Smart 
cards were novel and advanced payment instruments at their time. However, smart card proponents faced 
considerable challenges. Compared to the magnetic-stripe payment card, smart cards were more 
sophisticated payment instruments because they had a built-in computer chip that could store and execute 
Java applications. Furthermore, smart cards and their corresponding systems could use APIs. APIs 
enabled smart card providers to offer payment and payment-unrelated services, which gave them the 
ability to operate beyond the payment market. However, the initial attempt to introduce smart cards 
failed. The inability to mobilize a critical user base on the payment side (i.e., the lack of users with smart 
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cards and compatible payment terminals) and on the software side (i.e., lack of software) has resulted in 
the classic chicken-and-egg problem. 
Governance of Digital Payment Platforms 
Because contemporary digital payment platforms inherently have the capability to offer multiple services 
to different markets, digital payment platforms face the new and challenging task of governance. In the 
past, payment platforms were largely closed IT systems with rigid, few, or no access points. New digital 
payment platforms, however, are altering this notion because they provide third parties with access 
opportunities via APIs. As such, platform governance, which refers to managing third parties and their 
corresponding services, arises (Boudreau, 2010; Ghazawneh & Henfridsson, 2013). The technical and 
cultural shift in providing access to previously closed financial systems has a considerable impact on 
platform development from an internal viewpoint and on how services are distributed. Specifically, 
digital payment platforms have taken the new role to consider how deep the technical involvement with 
third parties should be to maintain platform control and resiliency. Another question is how to distribute 
services that are developed by third parties (i.e., moderated or unmoderated)? Most digital payment 
platforms have not explored the integration and governance of third party services, which ultimately 
effects service variety and the entry into different markets. 
To summarize, past studies have laid the conceptual foundation to understand digital payment platforms 
as a multi-sided phenomenon, which have the capability to distribute multiple services to different users 
in platform-driven markets. By supporting and distributing payment-unrelated services, digital payment 
platforms can enter other platform markets, which corresponds to the notion of platform envelopment 
(Eisenmann et al., 2011). 
In extending the literature that we reference above, in Section 3, we propose a framework that 
incorporates the aforementioned theories and concepts. First, we showcase different platform governance 
schemes (i.e., platform design) based on platform development and service distribution. Secondly, we 
leverage on technology standards literature to understand payment instruments in regards to 
compatibility (i.e., technology design). Technology compatibility is key in competitive technology-
driven markets because it impacts market access and one’s ability to create network effects. 
Digital Payment Platform Design Framework  
In this section, we present our framework (see Figure 4) that incorporates business design (i.e., platform 
envelopment) from Section 2 with platform design (i.e., platform governance) and technology design 
(i.e., technology standards). By embracing the contextual lens of digital payments, we argue that digital 
payment platforms can create conditions for platform envelopment by strategically designing and 
configuring platform - and technology-design elements to enter platform markets (i.e., business design). 
We exclude payers and payees in this study because we focus on digital payment platforms and their 
corresponding payment instruments. We are aware that payers and payees are subject to network effects 
and  switching and homing costs (Kazan & Damsgaard, 2013), and we realize that a payment platform is 
sine qua none without the payers and payees; however, we investigate the design logic of payment 
platforms and their corresponding instruments in achieving platform envelopment conditions. Prior 
studies have indeed investigated the design of digital payment platforms from different research angles 
(e.g., architecture, adoption patterns, platform ignition) and focused largely on the competitive dynamics 
within the payment market (Kazan & Damsgaard, 2014; Mallat, 2007; Ondrus, Gannamaneni, & 
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Lyytinen, 2015; Ozcan & Santos, 2014). However, we study specifically how digital payment platforms 
are designed and configured to create platform envelopment conditions to enter other existing platform 
markets. 
Platform Design: Platform Development and Service Distribution  
Digital platforms apply different types of governance schemes on third parties while interacting with 
them to create and capture value. To make sense of different governance schemes, we adapted Iyer and 
Henderson’s (2010) API management framework, which is a suitable theoretical lens to analyze and 
understand different types of governance schemes a platform owner can apply. Figure 3 illustrates that a 
digital payment platform may exercise 1) monopolistic power or collaboration with third parties in 
developing the platform (i.e., closed or open) and 2) how platform services developed by third parties are 
distributed to the market (i.e., moderated or unmoderated). 
 
Figure 3. Platform Design 
Platform development: we define platform development as the degree to which digital payment 
platforms and third parties co-develop and maintain a digital payment platform. Payment platforms, 
which follow the closed development approach, exercise monopolistic power in developing their 
platform and exclude third party participation. Barclays’ mobile payment service “Pingit” represents 
such a payment platform. On the contrary, open platform development involves third parties (i.e., 
platform co-development). For instance, the payment start-up Stripe has a presence on GitHub.com, 
which is an online forum and repository service for sharing code. By being active on GitHub.com, Stripe 
invites third party developers to come up with new ideas and solutions to co-develop Stripe’s platform 
further in a moderated manner. 
Service distribution: we define platform service distribution as the ability and the degree of freedom 
that a payment platform grants third parties to distribute their own services. The moderated service 
distribution approach enables payment platforms to exercise control on third party service distribution. 
Barclays’ mobile payment service Pingit, for instance, has moderated APIs, which grants authorized third 
parties access to their APIs. The unmoderated approach allows third parties the freedom to distribute 
their own services without platform approval. Coinkite, a Canadian Bitcoin merchant service that offers 
open and permissionless API towards third parties that does not interfere in their service provisioning, 
illustrates an unmoderated approach. 
Based on these concepts, we can derive four different and generic platform governance schemes, which 
we define as platform design options (see Figure 3): 
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1. The open and unmoderated platform approach allows the highest degree of freedom to modify a payment 
platform and to distribute services without approval (e.g., Bitcoin). 
2. The closed and moderated approach represents a closed system that excludes third parties from developing 
the platform. The distribution of third party services is moderated (e.g., Pingit). 
3. The open and moderated strategy allows third parties to assist in developing the platform; however, the 
platform moderates service distribution (e.g., Stripe).  
4. Lastly, the closed and unmoderated approach allows third parties to distribute services without approval. 
However, third parties cannot develop the platform (e.g., Coinkite).  
Payment Platform Design Implications 
Each of these four platform design options has its benefits and shortcomings. The closed and moderated 
approach requires a digital payment platform to have the organizational capabilities to review and 
distribute platform services, especially as the number of third party services grows (cf. Iyer & 
Henderson, 2010). Furthermore, payment platforms have to consider the risks of competing against their 
own user base (i.e., third parties), which may takeover valuable customer relationships (cf. Gawer & 
Cusumano, 2002, p. 29). The open and unmoderated approach may lead to permissionless and innovative 
platform developments and uncontrolled service distributions, but it bears the risk of fragmentation, 
which may impact the platform’s reputation and its incentive to develop services (Boudreau, 2012; West 
& Gallagher, 2006). Platform design has an impact on the quantity, quality, and distribution of platform 
services, which ultimately determines how effectively the platform can acquire platform envelopment 
conditions on the platform-design level. Next, we portray different payment instruments, which are 
physical proxies and components of digital payment platforms, and discuss their implications for 
technology compatibility and entering the platform market. 
Technology Design: Compatibility of Digital Payment Instruments 
Technology standards (or dominant design) are a set of rules that provide compatibility and 
interoperability between different components (Chen & Forman, 2006; Weitzel, Beimborn, & König, 
2006). Various payment providers compete to establish a dominant design for payment instruments to 
obtain a favorable market position (Besen & Farrell, 1994; Suárez & Utterback, 1995). A standardized 
payment instrument, which is basically a proxy of a payment platform (e.g., a payment card), allows the 
platform owner to reap economy-of-scale gains, gain positive network effects, and reach and serve an 
existing user base (e.g., merchants with their existing payment terminals). However, to establish a 
technology standard, temporary standard fragmentations and intended technology incompatibilities 
occur, which creates a competitive cycle of market inclusion and exclusion (cf. Anderson & Tushman, 
1990; Utterback & Suárez, 1993).  
One can classify physical devices as evolutionary or revolutionary devices in their attributes (Shapiro & 
Varian, 1999). Evolutionary devices offer a migration path to a new technology and have simultaneously 
backward compatibility to an existing standard system. The major benefit of these bridging technologies 
is that they allow one to access an existing user base in specific markets and set the ground for future 
technology transitions. For example, (plastic) payments cards are increasingly equipped with NFC chips 
that are evolutionary in their technology design attributes because, with them, one can make contactless 
payments. At the same time, NFC payment cards are backward compatible with existing payment 
terminals based on chips and PIN. As such, evolutionary devices exhibit the attributes of incremental 
innovation and, at the same time, compatibility with widely available technologies. 
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Revolutionary devices offer better performance and may provide a first-mover advantage. However, 
releasing revolutionary devices to the market is a risky endeavor. First, the technology itself may be 
incompatible with the prevalent industry standard and, hence, not accessible for a large user base. 
Second, it is uncertain whether or not a revolutionary technology design will take off to create a critical 
user base in the first place. In the payment context, mobile phones equipped with NFC chips have 
revolutionary technology-design attributes because they offer superior payment experience and 
functionality compared to payment cards (e.g., digital receipt management software). However, mobile 
payment based on NFC is incompatible with widely available chip and PIN payment terminals, which 
reduces market access on the merchant side. To illustrate different technology design options on the 
payer and payee side, Table 1 showcases four predominant payment instruments in the payment market 
(Smart Card Alliance, 2011). In this study, payment instruments are evolutionary in their technology 
design attributes, if they are compatible with widely available and existing devices between payers and 
payees. On the contrary, payment instruments are revolutionary in their technology design attributes, if 
are incompatible with widely available and existing devices between payers and payees. In this case, 
revolutionary technology design requires the abolishment of existing payment instruments. 
Table 1. Technology Design of Payment Instruments 
 Payer Payee 
Technology Design 
(Overall Assessment) 
S
M
S
 
Evolutionary 
 
Mobile payment based on SMS is 
evolutionary and functions well with 
existing and ordinary mobile phones on the 
payer side. 
Evolutionary 
 
SMS payments are compatible with 
existing payment terminals (requires 
software update) on the payee side. 
Implications: evolutionary 
 
SMS payment is compatible 
between both sides. 
Q
R
 c
o
d
e 
Evolutionary 
 
Mobile payment based on QR codes is 
evolutionary and functions with existing 
(camera-based) mobile phones on the payer 
side. 
Evolutionary 
 
QR code payments are compatible 
with existing payment terminals. 
(requires software update) on the 
payee side. 
Implications: evolutionary 
 
QR code payments are compatible 
between both sides. 
N
F
C
 
Evolutionary 
 
NFC payment cards is evolutionary and uses 
the existing payment card form factor. 
NFC mobile payment is evolutionary and 
uses the existing mobile phone form factor 
on the payer side. 
Revolutionary 
 
NFC payments are incompatible with 
existing chip and PIN payment 
terminals on the payee side. 
Implications: revolutionary 
 
NFC payment technology is 
incompatible between both sides. 
Requires strong network effects on 
the payee side to become a prevalent 
payment instrument. 
M
o
b
il
e 
C
a
rd
 
R
ea
d
er
 Evolutionary 
 
Mobile card readers are compatible with 
existing payment cards (magnetic stripe or 
chip/PIN) on the payer side. 
Revolutionary 
 
Mobile card readers are incompatible 
with existing card-based payment 
terminals on the payee side. 
Implications: revolutionary 
 
Payment technology is incompatible 
between both sides. 
Requires strong network effects on 
the payee side to become a prevalent 
payment instrument. 
Technology Design Implications 
Digital payment platforms that issue revolutionary payment instruments might benefit from a first-mover 
advantage to obtain a favorable market position compared to their competitors. However, platform users 
may be not willing to incur the high adoption and switching costs (e.g., new payment terminals on the 
payee side). Contrary, issuing an evolutionary payment instrument might be a safe bet to ensure market 
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compatibility and, thus, market access. For instance, banks are predetermined to offer new NFC payment 
cards as an evolutionary payment instrument, as the NFC payment card with its form factor is still 
compatible with the prevalent card-based payment infrastructure. However, an evolutionary device 
strategy built on shared technology standards represents a low barrier to keep competitors at a distance.  
In regards to platform envelopment, the choice of technology has additional implications for market-
entry, which may serve either as an interface or obstacle to access platform markets from an operational 
viewpoint. Take the versatile QR code technology as an example. Many payment services leverage on 
the QR code technology (i.e., evolutionary technology) to offer their mobile-payment service. At the 
same time, the QR code technology is a standard in other industries, such as in the airline industry in the 
form of mobile boarding passes. Accordingly, besides considering an evolutionary or revolutionary 
technology design approach, the choice of certain payment technologies may impact to entry and by that 
the convergence of platform markets in the first place (Besen & Farrell, 1994). 
Market Entry of Digital Payment Platforms Framework 
To understand how business, platform and technology design are intertwined, Figure 4 overviews 
different design and configuration options. To reach platform envelopment conditions, a payment 
provider has eight possible configuration options in entering existing platform-based markets. For 
completeness, Schumpeterian innovation (i.e., new market creation) represents a subcategory of business 
design; however, it is beyond our scope here. 
 
Figure 4. Digital Payment Platform: Eight Different Design Configurations Options 
 
In Section 4, we present our research method and eight cases, the latter of which serve as illustrative 
examples to demonstrate the applicability and usefulness of our proposed framework. Our framework’s 
practicality lies in its analytical capabilities to identify commonalities and differences based on different 
design and configuration options for digital payment platforms. 
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Research Method 
We synthesize and consolidate key concepts and literature into the proposed digital platform-design 
framework; as such, our approach is descriptive (i.e., theory type I.) and explanatory (i.e., theory type II.) 
in nature (Gregor, 2006). The proposed framework serves as an analytical template for our empirical data 
set, which we use both to understand how the three different design elements of a platform interrelate or 
differ in a simultaneous manner (Kochen, 1985). To answer our research question, we performed a 
multiple case study (Dubé & Paré, 2003; Yin, 2009) in a European setting. Employing a positivist 
approach, we test our proposed framework on eight cases to identify platform envelopment conditions. In 
so doing, we do not seek statistical generalizability but rather analytical generalizability of our proposed 
framework for different types of digital platforms (Yin, 2009). 
The case study method has received ample attention in the IS community (Dubé & Paré, 2003), which 
has the advantage to answer “how” and “why” questions in situations in which the researcher has limited 
or no control over the study object (Yin, 2009). Because we analyze the logic of how digitals payment 
platforms are designed to achieve platform-envelopment conditions, a multiple case study approach is 
suitable. By analyzing the idiosyncrasies of different digital payment platforms, a multiple case study 
promises to yield more general results (Yin, 2009) for understanding complex platform, technology, and 
business structures.  
Case Selection  
We selected the cases based on several criteria: we focused on European companies that offer digital and 
proximity-based payment instruments, payment actors with and without prior payment experience, that 
provide sufficient online data to test our conceptual framework, and that have a promising future to 
establish digital payment platforms based on their size or support from large firms. We divided the eight 
cases into four categories based on their industry backgrounds. From these four categories, banks are, 
according to our definition, the payment incumbents, whereas the other three actors (i.e., payment start-
ups, merchants and mobile network operators) are new in the payment market and act as payment 
envelopers. Note that the cases are illustrative examples that we use to showcase different design and 
configuration options of digital payment platforms. 
Table 2. Eight Digital Payment Platforms 
Banks Mobile network operators Merchants Payment start-ups 
- Swish (Sweden) 
- girogo (Germany) 
- Orange (France) 
- Turkcell (Turkey) 
- Yapital (Germany) 
- Flash‘N pay (France) 
- iZettle (Sweden) 
- Payleven (Germany) 
Data Collection  
We collected publicly available data from different online sources: press releases, online news and 
industry articles, interviews, and speeches at conferences. We searched for data via online industry and 
technology magazines, search engines, and social media channels using certain relevant keywords: 
“(NFC) mobile payment”, “NFC payment card”, “NFC Micro SD card”, “NFC SIM card”, “NFC phone 
payment”, “mobile phone payment”, “contactless payment”, “QR code payments”, and “payment card 
readers”. We limited the time period to May 2011 to March 2013. Online industry and technology 
magazines were particularly useful since they comprehensively cover factual reports on technological 
developments in the retail and payment area with in-depth background knowledge and cross-checked 
sources. Eight European companies emerged as we collected data due to large media coverage or their 
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being leading market actors in their original industries (e.g., the mobile network operator Turkcell) with 
the potential to establish a dominant digital payment design. Table 3 presents the data sources we found.  
We chose Web data because the selected digital payment systems were either planned, in the pilot stage, 
or currently (at the time of writing) in severe competition with their rivals and because collecting primary 
data through interviews is too sensitive and, thereby, partially inaccessible. Nevertheless, secondary data 
has its merits in information systems (IS) research (cf. Ghazawneh & Henfridsson, 2013; Romano, 
Donovan, Hsinchun, & Nunamaker, 2003) because it avoids potential biases between interviewers and 
interviewees as they mutually construct data (Silverman, 2006). Furthermore, secondary data is 
accessible and, more importantly, verifiable through replication studies. However, to overcome potential 
biases in our data set, we triangulated data from various publicly available Web sources (blogs, industry- 
and technology-focused magazines, press releases, and payment conferences) to provide enough data for 
to illustrate our conceptual framework. 
Table 3. Data Sources for the Analysis 
Data Sources Description 
 
Interviews 
 Four interviews with Yapital’s CEO Nils Winkler: 
 Two transcribed interviews by derhandel.de and etailment.de. 
 Two interviews in video format by empiria group (DE) and paperJam TV (LU). 
 One transcribed interview by mobilemoneyrevolution.co.uk with Turkcell’s Cenk Bayrakdar, Chief 
New Technology Businesses Officer. 
 One interview in video format by empiria group (DE) with Magnus Nilsson, iZettle’s CFO. 
Press releases 
All press releases related to new payment instruments: girogo (3), Swish (5), Orange (3), Turkcell (13), 
Yapital (13), Flash‘N pay (1), iZettle (21), and Payleven (13). 
Conference 
One of the authors attended the payment conference “The Nordic and Baltic CAC Mobile & NFC 
Conference 2013”, where Swish provided insights during and after the presentation. 
Online articles and 
reports 
girogo (18), Swish (2), Orange (4), Turkcell (2), Yapital (1), Flash‘N pay (6), iZettle (9), and Payleven 
(7) (cisco.com, computersweden.se, derhandel.de, finextra.com, geldkarte.de, gsma.com, 
mobilepaymentstoday.com, nfctimes.com, nfcworld.com, spiegle.de, telecompaper.com, 
techcrunch.com, thenextweb.com, welt.de, WSJ.com). 
Local radio news Two radio news and radio interview about girogo (DAS HITRADIO and ddp direct) 
Data Analysis 
We adopted a differentiated role strategy to analyze the data (Adler & Adler, 1988). The first author 
acted as the primary data collector and coder. He was responsible for eliciting Web data sources, 
developing the coding schemes, and mapping relevant quotes to each of the components in our proposed 
framework. Conversely, the second author played the role of the devil’s advocate by coming up with 
alternative interpretations and counterarguments. 
To begin, the first author imported the Web data as PDF and audio files into Nvivo 10, a qualitative 
analysis software program that allows one to collect and categorize data in a structured way. Then, the 
first author performed directed content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Potter & Levine-Donnerstein, 
1999). Directed content analysis is a suitable approach when prior or existing research about a 
phenomenon is incomplete or requires further explanation; as such, this method helps to support or 
extend key concepts and theories. Based on this notion, we initially derived coding categories from 
existing research, which served as a theoretical guide during the analysis process. 
To analyze the data, we used a coding scheme based on our conceptual framework, which we 
synthesized from existing literature. Furthermore, we practiced flexible coding to capture prominent and 
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intriguing events that did not fit directly into the coding scheme. Nevertheless, flexible coding failed to 
yield additional components beyond the proposed framework. As part of the coding process, the first 
author constantly consulted with the second author about intermediate codes that emerged. Whenever 
disagreements surfaced, we revisited and discussed the respective codes until we reached consensus. The 
entire coding process followed an iterative cycle, and we finished analyzing the data only when we 
agreed on the placement of quotes in accordance with the proposed framework. Table 4 overviews how 
we coded one of the cases. 
Table 4. Coding Sample 
Framework 
element 
Frequency1 Exemplary quote Synthesis Finding 
Platform 
Design 
3 
“Putting the secure element inside the SIM adds a 
very powerful layer of protection,” says Hakan 
Tatlici, Product Manager for Turkcell Wallet. 
“It’s like having a locked draw in a desk inside a 
locked room. I don’t think the others can compete 
with this.” (GSMA, 2013) 
The secure element on the SIM 
card is a proprietary area to 
host third party services, which 
allows Turkcell to control third 
party distribution. 
Turkcell follows a closed 
and moderated platform 
design approach.  
Technology 
Design 
8 
About SMS mobile payment: 
“The advantage of such a service is that it is 
useable by every mobile phone, so growing the 
available audience for Turkcell’s Cuzdan mobile 
wallet.” (Handford, 2013) 
Turkcell offers SMS mobile 
payment, which ensures 
compatibility with ordinary 
mobile phones. 
 
Turkcell issues 
evolutionary mobile 
payment instruments. 
Business 
Design 
9 
“Turkcell wants to introduce more nonpayment 
applications, such as couponing, loyalty and 
offers, which it sees as vital to ensuring the 
success of its wallet and earning more revenue 
for itself.” (Balaban, 2012) 
Turkcell bundles its mobile 
payment service with third-
party services, increasing 
thereby its value proposition. 
Through bundling, 
Turkcell enters into other 
platform markets.  
Eight Digital Payment Platforms 
Banks  
girogo (Germany) 
The saving bank group Sparkasse, one of the largest financial institutions in Germany, initially equipped 
1.5 million cardholders with NFC payment cards called girogo. The proprietary chip and PIN debit card 
also featured a built-in NFC prepaid card with the NFC payment functionality’s tied to the prepaid 
payment mode. On the merchant side, girogo payment cards are compatible with existing chip and PIN 
payment terminals, but the NFC functionality stays dormant. Nevertheless, the NFC rollout was 
accompanied by several retailers from various industries (e.g., gas stations to grocery stores) who 
showed their support by replacing old terminals with new girogo-compatible ones (i.e., 12000 girogo-
compatible payment terminals by March 2015 of 720K in total in Germany (European Central Bank, 
2012, p. 94)). To increase girogo’s value proposition further, the Sparkassen group teamed up with a 
small number of soccer clubs to bundle soccer season tickets with girogo payment cards, which allows 
soccer fans to enter the stadium and  make NFC payments at soccer games.  
                                                     
1 Number of relevant codes from data sample for a single case. 
  
 
82 
Swish (Sweden)  
Swish is a SMS-based mobile payment solution by a Swedish bank consortium comprising the six largest 
banks in Sweden: Danske Bank, Handelsbanken, Länsförsäkringar Bank, Nordea, SEB, and Swedbank. 
By joining their forces, Swish has the ability to reach 94 percent of Swedish bank customers. Swish is a 
mobile-payment application for Android, iOS, and Windows mobile phones and enables individuals and 
merchants to make mobile payments between themselves. Swish users (i.e., individuals and businesses) 
are asked to connect their mobile phone numbers with their existing bank accounts, which brings the 
convenience that money is directly transferred to existing bank accounts and avoids any intermediaries. 
Feature phones, which cannot install the Swish application, are still compatible with the Swish payment 
platform though limited in their functionality in receiving payments. To date, Swish is purely a mobile 
payment service without third party services and payment terminal integrations. In the latter case, 
merchants accept Swish payments through their existing mobile phones. 
Mobile Network Operators 
Orange (France) 
“Mobile NFC & Orange Money” is a proprietary NFC service by Orange, which is technically built on 
NFC SIM cards. The mobile network operator issues circa five million new and replacement post-paid 
SIM cards each year in hopes to equip 27 million customers with new payment instruments over the 
following years. Orange emphasized that it does not have the ambition to roll out its own payment 
service; rather, it considers itself a universal NFC hub for different contactless services. In doing so, 
Orange depends on agreements with third party NFC providers, such as banks or public transport firms, 
to be a viable NFC mobile platform service. On the merchant side, there are currently 300,000 
contactless payment terminals deployed (circa 1.8 million in total in France (European Central Bank, 
2012, p. 94)), and future payment terminals will be equipped with NFC functionalities. 
Turkcell (Turkey) 
In cooperation with the Turkish Yapi Kredit Bank and MasterCard, Turkcell, the largest mobile network 
operator in Turkey with more than 34 million customers, launched its mobile-payment initiative called 
Turkcell Cüzdan (Wallet), a mobile-payment service based on NFC. Initially, Turkcell issued 
smartphones with built-in NFC chips that the Chinese handset manufacturer Huawei produced. For 
subscribers who do not own NFC phones, NFC SIM cards served as a workaround solution. However, 
Turkcell acknowledged that the NFC rollouts were taking longer than expected. To accelerate the 
adoption, Turkcell started to offer a SMS person-to-person (P2P) payment service for mobile phones. In 
this context, mobile phone numbers serve as accounts to settle payments among users or to withdraw 
cash at ATMs. On the merchant side, Turkcell benefited from an existing NFC payment terminal 
infrastructure (66,000 units2, 2.1 million terminals in total (Bank for International Settlements, 2013, p. 
382)). Banks and terminal providers hope to increase units up to two million over the next few years. 
Turkcell has been successful in teaming up with third parties, such as Turkish banks (e.g., Akbank, 
Denizbank, İşbankası or Yapi Kredi, Garanti Bank), to host their contactless services on Turkcell’s 
proprietary NFC SIM card. Turkcell is like Orange France only an NFC hub for these payment services: 
                                                     
2 
https://www.cisco.com/en/US/solutions/collateral/ns341/ns525/ns537/ns705/ns1058/Cisco_Turkcell
_CS.pdf 
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Turkcell does not offer its own payment service. Besides payments, Turkcell increases its value 
proposition by hosting loyalty programs or location-based deals that inform subscribers about nearby 
deals. From these promotions, Turkcell receives a commission of 10 percent for each purchased deal. 
Turkcell’s business model is based on a SIM rental model that charges NFC service providers a monthly 
fee for hosting their NFC applications.  
Merchants  
Yapital (Germany)   
OTTO, the second-largest online retailer after Amazon, launched its own payment solution called 
Yapital, which is a mobile payment service based on QR codes. Yapital’s mobile payment platform is 
specifically designed to be compatible with the existing payment terminals and smartphones. By 
updating the software of ordinary chip and PIN payment terminals to display QR codes, updated payment 
terminals are capable of processing Yapital payments. To date, the Görtz Group (shoe chain), 
SportScheck (sport equipment), and Baur (online fashion and furniture store)—all subsidiaries of the 
OTTO Group—accept Yapital. Furthermore, the parent company of Yapital acquired the mobile 
commerce company NuBon, which is a specialist for mobile loyalty and couponing. NuBon and Yapital 
have announced their intention to exchange their know-how to offer a better and richer payment 
experience. At this stage, Yapital has acted solely as a mobile payment service without any third party 
involvement. 
Flash‘N pay (France)  
The Auchan group, a French multinational retail group, developed and launched a QR code-based 
mobile-payment solution called Flash‘N pay. Auchan hopes to create a mobile-payment standard across 
the French retail industry by inviting other retailers to adopt Flash‘N pay. Developed for iOS handsets, 
Flash‘N pay asks users to link their bank accounts and loyalty cards with it. To initiate payment 
transactions, customers can scan QR codes at existing payment terminals. Users are also free to choose to 
store any card by simply scanning the barcode of loyalty cards. Auchan emphasizes that its mobile-
payment service is an independent solution and compatible with existing payment terminals (i.e., after a 
software update), which allows them to circumvent the control of mobile network operators by using the 
open QR code technology.  
Payment Start-ups  
iZettle (Europe) 
The Swedish payment start-up iZettle, known as the “Square of Europe”, offers affordable mobile-
payment card readers aimed at merchants. The initial service is based on chip card readers (signature for 
authentication) that transforms existing iOS and Android mobile devices into mobile payment terminals 
by simply plugging the card reader into the headphone jack. In February 2013, iZettle launched a more 
secure version of its mobile card reader that supports chip and PIN payments, a common payment 
method in Europe. The new card reader with a built-in keypad establishes via Bluetooth a connection 
with ordinary mobile phones to process chip and PIN payments. To increase its payment ecosystem 
further, iZettle offers permission-based APIs, which allows third party developers to integrate iZettle’s 
payment functionalities into their own mobile applications. In this setting, iZettle processes payments in 
the background.  
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Payleven (Europe)  
Payleven is a Berlin-based payment start-up. Like its rival iZettle, Payleven offers mobile card readers 
for Android and iOS mobile devices based for chip and PIN payments. As a side note, Payleven and 
iZettle use the same payment hardware, which is a white-label solution from the same vendor. Payleven 
also offers permission-based APIs that allows developers to integrate Payleven payment functionalities 
into third party own apps.  
Comparative Case Analysis  
In Table 5, we analyze the cases to identify similarities and differences. The proposed framework (see 
Figure 4) serves as our analytical lens to obtain insights into how digital payment platforms are designed 
and configured that create conditions for platform envelopment. 
Table 5. The Design and Configuration of Eight Digital Payment Platforms 
Business Design Platform Design Technology Design Industry Configuration 
girogo 
Banks 
 
Business design 
In general, banks’ payment 
platforms have the capability 
to enter other platform markets 
 
 
Platform design 
Closed 
 
Technology design 
Evolutionary 
 
Market Entry: NFC hub 
girogo enters into the NFC 
service provisioning market by 
leveraging its existing user 
base. 
(Multi-sided payment 
platform) 
Closed & moderated 
girogo controls platform 
development (closed) and 
controls third party service 
distribution (moderated). 
Evolutionary 
The NFC payment card is 
compatible with existing chip 
and PIN terminals and uses the 
standard payment card form 
factor. 
 
 
Swish 
Market entry: not present 
Swish operates only in the 
payment market. 
(Two-sided payment platform) 
Closed 
Swish’s controls platform 
development (closed). Being 
solely a payment service, there 
is no third party service 
distribution. 
Evolutionary 
The mobile payment app 
(SMS) is compatible with 
existing mobile phones. 
Orange 
Mobile network operators 
 
 
Business Design 
Both mobile network operators 
enter into the market of 
moderating NFC services 
 
Platform Design 
Closed & moderated 
 
 
Technology Design 
Revolutionary 
 
Market entry: NFC hub 
Orange enters into the NFC 
service provisioning market by 
leveraging its existing user 
base. 
(Multi-sided payment 
platform) 
Closed & moderated 
Orange controls platform 
development (closed) and 
controls third party service 
distribution (moderated). 
Revolutionary 
Mobile payments based on 
NFC-SIM cards are 
incompatible with chip and 
PIN payment terminals. 
 
 
    Turkcell  
Market entry:  NFC hub 
Turkcell enters into the NFC 
service provisioning market by 
leveraging its existing user 
base. 
(Multi-sided payment 
platform) 
Closed & moderated 
Turkcell controls platform 
development (closed) and 
controls third party service 
distribution (moderated). 
Revolutionary 
Mobile payments based on 
NFC-SIM cards are 
incompatible with chip & PIN 
payment terminals. 
Yapital  
Merchants 
 
 
Business design 
Flash‘N pay enters the 
marketing market. However, 
both parent companies enter 
Market entry: not present 
Yapital operates only in the 
payment market. 
(Two-sided payment platform) 
Closed 
Yapital controls platform 
development (closed). Being 
solely a payment service, there 
is no third party service 
distribution 
Evolutionary 
Mobile payment based on QR-
Codes is compatible with 
existing payment terminals and 
camera-based mobile phones. 
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Discussion  
By embracing platform envelopment as our theoretical lens (Eisenmann et al., 2011), we study how 
digital payment platforms are designed and configured to enter other platform markets. We analyze eight 
digital payment platforms, six of which originate from different industries or were new actors in the 
payment market. We glean insights about how platforms are developed (i.e., closed or open) and how 
services are distributed (i.e., moderated or unmoderated), which we label under the umbrella term 
“platform design”. In addition, we study the payment instruments, which are physical proxies of digital 
payment platforms in regards to technology compatibility, which we label under the umbrella term 
“technology design”. Table 6 illustrates the findings from the studied cases. Key findings are that multi-
sided payment platforms enter into adjacent platform markets to exploit new business opportunities. In so 
doing, these market entries simultaneously attempt to support and reinforce existing market positions in 
their core markets. For instance, girogo, Orange, and Turkcell entered into the NFC service market, 
which, in turn, supports their respective platforms, payment instruments (payment card and mobile 
phones), and, thus, their position in their core markets. Lastly, evolutionary payment instruments that are 
compatible with existing infrastructures within different platform markets supports firms create positive 
platform envelopment conditions because it bridges users from core to adjacent platform markets. 
Payment as a service acts as the binding glue to connect core and adjacent platform markets. 
 
 
Flash‘N pay from the retail to the payment 
market. 
 
 
Platform design 
Closed 
 
Technology design 
Evolutionary 
 
Market entry: marketing 
Flash‘N pay’s enters the 
marketing market with loyalty 
card offerings. 
(Multi-sided payment 
platform) 
Closed & unmoderated 
Flash‘N pay controls platform 
development (closed). The 
distribution of loyalty cards 
does not require approval 
(unmoderated). 
Evolutionary 
Mobile payment based on QR 
codes is compatible with 
existing payment terminals and 
camera-based mobile phones. 
iZettle Payment start-ups 
 
 
Business design 
As new actors in the payment 
market, payment start-ups have 
not entered other platform 
markets, 
 
 
Platform design 
Closed & moderated 
 
 
Technology design 
Revolutionary 
Market entry: not present 
iZettle operates only in the 
payment market. 
(Two-sided payment platform) 
Closed & moderated 
iZettle controls platform 
development (closed) and 
controls third party services 
distribution (moderated). 
Revolutionary 
iZettle’s mobile card readers 
are incompatible with chip & 
PIN payment terminals. 
Payleven 
Market entry: not present 
Payleven operates only in the 
payment market. 
(Two-sided payment platform) 
Closed & moderated 
Payleven controls platform 
development (closed) and 
controls third party service 
distribution (moderated). 
Revolutionary 
Payleven’s mobile card readers 
are incompatible with chip & 
PIN payment terminals. 
 
Business design 
Four of the eight digital 
payment platforms enter into 
other existing platform 
markets. 
Platform design 
Closed and moderated is the 
dominant platform design 
approach among payment 
platforms. 
Technology design 
Technology design is balanced 
between evolutionary & 
revolutionary payment 
instruments. 
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Table 6. The Design and Configuration of Eight Payment Platforms 
 Two-sided payment platforms 
(Swish, Yapital, iZettle, Payleven) 
Multi-sided payment platforms 
(girogo, Orange, Turkcell, Flash‘N pay) 
B
u
si
n
e
ss
 D
e
si
g
n
 Platform market entry: non-existent  
The design and the configuration of all two-sided digital 
payment platforms do no support platform envelopment. 
Accordingly, conditions to enter other platform markets are 
not given.    
Platform market entry: NFC hub, marketing 
The design and configuration of all multi-sided digital 
payment platforms support conditions for platform 
envelopment to enter other platform markets.  
 
Identified markets: 
 NFC Hub: girogo, Orange, Turkcell 
 Loyalty Marketing:  Flash‘N pay 
P
la
tf
o
rm
 D
e
si
g
n
 
Platform development: closed (4x) 
All two-sided payment platforms have a closed development 
approach, hence excluding third parties from co-
development opportunities.  
Platform development: closed (4x) 
All multi-sided digital payment platforms have a closed 
development approach, hence excluding third parties from 
co-development opportunities. 
Platform service distribution: moderated (2x) 
Two of the two-sided payment platforms have a moderated 
approach in regards to platform access and service 
distribution: 
 Moderated: iZettle, Payleven 
Platform Service Distribution: moderated (3x) & 
unmoderated (1x) 
Three of the four multi-sided payment platforms have a 
moderated approach regarding platform access and service 
distribution, and one is unmoderated: 
 Moderated: girogo, Orange, Turkcell 
 Unmoderated: Flash‘N pay 
T
e
c
h
n
o
lo
g
y
 D
e
si
g
n
 
Evolutionary (2x) and revolutionary (2x) 
Two of the two-sided payment platforms issue evolutionary 
devices (i.e., SMS, QR code mobile payment) that are 
compatible between payers and payees. The other two-sided 
digital payment platforms issue revolutionary devices (i.e., 
payment dongles) that are incompatible on the payee side. 
 Revolutionary: iZettle and Payleven 
 Evolutionary: Swish and Yapital 
Evolutionary (2x) and Revolutionary (2x) 
Two of the multi-sided payment platforms issue 
evolutionary devices (i.e., NFC payment card, QR-Code 
mobile payment) that are compatible between payers and 
payees. The remaining multi-sided payment platforms issue 
revolutionary devices (NFC mobile payment) that are 
incompatible on the payee side. 
 Revolutionary: Orange, Turkcell 
 Evolutionary: girogo, Flash‘N pay 
In Sections 6.1 to 6.2.3, we discuss the insights from the Table 6 about how technology and platform 
design impact firms’ ability to enter other platform markets (i.e., business design). 
Technology Design 
Four of the eight payment platforms follow an evolutionary technology-design approach that supports 
users to adopt new payment instruments with relatively low switching costs (Eisenmann et al., 2006; 
Shapiro & Varian, 1999). The issuance of evolutionary payment instruments, in turn, enables the 
platform owner to extend the control over an existing user base. Furthermore, the findings suggest that 
industry background determines the type of payment instruments: new payment actors with no prior 
experiences in the payment market (i.e., payment start-ups and mobile network operators) have the 
tendency to issue revolutionary payment instruments. Contrary, actors with payment expertise in their 
daily operations (i.e., banks and merchants) support evolutionary payment instruments.  
One can argue that banks and merchants prefer payment instruments that are highly compatible and 
accessible with their current payment infrastructure to reduce adoption costs and, thus, reinforce existing 
customer and business structures. Contrary, mobile network operators and payment start-ups issue 
payment instruments that are relatively incompatible with the existing payment infrastructure, especially 
on the payee side. 
For instance, girogo’s NFC payment card is particularly evolutionary because it is highly compatible 
with existing ATMs and chip and PIN payment terminals. On the other hand, payment solutions by the 
mobile network operators and payment start-ups are incompatible with current chip and PIN payment 
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terminals on the payee side. One can argue that mobile network operators and payment start-ups pursue a 
deliberate revolutionary technology design strategy to lock-in their newly created user bases. Banks and 
merchants, on the other hand, pursue rather an evolutionary technology design strategy to maintain and 
grow their existing user bases.  
Implications for Business Design 
Controlling and leveraging an existing user base is a precondition for platform envelopment. The 
findings suggest that girogo and Flash N’ pay have created the best conditions for platform envelopment. 
These two payment platforms equip their large and existing user bases on the payer and payee side with 
accessible and evolutionary payment instruments, which creates conditions to bridge users into the NFC 
hub market (girogo) or loyalty card market (Flash‘N pay). Payment platforms that issue revolutionary 
payment instruments (i.e., mobile network operators, payment start-ups) face challenges in achieving 
similar platform-envelopment conditions because they lack the access and leverage of an installed user 
base, especially on the payee side. Additional findings suggest that the type of payment instruments 
determine market accessibility in the first place. Payment instruments based on NFC are suitable to serve 
contactless dominated markets, such as ticketing, which girogo illustrates (soccer season tickets). 
Alternatively, QR code-based payment instruments are more amenable to optical reader- and display-
dominated markets such as the (online) retail and marketing industry (see, for example, Flash‘N pay).  
To summarize, using evolutionary payment instruments supports platform envelopment conditions in 
regards to technology design. Moreover, strategically choosing and using certain payment instruments 
(e.g., NFC or QR codes) impacts firms’ platform envelopment capabilities to enter specific markets. 
Platform Design 
Platform Development 
The findings suggest that all eight payment platforms exercise closed platform development, which 
provides monopolistic power about how their platforms advance regarding functionality and governance. 
One can argue that a closed platform-development approach fulfills a firm’s need to exercise control over 
current and future value streams, reduce platform and service fragmentation. Alternatively, payment 
platforms simply lack organizational capabilities and resources to accommodate third parties. Lastly, 
payment service providers are highly regulated organizations (e.g., anti-money-laundering laws, 
security), which impacts the degree and number of platform co-development instances in the first place. 
Platform Service Distribution 
Six of the eight payment platforms offer platform access to third parties; however, the quality and type of 
service distribution differs. Among the two-sided payment platforms, only payment start-ups practice 
service distribution, however, payment start-ups exclude any service offered by third parties. More 
specifically, payment start-ups grant rather co-distribution rights for their own payment services (i.e., 
moderated). For example, iZettle and Payleven authorize app developers to make use of their payment 
APIs, which helps them to extend their footprint in the payment market.  
Contrary, multi-sided payment platforms integrate and distribute third party services. These platforms 
predominantly use a moderated service-distribution approach (e.g., see girogo, Orange, and Turkcell). A 
moderated service-distribution approach may allow firms to select complementary services to increase 
overall platform value as with girogo (i.e., ticketing) and Turkcell (i.e., mobile location-based deals). 
Flash‘N pay’s merchant solution differs. Flash‘N pay has an unmoderated service distribution approach 
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that does not require approval because Flash‘N pay grants one the freedom to store any loyalty card. This 
kind of configuration may support Flash‘N pay’s intended data-collection efforts in the loyalty card 
market.  
Our findings suggest that two-sided payment platforms primarily seek to operate and grow in the 
payment market and, accordingly, support design measures to achieve these goals. Thus, two-sided 
payment platforms are inherently designed and configured to operate in the payment market. Contrary, 
multi-sided payment platforms are inherently designed and configured to support payment-unrelated 
services, which corresponds with the notion of platform envelopment. 
Implications for Business Design 
To achieve platform envelopment conditions on the platform-design level, payment platforms need the 
necessary organizational and technical capabilities to incorporate and distribute payment-unrelated 
services to a large user base. In this study, girogo and Flash‘N pay have created the best conditions for 
platform envelopment on the platform design level. First, girogo and Flash‘N pay distribute payment-
unrelated services to a ready-made user base. Second, girogo and Flash‘N pay effectively distribute their 
payment unrelated services to their user base by leveraging on accessible and evolutionary payment 
instruments. Orange and Turkcell distribute payment-unrelated services as well. However, they do not 
create platform envelopment conditions as well as girogo and Flash‘N pay do. Because they issue 
revolutionary payment instruments, which limits service delivery to existing users especially on the 
payee side.  
To summarize, closed platform development and moderated/unmoderated platform service distribution 
are design options and configurations that support platform envelopment conditions on the platform-
design level. The current design and configuration of two-sided payment platforms do not support 
platform envelopment conditions, as they are purposefully designed to operate in the payment market. 
Theoretical and Practical Implications 
We contribute to the literature on multi-sided platforms (Hagiu & Wright, 2011; Rochet & Tirole, 2002, 
2003a, 2003b, 2006), technology standards (Besen & Farrell, 1994; Shapiro & Varian, 1999; Tassey, 
2000; West & Dedrick, 2000), and platform market entry (Eisenmann et al., 2011) by proposing a 
framework to study the design and configuration of digital payment platforms and how these firms create 
conditions for platform envelopment. 
Our findings are novel in that they suggest that, due to technological advancements in the digital 
payment space, one can conceptually extend the notion of two-sided payment platforms (i.e., single-
purpose platforms) (Rochet & Tirole, 2002, 2003a) to multi-sided payment platforms (i.e., multi-purpose 
platforms). Multi-sided payment platforms can create platform envelopment conditions through strategic 
design and configurations while supporting multiple services. Our results illustrate that multi-sided 
payment platforms create conditions for platform envelopment by leveraging on (1) evolutionary 
payments instruments and (2) payment services as means to bridge users from core to adjacent platform 
markets. In so doing, core and adjacent platform markets reciprocally support each other, which, in turn, 
strengthen firms’ market positions in their respective core markets. We are not aware of prior work that 
has specifically studied the design and configuration of digital payment platforms in terms of platform 
market entry. As such, this paper provides a conceptual contribution to better describe and understand 
contemporary digital payment platforms and their market-entry options. Moreover, we help practitioners 
make decisions by increasing their awareness of different digital platform design and configurations 
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options they have to enter other platform markets. For instance, managers can evaluate strategies for 
alternative platform configurations as digital payment platforms evolve and mature over time (e.g., 
extending their platform design towards open and moderated to create a valuable platform ecosystem). 
Future Research 
Future research could study different payment platform design and configurations to understand 
successful platform-envelopment strategies. Because our conceptual framework illustrates correlational 
relationships among the platform elements, future research could study the causality between platform 
governance, technology compatibility, and overlapping users to prescribe effective platform market 
entries. Lastly, research could also explore the different layers of payment platforms (Yoo et al., 2010). 
Mobile payment platforms consist of various technology layers that are provided by handset makers, app 
stores, and communication networks, which may impact platform envelopment capabilities. 
Limitations 
This paper has certain limitations. We adopt a platform-centric view, which does not cover an analysis 
about users, in-depth hardware specifications, or security requirements that may have an impact on 
market entries. Furthermore, because we only used triangulated data based on secondary sources, the 
proposed framework does not create theoretical generalizability. Nevertheless, we believe that this paper 
is a small but a concrete step to outline fruitful research avenues in the domain of multi-sided payment 
platforms. Another aspect that may reduce the framework’s validity is that almost all presented cases 
were in their pilot stages; thus, current settings (e.g., partnerships or technology) may change in the 
future. In addition, we could not study actual clashes between different platforms and third party services 
that may hijack customer relationships. Studying tensions would provide valuable insights into the 
dynamics of platform control and platform envelopment. 
Conclusion 
This paper presents a conceptual framework that we distilled from existing literature to understand and 
explain the design and configuration of digital payment platforms and how payment platforms create 
conditions to enter other platform markets through platform envelopment. To provide an answer to our 
research question, we performed a multiple and comparative-case study in a European setting by using 
our framework as an analytical lens to identify similarities and differences among the cases. By 
synthesizing our observations, we identify that digital payment platforms enter into adjacent platform 
markets (i.e., business design), which is driven by platform design (i.e., platform development and 
service distribution) and technology design (i.e., the issuance of evolutionary and revolutionary payment 
instruments. The findings suggest that multi-sided payment platforms leverage on (1) evolutionary 
payment instruments and (2) payment services as a mean to bridge users from core to adjacent platform 
markets. In so doing, platform envelopment strengthens firms’ market position in their respective core 
markets.   
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Towards a Framework of Digital Platform Competition: A Comparative 
Study of Monopolistic & Federated Mobile Payment Platforms 
Abstract 
This paper advances a framework for examining the competitive principles of mobile payment platforms. 
We postulate that the strategic interplay of platform layers will drive the competitive dynamics of 
platform-driven ubiquitous systems. This framework has been employed in a comparative case study 
between monopolistic (i.e., Pingit) and federated (i.e., Paym) mobile payment platforms to illustrate its 
applicability and yield principles on the nature and impact of competition among platform-driven 
ubiquitous systems. Preliminary findings indicate that monopolistic mobile digital platforms attempt to 
create unique configurals to obtain monopolistic power by tightly coupling platform layers, which are 
difficult to replicate. Conversely, federated digital platforms compete by dispersing the service layer to 
harness the collective resources from individual firms. Furthermore, the interaction and integration 
among platform layers give rise to commodity and value platform layers that translate into competitive 
battlegrounds among mobile payment services. This paper therefore represents a concrete step in 
unraveling the competitive dynamics of platform-driven ubiquitous systems from an architectural 
viewpoint. 
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1 Introduction 
Platformization of information technology (IT) has cultivated business ecosystems [2] that challenge the 
predominant business logics of traditional market structures. At its core, digital platforms mediate the 
production and consumption of goods and services (e.g., payment) in an efficient manner [45], [47]. As 
is apparent from the well-publicized cases of Apple’s iTunes, iPhone and the App Store [cf. 0), [28], 
[30], [50], digital platforms not only possess the capability to deconstruct once vertically integrate value 
chains, but they also erode the viability of incumbents’ business models at an unprecedented speed [20], 
[23], [39]. 
Increasingly, digitized goods and services are being distributed through ubiquitous computing systems in 
the form of mobile devices. As digital platforms and mobile devices become technologically intertwined, 
the latter typically function as physical proxies of the former. Together, digital platforms and their 
corresponding proxies resemble platform-driven ubiquitous systems that facilitate seamless access to 
cross-channel goods and services in order to aid users in accomplishing a multitude of tasks. As an 
illustration, the Android mobile operating system is reflective of a platform-driven ubiquitous system 
that encourages the creation and delivery of goods and services, which are interoperable across multiple 
devices. In other words, digital platforms constitute the technical foundation for realizing ubiquitous 
systems. An in-depth appreciation of digital platforms and their corresponding proxies is thus necessary 
to comprehend how ubiquitous systems emerge and compete. 
As digital platforms constitute the technical foundation for ubiquitous systems, they tend to differentiate 
and compete on two key fronts: (1) architectural, and; (2) deliverables. Digital platforms differ 
considerably in their architectural design and configuration in the delivery of ubiquitous platform-driven 
services. Arguably, certain architectural designs and configurations might be more efficient (e.g., high 
level of vertical integration) due to their competitive and/or generative capabilities. This architectural 
differentiation, in turn, has an impact on the attributes of the delivered platform services (e.g., app user 
experience). In so doing, digital platforms are confronted with the challenge of striking an equilibrium 
between internal stability to ensure system resilience, and external usability to address ever-changing 
customer needs in the market (cf. 0). Accordingly, platform providers offering ubiquitous services are 
compelled to design and configure their digital platforms in a dualistic manner that balances 
technological flexibility and reliability in order to derive business value. 
Platform-driven ubiquitous systems are predominant in the payment industry as well. With the 
emergence of mobile payment platforms, which are layered modular architectures offering payment 
services [57], payers and payees can be connected via mobile devices. Mobile devices basically serve as 
location-independent platform proxies. Although mobile payment is not a recent phenomenon, it is 
deemed as a novelty that has gained a recent foothold in European markets. For instance, Apple Pay was 
launched in Summer 2015 in the UK [7]. The delay can be attributed to the existence of well-accepted 
payment systems in Europe so much so that mobile payment solutions, which were introduced before, 
did not deliver a convincing value preposition, or that disagreements among stakeholders slowed the 
rollout of mobile payments services [42].  
The number of users and transaction volumes for mobile payment services are growing steadily. For 
instance, in 2014, 3% of UK adults performed in-store mobile payment, and this figure rose to 13% in 
2015 [22]. An outcome of this popular trend is that the mobile payment market becomes increasingly 
fragmented and competitive. To keep rivals at a distance, mobile payment providers usually strive for 
innovation to differentiate themselves. Yet, despite the growing prevalence of mobile payment services, 
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there is a paucity of studies that has examined how mobile payment platforms, or more broadly, how 
platform-driven ubiquitous systems compete in the market, especially from an architectural viewpoint. 
This paper hence advances a framework for unraveling the competitive logic of platform-driven 
ubiquitous systems. To do so, we embrace a granular view on mobile payment platforms and their 
corresponding proxies. Specifically, we expand on the work of Yoo, et al. [57] by delineating mobile 
payment platforms into five layers: (1) device; (2) (operating) system; (3) network; (4) service, and; (5) 
content. Furthermore, depending on the governance regime being enacted [4], [38], we argue that each of 
these aforementioned platform layers signifies a competitive space in its own right to wrestle for market 
leadership. Taken as a whole, the interaction and the integration among these five platform layers define 
and drive competition among platform-driven ubiquitous systems, which in turn gives rise to our 
conceptual distinction between commodity and value platform layers. Through this study, we endeavor to 
provide an answer to the following research question: 
What are the constituent dimensions of platform-driven ubiquitous systems that drive competition in 
mobile payment markets? 
This paper contributes to extant literature on digital platforms and ubiquitous systems [19], [21], [25], 
[26], [29], [41], [45], [57] by advancing a preliminary framework that situates competitive drivers of 
platform-driven ubiquitous systems between and within platform layers. This framework was then 
employed in a comparative case study between two leading UK mobile payment platforms (i.e., Paym 
and Pingit) to illustrate its applicability and yield principles on the nature and impact of competition 
among platform-driven ubiquitous systems. 
It has to be emphasized that this paper focuses on the competition of digital platforms that operate as 
ubiquitous systems [57]. For this reason, discussions on different platform categories (e.g., product or 
multi-sided platforms) (cf. 0), [29] are beyond the scope of this research. The remainder of this paper 
proceeds as follows: In the next section, we provide a working definition for digital platforms and their 
relationship to ubiquitous systems. Based on this definition, we offer an overview of extant literature on 
digital platform layers and governance regimes that give rise to distant platform profiles. In Section 3, we 
present our research method. In Section 4, we present Paym and Pingit as illustrative cases of mobile 
payment providers that leverage on platform thinking for market competition. In Section 5, we 
synthesized insights gleaned from analyzing these two cases. In Section 6, we conclude by: (1) 
summarizing implications for theory and practice; (2) outlining limitations, and; (3) proposing avenues 
for future research.  
2 Theoretical Background 
In this section we present our theoretical footing to understand digital platforms that enable ubiquities 
systems. 
2.1 Defining Digital Platform 
To define digital platforms, it is imperative to first distinguish the concept of platform from that of 
architecture and infrastructure, terms often employed interchangeably in past studies. Architecture is the 
conceptual and logical structure (i.e., blueprint) of a functional system [51], [52], whereas infrastructure 
is the actual operationalization of a functioning architecture. Hanseth and Lyytinen [33] defined 
infrastructure as a shared, open, heterogeneous and evolving socio-technical system whose structural 
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composition consists of other infrastructures, platforms, applications and technological capabilities, 
thereby underlining its recursive nature. 
Conversely, Yoo, et al. [57] conceived layered modular architectures (or digital platforms) as hybrids 
that blend both modular and layered architectures. Whereas (1) modular architecture represent a ‘nested 
and fixed’ boundary for the assimilation of modular components to build product-specific artifacts, the 
(2) layered architecture supports generativity over and above its modular counterpart by establishing the 
necessary requirements for creating agnostic platform derivatives (see Figure 1). Taking Apple’s iPhone 
as an illustrative example, its modular architecture comprises modular components (e.g., chips and 
operating system), which when combined, constitutes a smartphone as a nested, fixed and ubiquitous IT 
artifact. On the other hand, the layered architecture of the iPhone gives rise to developmental toolkits that 
can be harnessed by third parties to construct software for the service layer or hardware (e.g., camera 
lens) on the device layer. Accordingly, digital platform layers have the attributes in being symbiotic that 
connect and expand the functionalities of platform modules. 
For this study, we hence subscribe to Kazan, et al. [35] definition of digital platform as a proprietary or 
open modular layered technological architecture that supports efficient development of innovative 
derivatives, which are embedded in a business or social context. We find the preceding definition to be 
amenable to this study because as emphasized above, digital platforms should not be construed merely as 
monolithic artifacts, but rather, as the embodiment of both modular and layered architectures. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Platform evolution & layered platform 
2.2 Digital Platforms and Ubiquitous Systems  
Because digital platforms can be construed as a composition of technology layers and modules that 
facilitate the creation and delivery of goods and services within and across business networks [3], they 
basically function as building blocks for ubiquitous systems [41]. Ubiquitous systems are omnipresent IT 
artifacts that are deeply embedded in socio-economic environments through the delivery of location-
independent digitized goods and services [40]. Most of these ubiquitous systems or devices (e.g., 
smartphones), however, do not possess the required computational foundation to deliver these services 
on their own. Digital platforms thus play a vital role by providing the necessary computational 
foundation and business logic to deliver services that cater to a network of interrelated ubiquitous 
devices. In so doing, digital platforms and ubiquitous devices complement and support each other by 
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extending and augmenting functionalities in a conjoint manner. To put it differently, digital platforms 
enable platform-driven ubiquities systems. 
Today’s organizations face considerable challenges in offering platform-driven ubiquities services. 
Besides resolving complexities such as interoperability, revenue sharing or data ownership [56], 
organizational resources and capabilities are unevenly distributed among market participants in the 
delivery of competitive ubiquitous services.  
To understand the logic of ubiquities services within competitive market environments, we subscribe to 
the layered modular architecture [57] as our theoretical and analytical lens to unpack the constituents and 
competitive dimensions of platform-driven ubiquitous systems. We posit that the interplay of platform 
layers is the foundation upon which market competition manifests. For instance, the governance regime 
of Apple and Google on the service layer (Apple Pay vs. Android Pay) differ in their degree of control by 
blocking or tolerating services on the device layer for conducting moderated or unmoderated contactless 
mobile payments (cf.0), [50]. As alleged by Amadeo [5], Android was deliberately introduced by Google 
as an open source project to mobilize third-party developers and pre-empt Apple from acquiring 
dominance within mobile industries. 
2.3 Digital Platforms as Layered Modular Architectures 
Past studies have laid the foundation for envisioning digital platforms as layered modular architectures 
[8], [9], [44], [51], [57], especially with respect to how technological capabilities affect interconnected 
digital platforms [33], as well as how platform owners exercise governance in an attempt to strike an 
equilibrium between control and openness to foster platform innovation [11], [12], [30], [34], [54]. 
Consistent with Yoo, et al. [57] conception of layered modular architectures, we theorize digital 
platforms as encapsulating five distinct and interlinked platform layers: (1) device; (2) system; (3) 
network; (4) service, and; (5) content. Each of these five platform layers can independently support 
modularity [46], [48] by permitting external parties (e.g., third-party developers) to contribute with their 
respective software and/or hardware resources in co-creating and capturing value. Modularity [46] in 
digital platforms thus gives birth to modularized, digital goods and services on each layer (e.g., iOS 
payment applications). 
From a strategic viewpoint, layered modular architectures have the competitive advantage, as well as the 
challenge, in being doubly distributed [57]. They are distributed in that external actors collaborate and 
contribute with their respective resources towards different platform layers. At the same time, they are 
doubly in their nature as internal and external actors conjointly or independently (1) control and (2) 
generate component knowledge in select areas of a layered modular architecture. Consequently, 
organizations that mutually contribute to a single layer can be viewed as collaborators in pursuit of 
common business goals, but at the same time, they could be fierce competitors on other layers. Take 
Apple’s iPad as an example. Amazon contributes with its Kindle eBook service towards iPad’s content 
and service layer. But concurrently, Amazon competes with Apple on the device layer with its own 
Kindle eBook readers and tablets [57]. By drawing on the conceptual granularity of platform layers, we 
can better comprehend how the design and configuration of digital platforms (i.e., arrangement of 
platform layers) impact their competiveness within ubiquitous ecosystems. 
In the following, we illustrate the five platform layers through the example of Apple Pay, Apple’s mobile 
payment service (see Figure 2). 
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 Device Layer: A physical, programmable IT artifact for storing and processing digitally encoded 
data and instructions. Apple’s iPhone and smartwatch embody these traits by being physical IT 
artifacts that store and run the Apple Pay software (integrated in passbook app), and initiate 
Near-Field-Communication (NFC) payments.  
 System Layer: A logical software system for controlling and executing software and hardware 
components. Apple’s mobile payment solution Apple Pay requires iOS and Watch OS as 
operating systems to regulate the functional operations of the payment app (software), NFC chips 
and its secure element (physical). 
 Network Layer: Communication channel for transporting data packages among different nodes. 
Apple’s mobile payment service relies on the services of mobile operators (e.g., AT&T) and 
payment networks (e.g., Visa and MasterCard) to process and settle payments. 
 Service Layer: Software applications for storing, generating and distributing proprietary and/or 
third-party data. Apple Pay is a payment service that not only mediates commercial transactions, 
but also offers Application Programming Interfaces (API) and Software Development Kits 
(SDK) to facilitate the integration of Apple Pay into third-party applications. 
 Content Layer: Representation of digital data in terms of audio, video, text and images. Apple 
Pay generates payment data in the form of purchase amount, merchant, time and/or location, to 
name a few.  
Arguably, each of the aforementioned five platform layers possesses the capability to support modularity 
and that the depth of access to these platform layers leads to (un)moderated generativity and competition 
opportunities [58], which in turn attests to the criticality of governance regime in digital platforms. 
 
 
Figure 2: Digital platform layers & modules of Apple Pay 
2.4 Digital Platform Governance  
Extant literature on IT governance espouses the notion of alignment between IT functions and 
organizational structures to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of firms’ response to internal and 
external environments. Anecdotal evidence from these studies suggests that organizations typically 
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adhere to one of three IT governance regimes: centralized, decentralized and hybrid governance, the 
latter being the simultaneous application of both centralized and decentralized governance in certain 
business units within the same organization [4], [16], [17], [27], [38]. 
Ahituv, et al. [4] defined centralized systems as those with the entire computing power concentrated in 
one site, and that all strategic decisions are made in one location. Conversely, decentralized systems 
deploy processors (computing power) in various locations, which are not linked through a network, and 
that strategic decisions are located in a core location, but other decisions can be made in an unrestricted 
number of locations. Likewise, Leifer [38] and Ahituv, et al. [4] employ the same terminologies, but 
define them differently. For instance, Leifer [38] emphasized the connectedness of decentralized 
systems, describing such systems as peer networks where no central processor exists through which 
communications must pass, offering a high degree of communication freedom. For instance, consider 
Apple Pay and Bitcoin. Both represent novel forms of payment systems, but their governance structures 
differ substantially. Whereas Apple moderates access to its payment service through boundary resources 
(i.e., centralized and closed) [30], Bitcoin is ungoverned (i.e., decentralized and open). Conceivably, 
distributed digital platforms resemble a hybrid of centralized and decentralized platforms, where 
governance and control is dispersed among various permissioned stakeholders.  
In light of the above discussion, we differentiate and focus in this study on centralized and distributed 
governance for digital platforms. For centralized digital platforms, decision rights are concentrated with 
tightly coupled platform layers, what we labeled as nested and fix platform. This gives rise to 
monopolistic power over a digital platform and its layers exhibit the attributes of being vertically 
integrated. For distributed digital platforms, decision rights are dispersed among various permissioned 
third parties with loosely coupled platform layers, what we termed as federated platforms and its layers 
exhibit the attributes of being horizontal in nature. 
3 Research Method 
Research Method: Interpretive Case Study. The method of enquiry for this study is a comparative and 
interpretative case study aimed at uncovering how platform-driven ubiquitous ecosystems compete [53], 
[55]. Accordingly, we adopt a descriptive and exploratory approach [31] by synthesizing focal concepts 
from digital platform literature to craft an analytical lens for deriving competitive attributes pertinent to 
platform-driven markets and disentangling how competition plays out among platform layers. We deem 
the case study approach to be an appropriate mode of enquiry as it can answer how and why questions in 
complex and nebulous research environments [24], [55]. The case study approach is therefore suitable for 
untangling the intricate relationship between market forces and platform layers, both of which are 
responsible for shaping competition in the mobile payment market. 
Research Setting: UK Mobile Payment Market. For this study, we turn to the UK mobile payment market 
as our empirical context. The UK payment industry is in the midst of a massive transformation. New 
actors with little or no prior industry backgrounds (e.g., mobile network operators and payment start-ups) 
have entered the payment industry and are beginning to encroach on the traditionally protected payment 
market. Institutionalized incumbents (e.g., banks) are thus under threat from these new actors, 
transforming payment to a commoditized service and a by-product for other lucrative services.  
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By offering accessible, interchangeable and novel payment instruments (e.g., smartphones), these new 
players are pursuing a strategy of cultivating new consumption habits. These new consumption habits 
may aid in establishing fresh customer relationships and yielding opportunities for potential 
disintermediation. In this sense, incumbents (i.e., banks) were forced to launch their own mobile payment 
solutions as a preemptive move to discourage potential entrants or safeguard existing market structures. 
Specifically, current market incumbents introduced following mobile payment solutions to preserve 
current market: (1) Pingit offered by Barclays with 2.7 million active users (September 2015) [10], and 
(2) Paym with 3.2 million strong user base (February 2016) [43]. 
Mobile Payment Platforms: Orchestrating IT Artifacts. Mobile payment platforms are complex financial 
technology (i.e., FinTech) IT artifacts that are embedded within innovative and competitive business 
networks to mediate payment transactions. Fundamentally, payment is the process of transferring money 
from a sender to a receiver that involves payment instruments, payment processing and payment 
settlement [37]. Most moderns payment systems or platforms are four-party schemes (e.g., Visa, Pingit), 
where platform owner primarily orchestrate and set the rules [32], [45] for how payment transactions are 
transferred among (1) payers; (2) payees; (3) acquirer (i.e., payee’s bank), and; (4) issuer (i.e., payer’s 
bank).  
Figure 3 illustrates the logic of a mobile payment transaction within a four-part scheme. The payer 
authorizes the payee (e.g., merchant) with its mobile phone (e.g., through a QR-code scan) to debit a 
payment amount from the payer’s bank account. The payee in turn, sends a debit payment request to its 
acquirer, and the acquirer forwards the debit payment request through the mobile payment platform 
provider (e.g., Pingit) to the relevant issuer. If the payer’s bank account has sufficient liquidity, the issuer 
authorizes and settles the payment between the payment service provider and acquirer. The payee, at the 
end, gets notified about the successful transaction and hands over the (digital) goods to the payer. 
 
 
        Figure 3: Mobile payment platform within a four-party scheme 
 
Case Selections: Two UK Mobile Payment Platforms. To identify platform-driven competition in the UK 
mobile payment market, we began with four semi-structured interviews with experts, who are 
knowledgeable about the UK payment industry. These four experts were selected based on their 
familiarity with the UK payment industry and job capacity in prominent finance-related organizations. 
Interviews with these experts guided us in constructing an overview of the UK payment landscape and 
gleaning insights into the roles of various payment actors (e.g., banks, acquirers, technology providers, 
payment networks and infrastructure providers). From these interviews, we identified the two largest 
mobile payment platforms operating in the UK mobile payment: (1) Paym (a collaborative solution 
offered by UK banks), and; (2) Pingit (a proprietary solution promoted by Barclays).  
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Furthermore, industry experts aided us in identifying invisible payment actors (e.g., technology 
providers) that enable mobile payments behind the scenes. For instance, one expert states: Paym itself is 
owned by the Payments Council […] they are the group responsible for setting the rules, running the 
overall project and getting it live. What Vocalink provides is the technical infrastructure behind that but 
maps the mobile phone numbers to your bank account [….] the connectivity between something like Visa, 
MasterCard would be at a Faster Payments Link BACS type level […] there's then connectivity at a level 
above that, those overlay type services of Pingit and Paym. 
Both mobile payment platforms offer payment solutions targeted towards businesses and individuals. We 
opted for these mobile payment solutions as our case organizations because Pingit and Paym are the 
dominant solutions in the UK mobile payment market. Large financial institutions do not only operate 
them, they also boast of large and growing user bases with rising transaction volumes. In addition, we 
deliberately selected these two mobile payment platforms for comparison because they are representative 
of two distinctively different governance regimes: centralized managed by one organization (i.e., Pingit) 
versus distributive managed by a group organizations (i.e., Paym). 
Data Collection. The empirical basis for this study is based on two semi-structured interviews and 
secondary data. Specifically, we conducted in-depth and face-to-face interviews with: (1) the Head of 
Development at Paym, and; (2) the Senior Vice President (SVP) of mobile solutions at Barclays. 
Interview questions were adapted from extant literature on digital platform, paying particularly close 
attention to how platform layers are designed and configured. Our interview strategy is devised to 
unravel the mechanisms behind how each of the two mobile payment platforms functions in practice (i.e., 
narrative and visual reconstruction of mobile payment transactions) and ascertain external partners, who 
are vital in supplying complementary capabilities and resources to enable the corresponding payment 
service. Additionally, we triangulated the interview data with payment reports, white papers, press 
releases and archival records from industry associations (e.g., the European and UK Payments Council), 
payment industry online news outlets (e.g., Finextra) and payment news aggregators (i.e., The Paypers) 
in order to reconstruct the UK payment landscape with its respective stakeholders and pinpoint 
commercially active mobile payment platform providers and infrastructure providers.  
Data Analysis. After a careful review of the secondary data, relevant data points were interpreted [53] to 
reconstruct the UK payment industry. We conceptualized what a typical mobile payment transaction 
looks like for Paym and Pingit respectively (see Figure 3). We then identified external partners on the 
network and service layer, who are vital in supplying complementary capabilities and resources to 
achieve and sustain an operational mobile payment service. Ultimately, our research goal was to discover 
similar and different platform layer configurations in order to derive competitive platform principles. 
With regards to the fully transcribed semi-structured interviews, the first author performed thematic 
analysis [14], [15]. Thematic analysis is an analytical method to identify, analyze and report patterns 
(i.e., themes) within rich datasets. Specifically, we utilized theoretical thematic analysis, where codes or 
themes are guided by existing research to expand theory. The first author began by identifying emerging 
and recurring patterns from the dataset that exhibit architectural attributes (e.g., platform layers, 
modules) of platform-driven ubiquitous systems. These patterns were in turn filtered through the layered 
modular architecture framework (see Table 1) to derive competitive dynamics and principles on each 
platform layer. To do so, we adhered to an iterative approach similar to the one advocated by Klein and 
Myers [36] in that we go back and forth between our findings and the analytical framework. 
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To overcome potential biases on the part of the first author, we further pursued a differentiated role 
strategy during data analysis [1]. As the first author conducted the initial data analysis, the other co-
authors play the role of the devil’s advocate by coming up with alternative interpretations, and counter-
arguments. The entire data analysis process followed an iterative cycle as well and it was only concluded 
when all authors agree on the findings in accordance with the analytical framework. 
Table 1: Sample coding from Pingit 
Platform Layers Exemplary Quote Synthesis 
Content Layer […] it will be a lot of rigor around analyzing what those API's 
and what information they have access to […] it's very much 
about providing information into, or to, the Pingit app as opposed 
to integrating Pingit into another app, for example. 
Pingit is guarding its data (i.e., payment data) and 
that the data flow is orientated inwards to enrich the 
payment service further. 
Service Layer It has to be, of course, then commercially relevant to be 
disclosing any API's to that party. 
So [Pingit] available to anybody in the UK with a UK mobile 
number and a UK current account so you don’t have to be with 
Barclays to use Pingit. 
Pingit is providing through application program 
interface (APIs) moderated access to its payment 
service. Furthermore, the payment service is 
accessible to all UK banks customers (i.e., including 
customers from rival banks). 
Network Layer So yeah, when we use the Faster Payment infrastructure we as, of 
course, is one of the founders of the Faster Payments 
infrastructure we'll have connectivity into the Payments Councils 
faster payments product […] 
All major UK banks, including Barclays, have access 
to the Faster Payment infrastructure to send and clear 
payments across the UK. 
System Layer In terms of the support that we provide for Pingit for consumers, 
we're running on certainly iOS, on Android, on Blackberry or - 
and Microsoft now as well. 
Pingit is compatible with major mobile operating 
systems. 
Device Layer So the consumer side, we provide the app that runs on the 
different smartphone platforms or tablets. 
Pingit is designed to work on various ubiquitous 
devices.  
4 Comparative Case Study of Two Mobile Payment Platforms 
In this section, we present two distinctive mobile payment platforms: Paym and Pingit. Consistent with 
Hagiu and Wright [32], digital payment providers are multisided payment platforms that connect payers 
and payees. To illustrate the explanatory power of our proposed framework for deciphering competition 
of platform-driven ubiquitous systems, we perform a comparative cross-case analysis to pinpoint 
competition on different platform layers that give rise to competitive profiles. 
Pingit by Barclays. In 2012, Barclays was the first UK high street bank to launch its own internally 
developed mobile payment service called Pingit. Pingit was initially designed to be a pure person-to-
person (P2P) mobile payment service, enabling individuals to perform direct payments among one 
another. After successfully establishing a solid installed user base, Barclays grew its Pingit customer base 
further by targeting small business owners and online retailers, enabling businesses to conduct end-to-
end mobile commerce for the first time. 
Barclays was highly strategic in rolling out Pingit, having the ambition to attain market dominance in a 
rapid fashion. A key measure was garnering the support of all major mobile platforms right from the start 
(i.e., iOS, Android and Blackberry), which enabled Barclays to leverage on customers’ smartphones (and 
smart watches lately) to issue digital payment instruments. Compared to conventional means (e.g., plastic 
payment card), the issuance of digital payment instruments (e.g., iOS app) has the advantage of issuing 
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affordable payment instruments in a rapid manner with the latest features, directly into the hand of the 
customers. Moreover, the Pingit service is made available to users from rival UK banks as well. This sets 
the foundation for establishing new customer relationships in a subtle manner while harvesting valuable 
customer data over time.  
To grow its Pingit ecosystem even further, Barclays operates an accelerator program in parallel, granting 
select startups with privileged access to Pingit APIs. After an internal review process, Barclays chose 
startups that can harness Pingit APIs to innovate new services with the ultimate objective of bolstering 
the value proposition of the mobile payment service. In general, these measures help to boost transaction 
volume on the Pingit platform, which in turn benefits from economies of scale effects while increasing 
prospects for data collection. With a 2.7 million strong user base, Barclays recently decided to expand 
Pingit’s usefulness and market reach by improving its compatibility with Paym, an alternate consortium-
driven mobile payment system. 
To initiate Pingit payments, users enter the mobile phone numbers of the recipient where phone numbers 
serve as proxies for bank account details stored on the Pingit system. After receiving the payment 
instruction, Barclays applies a dual approach in processing and settling Pingit payment transactions. For 
Pingit users who are Barclays customers, the settlement occurs internally within the Pingit platform in 
real-time (see Figure 4). In elaborating it further, the SVP states that: a consumer [pushes] the money 
which is what a Pingit transaction [is…] we can just move the money from one Pingit account to another 
Pingit account. For Pingit users who are non-Barclays customers, Pingit routes the (push) payment 
through the Faster Payments network. As a founding member of the Faster Payments scheme, Barclays 
has express access to the Faster Payments network, enabling interbank transfers in near real-time. As the 
SVP states: we use the Faster Payments infrastructure, of course, as one of the founders of the Faster 
Payments infrastructure we have connectivity. 
 
Figure 4: Pingit mobile payment platform 
Paym – Industry Consortium Solution. Launched in April 2014, Paym is a mobile payment service 
developed by the UK Payment Council and is now jointly owned by its participating members of 
financial institutions. The UK Payment Council, an industry-wide consortium representing financial 
institutions, has the mission of fostering innovation and collaboration in the British payment landscape. 
As Barclays has proven market readiness and success with its own mobile payment service in the form of 
Pingit, the UK Payment Council was commissioned to develop a competitive, though, collaborative 
solution. Specifically, the Paym initiative has the intention of equipping bank institutions with basic 
mobile payment functionalities that serve as the foundation for an industry-wide standard. Arguably, the 
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industry collaboration represents a preemptive move against Barclays to impede its market dominance 
and preserve pre-existing customer relationships. 
At the same time, the Paym initiative was deliberately designed to leave room for differentiation in order 
to create competitive space among its members. Specifically, Paym differs from Barclays’ Pingit 
standalone application in that it functions as a feature within existing mobile banking applications. 
Accordingly, Paym is identical in its functionality for each financial institution. However, the 
competitive turf among participating financial institutions occurs in their own mobile banking 
applications, competing through service differentiation and interface usability. 
Paym’s availability towards end-users (private or businesses) is determined by whether: (1) a financial 
institution has entered into a Paym service agreement, and; (2) a mobile banking app is supportive of 
certain mobile platforms (e.g., Android, Windows). Accordingly, the physical payment instrument, 
usually provided by financial institutions in the form of plastic payment cards, comes now in a digital 
form while leveraging on end-user smartphones. Consequently, the Paym platform acts as an overlay 
service on top of existing banks accountants that links bank account numbers with mobile phone 
numbers. As soon a Paym transaction is tied to a mobile phone number, the service initiates a traditional 
bank transfer to the associated bank account (see Figure 5). 
Paym is hence a highly complementary service that supports existing bank-customer relationships, 
preserves existing customer data ownerships, and utilizes existing payment rails (i.e., Faster Payments 
and LINK). As the Head of Development states: the idea is that you already trust your bank, you get this 
functionality and then everybody can send money to each other using their existing relationship […] I'm 
then providing my bank with the instruction to make a payment and that payment will either go through 
Faster Payments or it will go through LINK and those are the two approved, two supported, payment 
schemes in this service.  
 
Figure 5: Paym mobile payment platform 
5 Case Analysis and Findings 
In this section, we present insights gleaned about the competitiveness of mobile payment platforms for 
each of the five platform layers through a comparative analysis of Paym and Pingit. For each layer, we 
will describe the layer dynamics and their underlying competitive principles. Whereas the platform layer 
dynamics depict how each platform layer is designed and configured from an internal viewpoint, the 
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platform layer competitive principles reveal the underlying competitive principles that transpire in the 
marketplace. 
5.1 Device Layer 
Platform Layer Dynamics: Paym and Pingit leverage on customers’ mobile devices to offer and distribute 
their mobile payment services to the market. Requirements for mobile devices to participate in these 
mobile payment services are relatively low, as they require simply an Internet connection and phones 
number to settle payments between payers and payees. By offering mobile payments to end users, both 
mobile payment platforms have the ability to issue affordable digital payment instruments in a rapid 
fashion. In so doing, Paym and Pingit demonstrate that these mobile payment platforms are neither 
interested nor capable of controlling the device layer (i.e., smartphones). In this sense, both mobile 
payment platforms have to adapt their payment applications accordingly in order to piggyback on 
customers’ mobile devices to utilize them as ubiquitous distribution channels. 
Competitive Principles: Both mobile payment platforms adhere to a cost-driven approach on their device 
layer by leveraging on readily available and affordable payment devices to realize service ubiquity. We 
therefore propose that the adoption and leveraging of affordable mobile devices on the device layer 
creates a commodity layer and does not present a competitive ground between mobile payment 
platforms, due to easy replication by rival firms. 
5.2 System Layer 
Platform Layer Dynamics: Both mobile payment services leverage on widely available mobile operating 
systems (i.e., iOS, Android, Blackberry) in offering their payment services to the market. Mobile 
payment platforms are highly dependent on mobile operating systems to offer reliable and secure 
payment services. Similar to the aforementioned device layer, Paym and Pingit have no control over the 
system layer of mobile devices. Therefore, both payment services have to accept and comply with 
systems specifications stipulated by the software vendors. Competitiveness may only occur between both 
mobile payment platforms by striving for high compatibility with the operating system to provide the 
best mobile payment application experience. 
Competitive Principles: Both mobile payment platforms leverage on dominant and standardized mobile 
operating systems to avoid fragmentation and ensure interoperability in their service delivery. As these 
mobile operating systems are likewise highly accessible for rivals, it does not justify a competitive 
advantage. We therefore propose that mobile payment platforms leverage on widely available mobile 
operating systems to achieve service interoperability. In so doing, both mobile payment platforms treat 
the system layer as a commodity platform layer due to the lack of control and ownership. 
5.3 Network Layer 
Platform Layer Dynamics: Paym and Pingit depend on Faster Payments and LINK payment networks to 
send, process and settle payments. The aforementioned payment networks are vital, as they present the 
binding glue between financial institutions to transmit payments throughout the UK payment industry. 
The owners of Pingit (Barclays) and Paym (industry consortium) co-own these inclusive payment 
networks. Thus, competition is negligible due to mutual governance and ownership. Other mobile 
payment platforms (e.g., PayPal) that have no direct access to these payment networks are indeed 
disadvantaged, as they have to enter into contractual agreements to have access to the industry-specific 
resource. Nevertheless, the financial institutions behind Paym and Pingit have the economic interest to 
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avoid transactions through these payment networks, as the costs for maintaining these networks are based 
on transactions volumes. As such, each financial institution has the business goal to maintain and 
increase transaction volumes within their own mobile payment services and by extension, to stay isolated 
as much as possible. 
Competitive Principles: Payment networks are vital, as they connect financial institutions with each other 
with their corresponding mobile payment platforms. However, as the financial institutions behind Paym 
and Pingit have non-discriminatory access to the same payment networks, access to these payment 
networks does not constitute a competitive advantage. In this sense, the network layer of both mobile 
payment platforms (i.e., Paym and Pingit) exhibits attributes of a commodity layer. We therefore propose 
that the adoption of inclusive network layer strategy by mobile platform providers does not contribute to 
competitive advantage over rivals, because it does not impose accessibility constraints. 
5.4 Service Layer 
Platform Layer Dynamics: Barclays’ Pingit payment platform obtains its competiveness by offering a 
tightly integrated monopolistic mobile payment service to provide the best payment and mobile 
commerce experience in the market place. To achieve this degree of control, Pingit goes beyond Paym by 
developing and offering a dedicated mobile payment application (i.e., Pingit app), which co-exists with 
Barclays’ mobile banking application. From a customer viewpoint, Pingit also reduced multi-homing 
apps, as it allows customers to send payments from the Pingit application to Paym users, incentivizing 
users not to use Paym. 
Paym, on the other hand, has the traits of a federated mobile payment platform that exist as a feature 
within heterogeneous and isolative mobile banking applications. It can be argued that Paym may not 
achieve user experience consistency as Pingit does, because each financial institution decides how Paym 
is implemented within their own mobile banking applications. With respect to user acquisition, Pingit has 
the competitive advantage in being an inclusive app by having the capability to serve non-Barclays 
customers. Therefore, Barclays has, through Pingit, the potential to build meaningful customer 
relationships. On the contrary, Paym, the industry consortium solution, does not have the same facility. 
Paym is not designed to collect customer data from rival institutions because it merely preserves existing 
customer relationships within each mobile banking application. 
With regards to platform access, Barclays exercises monopolistic power over its own service by 
protecting its platform from external systems and granting exclusive API access to select partners. Pingit 
platform access is granted under the condition that these complementary third party services (e.g., 
startups) advance the Pingit ecosystem further by increasing usefulness and transaction volume with the 
ultimate objective of amplifying Pingit’s value proposition. At this stage, Paym does not provide access 
options towards third parties. 
Competitive Principles: Both mobile payment platforms are attempting to create a dominant design in the 
mobile payment space by creating their own value ecosystem. Barclays possesses the internal resources 
and the first mover advantage to protect and grow its Pingit ecosystem through its germination strategy 
to extract value. Paym, on the other hand, has entered the market as a second mover. It can be argued that 
the rollout of Paym is a preemptive move to erode Barclays’ potential market dominance. Individually, 
these financial institutions would not have the leverage to create a competitive solution that could 
challenge Pingit. Nevertheless, to remain competitive with Pingit, Paym applies an orchestration strategy 
by augmenting the resources of individual financial institutions into a federated mobile payment 
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platform. We therefore propose that the service layer of mobile payment platforms presents a competitive 
ground to extract business value while applying a germination or orchestration strategy. Accordingly, 
the service layer represents a value layer for mobile payment platforms. 
5.5 Content Layer 
Platform Layer Dynamics: Each financial institution is protective of its payment data because it serves as 
a valuable resource for generating competitive business insights and by extension, embodying the 
potential for value extraction. Accordingly, financial institutions are selective in sharing payment data 
with third parties and prefer to silo their content layer from external ones. Barclays, though, has the 
advantage to overcome this hurdle due to its own developed mobile payment application. As non-
Barclays customers have the ability to install and link their personal data to the Pingit app and generate 
rich data through their payment habits, Barclays absorbs and collects valuable payment data to build 
future customer relationships (e.g., purchase behavior to for marketing purposes). On the contrary, Paym 
does not possess the same prospects for data collection. Paym does not exist as a standalone application, 
but rather as a feature within heterogeneous and isolated mobile banking applications that reinforce 
existing customer relationships. 
Competitive Principles: The content layer is manifested in the form of payment data, which is a valuable 
and competitive industry specific resource for financial institutions to capture value. Both mobile 
payment platforms are guarding their content layer by isolating it from third parties. Barclays, however, 
infiltrates the content layer of rivals by applying a Trojan horse strategy through its standalone payment 
application Pingit, which is installed on non-Barclays customer smartphones. We therefore propose that 
the content layer of mobile payment platforms constitutes a value layer to capture business value and 
that the issuance of dedicated and inclusive mobile payment applications enables data collection 
opportunities of customers belonging to competitors. 
5.6 Competitive Principles Across Platform Layers 
To generalize our observations, mobile payment platforms embody two types of platform layers: value 
and commodity layers. In this study, commodity layers (i.e., device, system, and network) merely serve 
as a means to reach out and distribute services towards end customers. In other words, commodity layers 
are means to achieve platform-driven service ubiquity. Conversely, value layers (i.e., service and content 
layers) present value creation and capturing opportunities, translating into competitive battlegrounds 
among mobile payment services. Prior to mobile payments, traditional payment instruments (e.g., 
payment cards) were proprietary and vertically integrated into the organizational boundaries of a 
financial institution that enabled control and enforcing switching costs. With the prevalence of mobile 
payment services, previous vertically integrated payment platforms show early signs of deconstruction, 
which is driven by ubiquitous and affordable smartphones as a new form of payment instrument. In this 
sense, financial institutions lost the control and the right to issue propriety payment instruments and by 
that lock-in mechanisms. The result is that financial institutions concentrate their organizational efforts to 
protect the remaining value layers of digital payment platform. Table 2 summarizes the insights from our 
comparative case study. 
6 Conclusion 
This paper was motivated by a growing urgency to improve our comprehension of digital platforms and 
how the constituent dimensions of such platforms shape market competition for platform-driven 
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ubiquitous systems. Prior platform research has typically treated digital platforms as a generic 
phenomenon. Whereas one research stream explores the pricing mechanisms among platform users, 
others either examine how certain platform management strategies induces growth and innovation or 
investigate the idiosyncrasies of different platform categories (e.g. product or multi-sided platforms) in 
order to better explain distinctions among these categories [49].  
This study contributes to extant literature on digital platforms and ubiquitous systems by delineating 
platform-driven ubiquitous systems into five constituent dimensions that drive their potential for market 
competition. Our study serves as a fitting response to Yoo, et al. [57] call for a deeper understanding of 
the competitive strategies of layered modular architectures. Specifically, a key theoretical thrust of this 
paper is our postulation that platform-driven ubiquitous system competition manifests within and across 
five platform layers (i.e., device, system, network, service and content). Furthermore, we discovered that 
the industry context determines which of the platform layers are designated as: (1) commodity layers 
enabling service ubiquity, as well as; (2) value layers offering strategic business opportunities to create 
and capture value. 
Table 2:  Comparative cross-platform analysis 
Platform Layers Paym Pingit 
Competitive Principles within 
Platform Layers 
Content Laye 
(Value Layer) 
Protected  
Paym adopts a guarded content 
layer approach by preserving 
existing data collection rights for 
each financial institution within 
heterogeneous mobile banking 
applications 
Protected & Absorptive 
Pingit adopts like Paym a guarded 
content strategy that does not share the 
payment data of Pingit users with third 
parties. The Pingit app, though, is 
inclusive by serving non-Barclays 
customers as well that creates data 
collection opportunities. 
Guarded vs. Infiltrative 
Both mobile payment platforms 
showcase protective behavior on their 
content layer as payment data serves as 
valuable industry resource to create 
value. By releasing a dedicated mobile 
payment application, Pingit performs a 
Trojan horse strategy that collects 
customer and payment data from rival 
institutions. 
Service Layer 
(Value Layer) 
Federated and Isolative  
Paym is a federated mobile 
payment platform that attempts to 
augment the individual resources of 
various financial institutions. In so 
doing, it preserves existing market 
structures by being a mobile 
payment feature within existing 
mobile banking applications. 
Monopolistic and Breaching 
Like Paym, Pingit protects its service 
layer, moderating and shielding it 
platform from third parties. Access is 
granted if these services enhance the 
value proposition of Pingit. Lastly, 
Barclays uses the Pingit app as a mean 
enter in to the territory of rivals to build 
customer relationships with non-
Barclays customers. 
Orchestration vs. Germination  
Paym has on its service layer the 
strategy to offer a competitive industry 
consortium mobile payment application 
that solidifies existing market structures 
and data sovereignties. Barclays has the 
strategy nurture its own Pingit 
ecosystem, but leverages on Pingit as a 
Trojan horse to challenge rivals on their 
content layer. 
Network Layer 
(Commodity Layer) 
Inclusive  
Both mobile payment platforms have non-discriminatory access to the Faster 
Payment or Link payment network to clear mobile payments. Thus, not 
presenting a competitive advantage between these two mobile services. 
Accessibility 
Network layer for both payment 
services shares the traits of a 
commodity layer due to the inability to 
create access constrains.  
System Layer 
(Commodity Layer) 
Availability  
Both mobile payment platforms leverage on widely available and 
standardized mobile operating systems. Competiveness may occur by 
developing the mobile payment application that makes the best use of the 
Interoperability 
System layer shares the attributes of a 
commodity layer, as the control and 
governance is not the realm of financial 
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system resources to ensure best application experience. institutions, but rather controlled by the 
smartphone vendor.  
Device Layer 
(Commodity Layer) 
Affordability  
Both mobile payment platforms leverage on standardized smartphones in 
delivering their mobile payment services to end customers. 
Ubiquity 
Device layer has the attributes of a 
commodity layer, as the mobile phone 
as a new payment instrument is now 
owned by end users and designed by 
the smartphone vendor. 
Competitive 
Principle across 
Platform Layers 
Value Layers: Content and Service  
Both mobile payment platforms treat the content and service layer as value 
layers, as they serve as industry specific resource to create and capture 
business value. 
Commodity Layers: Network, System and Device. 
Contrary to the content and service layers, the remaining layers serve merely 
as a mean to deliver the mobile payment as a ubiquitous service to the 
market. 
 
 
As observed in the mobile payment context, the content and the service layers represent value layers that 
give rise to value creation and capturing opportunities while harnessing payment data as an industry 
specific resource. The remaining platform layers, on the other hand, share the attributes of commodity 
layers that foster service ubiquity. Specifically, device, system and network layers of a mobile payment 
platforms are co-owned or governed by third parties (e.g., smartphones vendors) and that these 
commodity layers serve merely as distribution layers, which are accessible to rival firms and obstruct 
mobile payment providers from enforcing monopolistic power to acquire competitive advantage. We 
argue, though, that other industries may consider other platform layers as more valuable than the 
payment industry does. For instance, in the context of smartphone manufacturers, value layers are 
arguably concentrated on the device and system layers, as they present the most fitting competitive 
grounds for creating and capturing value. 
From our comparative case study, we offer preliminary evidence of the applicability of our framework in 
unraveling how competition could manifest between monopolistic and federated platform providers 
offering ubiquitous services. Evidently, Paym, which exhibits attributes of a federated mobile payment 
platform, obtains its competiveness by augmenting the resources of individual financial institutions 
(mobile banking applications) on the service layer. This in turn allows the development of a competitive 
industry consortium solution that solidifies existing market structures and preserves payment data 
sovereignties on the content layer. Pingit, on the other hand, showcases the traits of a monopolistic 
platform that obtains its competiveness by tightly coupling the service and content layer. Moreover, 
Pingit, with its stand-alone mobile payment application attempts to increase its dominance in the market 
place by internalizing and monetizing valuable payment data of non-Barclays customers as well. In other 
words, Pingit functions as a Trojan horse on the service layer that attempts to establish new customer 
relationships that grants Barclays access to the content layer of rival banks. 
Pragmatically, we provide decision support by increasing awareness of different platform governance 
regimes and layer configurations choices available to payment platform providers. Specifically, current 
and future mobile payment providers can utilize our proposed framework to: (1) identify commodity and 
value layers of a mobile payment service; (2) unearth their underlying competitive principles, as well as; 
(3) channel internal resources accordingly to reach their organizational goals. More broadly, our 
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proposed framework supplies managers in other industries with a conceptual tool to analyze and 
comprehend the dynamics of other digital platform-driven markets in order to arrive at their own 
competitive strategies. Lastly, the study may assists policymakers and regulators in disentangling 
industry-specific competitive dynamics in order to design legal frameworks to foster effective market 
competition and innovation among various stakeholders. 
This study is constrained in its generalizability as it utilizes only two cases of mobile payment providers. 
Furthermore, because we embrace a platform centric approach, this study is constrained in its analysis 
about privacy or security requirements that may have an impact on the competitive dynamics of 
platform-driven ubiquitous systems. Having said this, these limitations serve as impetus for future 
research in this direction, an undertaking we have planned for the near future. Future studies can explore 
the option of administering a quantitative survey on stakeholders of digital platforms to validate our 
proposed framework in Table 2. Other avenues for future research could include the exploration of 
necessary and sufficient conditions for market competition within and across layers as well as the 
prescription of effective mechanisms to defend against competition from an incumbent and challenger 
viewpoint. 
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The Innovative Capabilities of Digital Payment Platforms: A 
Comparative Study of Apple Pay & Google Wallet 
 
Abstract 
This study presents a model for studying the innovative capabilities of digital payment platforms in regards to open 
innovation integration and commercialization. We perceive digital platforms as layered modular IT artifacts, where 
platform governance and the configuration of platform layers impact the support for open innovation. The 
proposed model has been employed in a comparative case study between two digital payment platforms: Apple Pay 
and Google Wallet. The findings suggest that digital payment platforms make use of boundary resources to be 
highly integrative or integratable, which supports the intended conjoint commercialization efforts. Furthermore, 
the architectural design of digital platforms impacts the access to commercialization, resulting to an exclusion or 
inclusion strategy in accessing value opportunities. Our findings contribute to the open innovation and digital 
platform literature, by providing a deeper understanding how these digital platforms can be designed and 
configured to support open innovation. 
Keywords: Digital Platforms, Open Innovation, Payment, Apple Pay, Google Wallet 
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Introduction 
Digital payment platforms are multi-sided and layered modular artifacts (Rochet et al. 2003; Yoo et al. 
2010) that primarily mediate payment transactions between payers and payees. Due to recent 
technological advancements in payments, new interconnected digital payment platforms (e.g., Apple Pay, 
Google Wallet) are equipped with application programming interfaces (APIs), and software development 
kits (SDKs), which have the goal to foster platform generativity, and simultaneously enforce platform 
control on third parties (Ghazawneh et al. 2013). 
As such, new digital payment platforms create the foundation for (coupled) open innovation, and open 
business models (Gassmann et al. 2004), which is basically conjoint development and commercialization 
of innovative platform derivatives (e.g., apps) between platform owners and third parties. The growing 
prevalence of these novel payment IT artifacts, which are embedded within innovation ecosystems 
(Adner et al. 2010; Iansiti et al. 2004; Nambisan et al. 2011),  makes it for researchers, as well as for 
practitioners imperative, to understand how digital payment platforms can make use of external 
innovations from an integration and commercial point of view. As payment incumbents and start-ups 
utilize digital platforms to achieve their information systems (IS) and business strategies (Bharadwaj et 
al. 2013; Chen et al. 2010), there is notable paucity in the literature regarding how organizations 
integrate and commercialize external innovation.  
Consistent with West et al. (2014), they conclude in their comprehensive literature review on open 
innovation studies that sourcing open innovation has received abundant attention among researchers. 
Even so, there are knowledge gaps in how firms integrate and commercialize open innovation. Following 
the call by West et al. (2014) for more research in this area, the aim of this paper is to study how digital 
payment platforms create conditions for (1) integrating open innovation, and (2) how is open innovation 
commercialized that reflect reciprocal business interests. Thus, our research question is: How do digital 
payment platforms integrate and commercialize open innovation?  
To answer our research question, we expand on the work of Yoo et al. (2010) by delineating digital 
payment platforms into five layers: (1) device; (2) operating system; (3) network; (4) service; and lastly, 
(5) content. Secondly, we adapt the API management framework by Iyer et al. (2010) illustrating how 
payment providers develop their digital platforms and how platform derivatives (e.g., apps) are 
distributed. We argue that platform layer configurations have an impact on the integration of open 
innovation, by being either integrative or integratable towards third parties. Secondly, the findings 
suggest that the chosen integration type defines the attributes of commercializing open innovation. In this 
case, platforms follow either a selective or indiscriminant commercialization strategy with third parties. 
This research aims to have several contributions. First, our study complements the extant literature on 
digital platforms (Baldwin et al. 2000; Gawer et al. 2002; Ghazawneh et al. 2013; Iyer et al. 2010; 
Thomas et al. 2014; Wareham et al. 2014; Yoo et al. 2010). By providing conceptual clarity, this paper 
would lead to more concise digital platform studies. Secondly, by following the call by West et al. 
(2014), this study contributes to the open innovation literature (Chesbrough 2003) by delineating coupled 
open innovation. Lastly, this study follows the call by Bharadwaj et al. (2013) to unravel complex digital 
platforms and their business strategies. This paper provides insights into how digital payment platforms 
exercise open business models in the payment context. 
Theoretical Underpinnings 
In this section, we provide the theoretical background in understanding the logic of digital platforms, and 
how these layered modular IT artifacts support open innovation in regards to integration and 
commercialization. To derive our theoretical model, we draw on key concepts in the open innovation and 
digital platforms literature, which are serving us as theoretical lenses to study the innovative capabilities 
of digital platforms. Figure 1 illustrates our proposed unified theoretical model of digital platform 
innovation based on related literature. We argue that the design and configuration of digital platform 
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layers have an impact in supporting open innovation, from an integration and commercialization point of 
view. The linkages between these platform elements illustrate correlations, and do not imply causality. 
 
Figure 1. Digital Platform Innovation Model. 
 
Support for Open Innovation   
Open innovation is the use and leverage of external and internal ideas to create new products and 
services (Chesbrough 2003), whereas the open business model is the commercialization of co-created 
ideas (Chesbrough et al. 2006). Studies on open innovation have identified three distinct modes in which 
firms practice open innovation within and across their organizational boundaries (Gassmann et al. 2004; 
West et al. 2014): (1) outside-in, (2) inside-out, and (3) coupled innovation. Outside-in open innovation 
is the integration of external resources (e.g., knowledge) into organizations to enhance the value 
propositions of their products ands services, whereas inside-out open innovation is the reversed 
approach of externalizing internally developed resources (e.g., patents) to the market, which may 
translate to adoption and profitability. 
Lastly, coupled open innovation has a dual approach, as it represents a combination of the 
aforementioned open innovation concepts, where value is co-created in a reciprocal, cooperative, and 
complementary manner (Gassmann et al. 2004). Taking digital platforms as an illustrative example, 
digital platforms support the notion of coupled open innovation, as digital platforms and third-party 
developers complement and integrate their corresponding services with each other. This builds the 
architectural foundation for future innovative platform derivatives in an iterative manner. As such, this 
kind of open innovation illustrates interfirm modularity (Staudenmayer, Tripsas, & Tucci, 2005), where 
organizations with external ones conjointly create and capture value.  
 
Figure 2. Three Types of Open Innovation. 
The open innovation literature has received substantial attention among scholars in their bid to explain 
the logic behind open innovation. However, by distilling a comprehensive literature review of 291 open 
innovation publications, West et al. (2014) conclude that research on integration and commercialization 
of open innovation are notably rare: “This review has shown an extensive body of research on the front 
end of the process of externally sourcing innovation, but leaves major gaps on how such innovation is 
integrated and ultimately commercialized.” 
  
 
115 
As digital platforms practice coupled open innovation, proprietary (e.g., iOS), and open digital platforms 
(e.g., Android) have evidently different platform governance mechanisms (cf. Ghazawneh et al. 2013), 
and organizational capabilities (cf. Iyer et al. 2010) in how innovations (e.g., apps) by third parties are 
integrated and distributed to create and capture value. It can be argued that the integration and 
commercialization of open innovation is to a large extend determined by the architectural structure of 
digital platforms, and how these structures (e.g., platform layers) are designed and configured. In the next 
section, we provide a working definition of digital platforms, which are layered modular architectures. 
Digital Platforms: Layered Modular Artifacts 
Digital platforms are layered modular architectures (Yoo et al. 2010), which have the capabilities to 
create rapid positive network effects (Eisenmann et al. 2006; Katz et al. 1985). We adopt the digital 
platform definition by Kazan et al. (2014), who state that a “digital platform [is] a proprietary or open 
modular layered technological architecture that supports efficient development of innovative derivatives, 
which are embedded in a business or social context”. Consistent with Yoo et al. (2010), this working 
definition is a suitable theoretical lens, as it describes the innovative capabilities of digital platforms due 
to their modularity. As these layered IT artifacts integrate and release controlled, or permissionless, 
innovative platforms derivatives (e.g., mobile apps) on different layers, digital platforms have the 
capabilities to support coupled open innovation. 
Digital Platform Layers: Five Different Layers 
Previous studies have laid the theoretical foundation to understand what digital platforms are, which are 
layered modular architectures (Baldwin et al. 2000; Baldwin et al. 2008; Yoo et al. 2010), how IT 
capabilities present the genesis of (digital) platforms (Hanseth et al. 2010), and how digital platform 
owners govern their systems, while balancing the act between control and generativity (Ghazawneh et al. 
2013; Iyer et al. 2010). As such, earlier studies had a more generic view on digital platforms, where the 
unit of analysis was merely the service layer (cf. Yoo et al. 2010). Therefore, studies showed little 
attention to discussion of the different and interlinked platform layers, which have significant impact on 
platform configurations, and business models. Based on our working definition, we perceive digital 
platforms not as monolithic IT artifacts, but rather as five distinct platform layers (Kazan et al. 2014; 
Yoo et al. 2010). In doing so, the conceptual granularity allows us to analyze digital platforms in a more 
precise manner. We exemplify the five platform layers on the basis of Apple’s mobile payment service 
Apple Pay. 
The device layer constitutes a physical, programmable IT artifact through which stores process and 
execute digital encoded data and instructions. Apple’s iPhone and smartwatch embody these traits by 
being physical IT artifacts that store and run the Apple Pay software (integrated in passbook app), and 
initiate NFC (Near-Field-Communication) payments. The (operating) system layer represents a logical 
software system that executes and controls software, as well as physical IT artifacts. Apple’s mobile 
payment solution Apple Pay requires iOS and Watch OS as operating systems, to control the payment 
app (software), NFC chips and its secure element (physical). The network layer is the communication 
channel to transport data among different nodes. Apple’s mobile payment service relies on mobile and 
payment networks (e.g., Visa, AT&T) to process and settle payments (Kokkola 2010). The service layer 
constitutes software applications for storing, generating and distributing own, or third-party data. Apple 
Pay represents a payment service that mediates payment transactions, and addition, it offers APIs toward 
third parties to integrate Apple Pay into their apps (Apple 2014c). Lastly, the content layer is the 
representation of digital data based on audio, video, text and images. Apple Pay generates payment data, 
e.g., purchase amount, merchant, time and/or location (Apple 2014b). As digital platforms consist of five 
different layers, each layer has the capability to support open innovations (e.g., third-party devices). As 
digital platforms exercise different control mechanisms on different platform layers, this has an impact 
how supportive digital platforms are towards open innovation. 
Digital Platform Governance 
To align IS and business strategies of digital platform owners (Bharadwaj et al. 2013; Chen et al. 2010; 
Henderson et al. 1993), digital platforms make use of boundary resources (e.g., APIs, SDKs) 
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(Ghazawneh et al. 2013) to enforce their preferred platform governance scheme. To achieve this, a digital 
platform and each of its layers are accordingly designed and managed in regards to (1) platform 
development (self or co-development), and (third-party) service distribution (open or moderated). 
Therefore, the design and rules for platform development and service distribution (platform derivatives) 
vary among digital platforms, since organizational capabilities, IS and business strategies differ.  
To illustrate different platform governance options, we adapted the API management framework by Iyer 
et al. (2010), which is a suitable theoretical concept to explain the logic of different types of platform 
governance design options, in regards to platform development in an exclusive or inclusive manner, and 
the degree of control in how platform derivatives are distributed (cf. Kazan et al. 2013). 
Platform Development. We define platform development as the ability of and degree to which third 
parties co-develop and maintain a digital platform. Platform owners, which follow the closed notion, 
develop and set the rules on their own (e.g., the amount and the rules for APIs access), thereby excluding 
third parties. To illustrate closed platform development, Barclays’ mobile payment service Pingit shares 
these traits, as it is a proprietary and self-developed mobile payment platform. On the contrary, open 
platform development is the involvement of third parties, enabling third-party platform co-development. 
For instance, the payment startup Stripe is active on GitHub.com, an online forum and repository service 
for code sharing. By having an online presence on this service, Stripe (platform owner) and its third-party 
developers are co-developing the platform in a moderated process. 
Platform Derivative Distribution. We define platform derivative distribution as the ability and degree of 
freedom for third parties in distributing their platform derivatives. Digital platforms also differentiate in 
how platform derivatives are distributed. The moderated approach allows the platform owner to control 
and channel the distribution of platform derivatives. As an example, PayPal requests prior approval from 
third parties to use its payment APIs, to exclude e.g., undesirable merchants. The free approach allows 
third parties to distribute their services without prior approval by the platform owner. Coinkite, a 
Canadian Bitcoin merchant service, illustrates the free approach by offering open bitcoin APIs to third 
parties without interfering what service they offer. Based on the above-mentioned concepts, we can 
derive four different and generic platform governance design options: (1) closed and moderated; (2) 
closed and free; (3) open and moderated; and lastly, (4) open and free.  
 
 
Figure 3. Digital Platform Governance. 
Research Method  
The empirical basis for this research is a comparative and interpretive case study to examine how 
different digital platform design and configurations are impacting the support for open innovation 
(Walsham 1995; Yin 2009). As such, our study approach has an explorative trait through synthesizing 
and combining key platform concepts into one unified theoretical model (Figure 1). Based on two cases 
(Apple Pay and Google Wallet), the proposed model (Digital Platform Innovation) is guiding us in 
identifying similarities and variations between these two cases. We consider the case study approach to 
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be a suitable method of inquiry, as it can answer “how” and  “why” questions within a contemporary, 
broad and complex setting (Dubé et al. 2003; Yin 2009). In this study, the complexity is reasoned as 
digital platforms constitute digital ecodynamics (El Sawy et al. 2010), which are embedded in innovation 
ecosystems (Adner et al. 2010; Iansiti et al. 2004). In doing so, digital platforms have to cope with 
internal complexities (i.e., internal IS business strategy alignment), as well as external ones, as digital 
platforms act as bridging technologies between internal and external systems. Therefore, a case study 
approach is deemed to be appropriate for grasping complex platform configurations, innovation and 
business structures. 
Research Context and Case Selection  
To study the innovative capabilities of digital platforms, we chose digital payment platforms as our 
context and unit of analysis. Digital payment platforms are particularly suitable to explore digital 
platform innovation, as the payment landscape is in the midst of industry transformation. New and 
innovative digital payment platforms enter the payment market (e.g., Apple Pay, Stripe), where 
established financial institutions are confronted with challenging market dynamics. More importantly, 
the application of accessible and affordable technologies is leading to disintegrations of once-profitable 
business models (Jacobides 2005).  
We chose two prominent digital payment platforms, which have the capabilities and resources (technical 
and financial) to introduce a new and dominant design (Suárez et al. 1995) in regards to mobile payment: 
Apple and Google. Both technology firms are known for being cross-boundary disrupters (Burgelman et 
al. 2007), as they have the power to upset market equilibrium in rapid fashion (Downes et al. 2013). 
Furthermore, Apple and Google have different approaches in regards to platform control. Google is 
known for supporting openness (e.g., Android), whereas Apple is recognized for its walled garden 
approach (e.g., iOS) (cf. Eaton et al. 2015). Conceivably, these two different platform firms may have 
different approaches in regards to open innovation, which might provide additional insights from an 
integration and commercialization point of view. It should be emphasized that these two cases are 
illustrative examples, to demonstrate the applicability of the proposed digital platform innovation model. 
Data Collection 
The empirical basis for this study is based on two sources: one semi-structured interview (primary) and 
online data (secondary). We collected publicly available data from different online sources (blog entries, 
news articles, official documents by Apple and Google). To assist with our data collection efforts, we 
made use of the technology blog aggregator Techmeme.com. Blog aggregators have the advantage of 
serving as a filter, as they tend to highlight influential articles (Davidson et al. 2009; Eaton et al. 2015). 
In the case of Apple, the search was conducted using the keyword “Apple Pay” by limiting the time 
period from the 9th of September, 2014 (Apple Pay announcement), till 15th of November, 2014. Our 
search inquiry on Techmeme.com resulted into 68 hits. In the case of Google, the same method was 
applied by using the keyword “Google Wallet” between the time period 25th of May, 2011 (Google 
Wallet announcement), and 15th of November, 2014. Our search inquiry resulted into 119 hits. In 
addition to Techmeme.com, we crosschecked official documents by Apple and Google (i.e., FAQ lists on 
product and developer website and guidelines), if the online data was not sufficient enough.  
To support the data collection process, online data was imported into Nvivo 10, a qualitative analysis 
software program that allows a structured way to collect and categorize data. Data collection based on 
online sources has the advantage of being current, accessible and more importantly, verifiable through 
replicative studies. To complement the Google Wallet online data set, the case was triangulated with a 
semi–structured interview. We conducted an in-depth and face-to-face semi-structured interview 
(October 2014) with a mid-level manager from the Google Wallet unit. The interviewee was significantly 
involved in Google’s mobile wallet rollout (US and Europe) between 2011 and mid-2014. The interview 
lasted 42 minutes and was recorded and fully transcribed. The interview questions were derived from the 
proposed digital platform innovation model. Apple was not interviewed, as they are known for being 
secretive and inaccessible. Nevertheless, the secondary data sources of Apple are rich and triangulated to 
provide sufficient data points to conduct a comparative analysis (cf. Eaton et al. 2015). Our interview 
strategy was to understand events and decisions on (1) how and why Google Wallet was designed and 
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governed from an architectural point of view (e.g., platform layers and platform integration). The second 
goal was to gain insights into (2) the business strategy and its corresponding business model, and lastly, 
(3) whether or not open innovation was supported and commercialized. Semi-structured interviews have 
the advantage of allowing the interviewer to capture additional insights (e.g., publicly inaccessible data) 
that can enrich the model further. 
 
Data Sources Description 
Interviews One interview with a former Google Wallet manager. Interview duration: 42 minutes, 
recorded and transcribed. 
Press releases Apple Pay (7), Google Wallet (38) based on official Google Blog and Google 
Commerce 
Product Website  Apple Pay: https://www.apple.com/iphone-6/apple-pay/, Google Wallet: 
https://www.google.com/wallet/ 
 
 
 
Support Page Apple Pay FAQ Consumer: http://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201469 
Google Wallet FAQ for consumer: http://www.google.com/wallet/faq.html 
Google Wallet FAQ for business: http://www.google.com/wallet/business/faq.html 
Developer Page Apple Pay: https://developer.apple.com/apple-pay/ 
Google Wallet: https://developers.google.com/wallet/ 
Online articles 
(Techmeme.com) 
 
 
 
Apple Pay (68) and Google Wallet (119), (9to5Mac, ArsTechnica, Bank Innovation, 
Bloomberg, Engadget, MacRumors, New York Times, PandoDaily, Re/code, 
TechCrunch, TheVerge, Wall Street Journal) 
Table 1. Data Sources. 
 
Data Analysis 
After a careful review, relevant online data was selected and coded. The selection criteria were based on 
containing and supporting coding categories of the proposed digital platform innovation model (e.g., 
platform layers, support for open innovation). For analyzing the data, directed content analysis was 
applied (Hsieh et al. 2005; Potter et al. 1999). The coding categories were derived from the digital 
platform innovation model, serving as a theoretical guide during the analysis process. Directed content 
analysis is a suitable approach when prior or existing research about a phenomenon is incomplete or 
requires further explanation, helping to support or extend key concepts and theories. As such, the aim of 
this research was to study the integration and commercialization of coupled open innovation within 
digital platforms. 
Two Digital Payment Platforms: Apple Pay & Google Wallet 
Apple Pay 
In September 2014, Apple announced its much-anticipated mobile payment service called Apple Pay. 
Apple Pay makes use of interoperable Near-Field-Communication (NFC), which allows iPhone 6 (iOS) 
and Apple Watch (Watch OS) users to perform both biometric (fingerprint and pulse) and contactless 
payments within mobile apps and at brick-and-mortar stores. Accordingly, merchants within physical 
stores are required to have complementary NFC payment terminals to accept Apple Pay. To mediate 
these payment transactions, Apple has partnered with credit card networks (MasterCard, Visa, AmEx) 
and with multiple banks, which ultimately process and settle payments between cardholders and 
merchants. In this context, Apple Pay serves merely as a proxy and mediator between cardholders’ (card 
issuer) and merchants’ (acquirer) bank accounts, thereby supporting and enforcing the existing roles and 
business models of financial firms in the current payment ecosystem. At its initial rollout, Apple 
preserved the exclusive right to have access to the NFC chip with its secure element; the latter stores 
sensitive payment details, i.e., payment tokens (controlled by credit card networks) and cryptogram 
(controlled by banks).  
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To enhance its payment service further, Apple offers Apple Pay APIs free of charge to third-party 
developers, which allows them to offer Apple Pay functionalities within their own mobile applications, 
after they have passed the review process. For developers who don’t have their own payment processor, 
Apple collaborates with several online payment solution providers (e.g., Stripe, Braintree). These 
payment processors offer third-party developers an uncomplicated integration process, in accepting 
biometric-based Apple Pay payments. At the end, these processors charge regular payment fees. Apple 
Pay has the technical capabilities to generate highly contextual and valuable payment data, though Apple 
has not the ambition to utilize it. Rather, Apple supports current business practices, where financial 
partners continue in capturing valuable payment data. For security reasons and service improvements, 
Apple Pay collects only the location of the device, and date/time. The business model of Apple Pay has a 
two-track approach: the usage of Apple Pay is free of charge for end-users and third-party developers 
(subsidy side). There is no change for merchants in accepting Apple Pay, as they still continue to pay the 
regular fees to their payment processors. Moreover, Apple charges the banks (money side) with the help 
of credit card networks, which hand over 0.15% (credit card fees) of the transaction amount to Apple. 
Google Wallet 
In May 2011, Google announced its mobile payment service Google Wallet, an initiative to extend its 
advertising business to the offline world. At launch, Google teamed up with the handset vendor 
Samsung, which provided the first Android mobile phone (Nexus S) that was compatible with Google 
Wallet, allowing users to perform contactless payments. The phone contained the NFC chip, and the 
secure element, which stored a virtual credit/prepaid card by MasterCard (payment network) and Citi 
bank (card issuer). First Data (acquirer), which had the role of a Trusted Service Manager (TSM), was 
responsible to manage remotely the secure element. Google Wallet was a novel payment instrument; 
however, it faced considerable challenges during its rollout. Besides slow adoption on the user side and 
merchant side, large mobile network operators (T-Mobile, AT&T, Verizon) had no interest in supporting 
Android smartphones, which had a built-in secure element. Rather, they preferred to have the secure 
element in their controlled SIM cards. Secondly, as these mobile operators were also working on their 
own mobile payment solution (Softcard), they had little incentive to support a rival solution on their 
mobile networks. Absent from this joint venture, Sprint was the only US mobile operator willing to 
collaborate with Google.  
To overcome these challenges, Google released a new version of its mobile OS Android (KitKat), which 
allows storage of the secure element in the cloud (Host-Card-Emulation). With a cloud-based approach, 
Google Wallet is compatible with practically any NFC Android device, without requiring approval by 
handset vendors and mobile network operators. Moreover, this solution is also applicable by any other 
NFC service provider without Google’s approval. To extend its user base beyond Android devices, 
Google made its mobile payment service also available to iOS users (P2P payments only). Over time, 
Google was also successful in teaming up with the remaining payment networks Visa, AmEx and 
Discover, as Google Wallet agreed to support their existing fee-based business models. The value 
proposition toward merchants to accept Google Wallet is that it is tightly integrated with Google’s 
location-aware promotion offers (e.g., loyalty and offers). Besides regular payment fees to payment 
processors, merchants can use Google Wallet and its promotion functionalities on different third-party 
online channels free of charge, after passing a review process. Google, however, charges merchants fees 
as soon as online properties by Google are used (e.g., AdWords).  
To build a community around its payment service, Google Wallet offers APIs, allowing third parties to 
ingrate payment functionalities/promotions into their own Android/iOS apps and mobile and desktop 
websites, free of charge. However, Google differs from Apple, in that it doesn't provide a list of 
recommended payment processors, leaving third-party developers unsupported to a certain degree. 
Google Wallet collects payment data much like Apple Pay, such as merchant, payment amount, date and 
time, method of payment and location. As such, the business model for Google Wallet is primarily 
designed to extend Google’s online advertising business. 
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Analysis  
Platform Layers and Governance 
Device Layer. Apple issues proprietary device layers (i.e., iPhone, Apple Watch) with built-in NFC chips 
and secure elements. In doing so, Apple preserves the exclusive right to produce, modify and configure 
any hardware components. On the contrary, the Google Wallet service relies on open device layers 
(Android handsets), which are manufactured and provided by third parties. To illustrate the open device 
layer strategy of Google Wallet, the Google manager states: “We want [service] ubiquity […] we need a 
partnership with an OEM (original equipment manufacturer) right now.” Furthermore, he states: “Let's 
find a way to [remove] the OEM from needing to be part of the process. So let's release host card 
emulation, [where] no hardware is needed, […] if a phone has NFC […and] it's running Android, it's 
done”. Implications: We therefore propose that the Apple Pay device layer is closed (i.e., proprietary), 
whereas the Google Wallet device layer is open and free in supporting third parties to manufacture and 
distribute Android devices. 
System Layer. To be functional, Apple Pay requires iOS and Watch OS, which are proprietary system 
layers by Apple. Conversely, Google Wallet operates on Android, which is open source (i.e., Android 
Open Source Project), representing an open system layer. Overall, the closed system layers of Apple Pay 
are tightly integrated with closed Apple device layers, offering better configurations options in regards to 
technology and user experience. On the other hand, Google Wallet’s system layer is open, and can be 
integrated within various open Android devices in an agnostic manner. By keeping the device and system 
layers open to external stakeholders, Google Wallet creates the conditions for service ubiquity on many 
Android devices. Implications: We therefore propose that the Apple Pay system layer (e.g., iOS) is 
closed (i.e., proprietary), whereas the Google Wallet system layer (i.e., Android) is open and free to 
create and distribute custom operating systems for various Android devices. 
Network Layer. Apple Pay and Google Wallet have cooperative arrangements with payment networks 
and with banks, which have granted access to their financial networks to processes and settle Apple Pay 
and Google Wallet transactions. In addition, both services rely on mobile network operators to send 
payment transactions. Implications: We therefore propose that the network layer of Apple Pay and 
Google Wallet are closed, (controlled by financial institutions and telecom operators), and free, as these 
networks distribute payment services without major interferences. 
Service Layer. Apple Pay offers third-party developers SDKs and APIs to integrate the Apple Pay 
functionality (biometric only) into their own and approved mobile application, which are distributed 
through Apple’s App Store at the end. Likewise, Google Wallet offers SDKs and APIs to approved third-
party developers. As the Google manager states: “They're public APIs; there are terms and conditions 
that are associated with them […] it's kind of like a click and accept agreement type.” However, Google 
Wallet exceeds Apple Pay by being highly integratable into various external channels, such as email, 
mobile and desktop webpages. Implications: We therefore propose that the service layer of Apple Pay is 
closed (i.e., proprietary) and moderated, as Apple controls third-party app distributions through its App 
Store. In contrast, the service layer of Google Wallet is closed (i.e., proprietary), but free, as it allows 
third parties to distribute the Google Wallet service on various channels without major interventions. 
Content Layer. For Apple Pay, the payment data is opaque, since Apple does not collect the data. Rather, 
it supports existing business practice and data sovereignty by allowing credit card firms and banks to 
have exclusive data collection rights. According to Eddy Cue, Apple’s Senior Vice President of Internet 
Software and Services: “Apple doesn’t collect your purchase history, so we don’t know what you bought, 
where you bought it or how much you paid for it,” [stating that] “the transaction is between you, the 
merchant and your bank.” (Apple 2014a) Google Wallet collects payment data cooperatively with credit 
card firms, and banks data in the form of location, merchant name, amount, date/time and method of 
payment. The Google manager states: “The data that Google Wallet was receiving was the same data 
that MasterCard and Visa were receiving […]. Furthermore, the manager emphasizes “What really 
matters is not basket-level data but item-level data […].” As such, Google has rather a long-term view in 
commercializing payment data. Implications: We therefore propose that the content layers of Apple Pay 
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and Goggle Wallet are closed (i.e., proprietary), as payment data is not accessible by third parties (e.g., 
developers), except it is shared with its core business partners (i.e., banks and credit card firms). 
 
 Apple Pay Google Wallet Platform Governance 
P
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C
o
n
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n
t 
Apple Pay does not collect payment 
data. Credit card firms & banks 
have data sovereignty over payment 
data. 
Google Wallet collects payment data 
cooperatively with its business partners. 
Closed: both payment platforms have 
closed content layers.  
S
er
vi
ce
 
 
Apple Pay offers SDKs and APIs to 
app developers & payment 
processors (e.g., Stripe), enabling 
them to integrate Apple Pay into 
their iOS-based services. 
 
Google Wallet offers SDKs and APIs to 
third-party developers, to integrate 
payment & promotion into their email, 
mobile apps and web services. 
Apple Pay: Closed & Moderated 
Apple controls the service layer, and 
moderates the distribution of third-party 
services. 
Google Wallet: Closed & Free 
Google controls the service layer, but does 
not moderate the distribution of services. 
N
et
w
o
rk
 
Apple collaborates with three credit 
card firms (MasterCard, Visa, 
AmEx) and with the consent of 
multiple banks to process and settle 
biometric and contactless mobile 
payments.  
Google partnered with two credit card 
firms (MasterCard, Discover) & with one 
bank to store & process any payment card 
without prior approval of the card issuer. 
Closed & Free 
Both payment platforms rely on closed 
and externally owned networks layers, 
though the service distribution occurs 
without major interferences.  
S
ys
te
m
 
Apple Pay uses proprietary mobile 
operating systems (iOS/Watch) to 
be operational. 
Google Wallet requires Android (KitKat 
or higher), which is an open source 
mobile operating system (i.e., Android 
Open Source Project). 
Apple Pay: Closed 
Apple controls the system layer 
Google Wallet: Open & Free 
Google does not control the system layer 
or its distribution. 
D
ev
ic
e 
Apple Pay functions on proprietary 
mobile devices, which are 
controlled by Apple. 
Google Wallet functions with any NFC 
Android phone produced by third-party 
handset vendors. 
Apple Pay: Closed 
Apple controls the device layer. 
Google Wallet: Open & Free 
Google does not control the system layer 
or its distribution. 
Table 2. Comparative Platform Analysis. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The aim of this study is to advance the digital platform and open innovation literature that sheds light on 
how digital platforms are designed and configured to utilize open innovation. Following the call by 
(West et al. 2014) for more studies on how organizations integrate and commercialize open innovation, 
this paper investigates how digital payment platforms perform third-party integration and 
commercialization. 
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Open Innovation Integration  
Both digital payment services make use of boundary resources (SDKs and APIs) on the service layer to 
ensure integration conditions for open innovation (Ghazawneh et al. 2013), though both digital payment 
platforms differ as to how integration is accomplished. Apple Pay has an integrative approach to open 
innovation, as third parties are compelled to integrate their services into Apple’s platform (i.e., outside-
in). For instance, developers of iOS applications with built-in Apple Pay are required to submit their 
applications to Apple to pass the review process, which are afterwards exclusively distributed through 
Apple’s App Store. Accordingly, the findings suggest that Apple’s capability to enforce an integrative 
approach to open innovation can be argued, as Apple’s platform layers are tightly integrated with each 
other, achieved by designing, configuring and offering primarily closed and moderated platform layers. 
As such, Apple performs coupled open innovation by offering a coupled modular platform architecture, 
which requires from third parties to follow Apple’s integration rules in order to have the opportunity to 
capture value. Google’s payment solution has a reverse approach in regards to integration. Google Wallet 
is designed to be highly integratable into various external services and systems (i.e., inside-out) in 
providing the conditions for co-creating value. Taking the service layer and the device layer as an 
example, third parties are free in their choice as to how Google Wallet is integrated into external systems 
(service layer). Furthermore, Google does not dictate which NFC Android handset is used (i.e., device 
layer) to perform contactless payments, as independent third-party handset vendors manufacture and 
control these Android devices. Based on these results, Google’s capability to practice an integratable 
approach to open innovation can be argued as Google Wallet’s platform layers are loosely coupled, 
which is achieved by designing, configuring, and offering primarily open and free platform layers. As 
such, Google achieves coupled open innovation through its decoupled modular architecture, allowing 
third parties the flexibility in integrating Google Wallet, in order to have the opportunity to capture value. 
 
Open Innovation Commercialization  
Based on the above-mentioned observations, Apple Pay has a selective commercialization strategy by 
controlling access to value. Apple takes the freedom to decide with whom it does business by leveraging 
boundary resources (i.e., SDKs and APIs) and its coupled modular architecture against external 
stakeholders, thereby granting qualified access to value capture opportunities. As an example, Apple 
denied Adobe access to Apple’s service layer (i.e., Safari browser) in integrating its graphic standard 
“Flash” due to performance issues (cf. Eaton et al. 2015). In doing so, Apple ensures monopolistic power 
on its platform layers. We therefore propose that Apple performs with its integrative approach to open 
innovation an exclusion commercialization strategy to value access. Contrasting Google’s payment 
service, Google Wallet has an indiscriminate commercialization strategy by opening access to value. To 
achieve service ubiquity, Google leverages boundary resources (i.e., SDKs and APIs), and its decoupled 
modular architecture to be highly integratable into external stakeholder systems, thereby providing 
ubiquitous access to value capture opportunities. For instance, in introducing a cloud-based NFC 
payment solution (i.e., host card emulation), Google relinquished control of the device layer, a domain 
previously controlled by handset vendors and telecom operators. In doing so, Google ensures service 
ubiquity, which is driven by third parties on the device and system layer. We therefore propose that 
Google performs with its integratable approach to open innovation an inclusion strategy to value access. 
 
Apple Pay Google Wallet 
Integrative Open Innovation:  
Apple Pay makes use of SDKs and APIs to be highly 
integrative into Apple’s platform (i.e., device and 
service layer). 
Selective Commercialization: 
Apple Pay performs with its integrative approach on 
open innovation an exclusion strategy to access value. 
Integratable Open Innovation:  
Google Wallet makes used of SDKs and APIs to be 
highly integratable into various external third-party 
systems 
Indiscriminate Commercialization:  
Google performs with its integratable approach on open 
innovation an inclusion strategy to access value. 
Table 3. Support for Open Innovation. 
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Theoretical & Practical Implications 
This study contributes to the platform (Gawer et al. 2002; Ghazawneh et al. 2013; Iyer et al. 2010; 
Thomas et al. 2014; Yoo et al. 2010) and open innovation literature (Chesbrough 2003; West et al. 2014) 
by bridging knowledge gaps in how digital (payment) platforms integrate and commercialize open 
innovation. The findings suggest that the studied digital platforms utilize two different modes of open 
innovation integration (i.e., being integrative and integratable). Ultimately, these two types of 
integrations have an impact on how access to commercialization is granted, resulting in either an 
exclusion or inclusion strategy in accessing value opportunities. From the practitioner’s point of view, we 
provide decision support by increasing the awareness of different digital platform configuration options 
they have to provide and access platform value. This paper is constrained in its generalizability, as it used 
only two cases. Relevant avenues for future research are available in terms of configuration of digital 
(payment) platforms. In this study we have illustrated that different platform layer configurations 
(decoupled and coupled modular architecture) are leading to the same service offering. The question 
arises whether different platform design configurations with the same outcome are equally successful. 
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Paper 4 – JMIS 
 
Disentangling Digital Platform Competition: 
The Case of UK Mobile Payment Platforms 
 
Abstract 
Digital platforms confer competitive advantage through superior architectural configurations. There is 
however still a dearth of research that sheds light on the competitive attributes which de-fine platform 
competition from an architectural standpoint. To disentangle platform competition, we opted for the 
mobile payment market in the United Kingdom (UK) as our empirical setting. By conceptualizing digital 
platforms as layered modular architectures and embracing the theoretical lens of strategic groups, this 
study supplements prior research by deriving a taxonomy of plat-form profiles that is grounded on the 
strategic dimensions of value creation and value delivery architectures. We discover that mobile payment 
platforms could be delineated based on whether they are: (1) integrative or integratable on their value 
creation architecture; and (2) have direct, indirect, or open access on their value delivery architecture. 
The preceding attributes of value creation architecture and value delivery architecture aided us in 
identifying six profiles associated with mobile payment platforms, which in turn led us to advance three 
competitive strategies that could be pursued by digital platforms in network economies. 
Keywords: Competition, digital infrastructures, digital platforms, financial technologies, mobile 
payments, network economies, strategic groups 
 
A version of the paper is published as Kazan, E., C.-W. Tan, E. T. K. Lim, C. Sørensen, & J. Damsgaard 
(Forthcoming): Disentangling Digital Platform Competition: The Case of UK Mobile Payment 
Platforms. Journal of Management Information Systems, Special issue on Financial IS, Underlying 
Technologies, and the FinTech Revolution.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The platformization of digital goods and services is a growing trend in many industries. Digital 
platforms [16] (hereafter platforms) are layered modular information technology (IT) architectures [74, 
80] embedded within business networks [2, 66]. Within these business networks, platforms function as 
innovation hubs in offering services (e.g., payments) that emphasize mediation and modularity [68, 80]. 
Platform owners (e.g., Apple) and platform complementors (e.g., developers) collaborate to develop 
respective firm-specific components to co-create valued platform derivatives3 (e.g., apps) [20, 27, 62]. 
Because platforms constitute a vital source of competitive advantage within networked economies, there 
has been an enduring stream of research that examines how platforms effectively compete [7, 8, 60]. 
Scholars have attested to the criticality of matching mechanisms (e.g., pricing) in attracting and retaining 
stakeholders. A core premise of these studies is that successful platforms must induce positive and 
sustainable network effects to appeal to stakeholders. In the same vein, platformization has 
revolutionized the financial service industry by altering the manner through which value is created and 
delivered. Emerging technologies in the likes of blockchain and cryptocurrency have displaced 
conventional modes of transactions (e.g., centralized payment networks controlled by market 
incumbents) by introducing alternative value creation and delivery architectures that function as open, 
decentralized peer-to-peer (P2P) platforms. This in turn compels market incumbents to redesign their 
financial service offerings to harness the benefits of platformization and remain competitive within 
networked economies. 
Yet, despite the disruption brought about by platformization, we have limited knowledge of how digital 
platforms compete from an architectural standpoint [5]. Responding to calls for an in-depth appreciation 
of the impact of architectural configurations on digital platform competition [5], we draw on previous 
literature on interfirm competition. Specifically, we espouse the theoretical lens of strategic groups to 
unpack the dimensions upon which interfirm rivalries are built [18, 44]. Research has delineated and 
clustered firms into strategic groups to account for their competitive dynamics. Past studies hold that 
firms belonging to the same strategic group possess comparable competitive attributes, and thus, compete 
more fiercely with group members (intragroup competition) than with members from another strategic 
group (intergroup competition). By embracing the theoretical lens of strategic groups, we aim to 
contribute to an in-depth appreciation of how different platform-driven strategic groups configure their 
technological architectures to bolster their competitiveness. 
The mobile payments market in the United Kingdom (UK) is highly mature and competition is driven 
primarily by advances in financial technology – fintech innovation – among incumbents and contenders. 
Long-standing relationships among market incumbents and costly access to established payment 
infrastructures have compartmentalized competition by forcing select players to band together to 
compete with incumbents. The fragmentation of the UK mobile payments market into competing factions 
hence conforms to the classical conception of strategic groups, and serves as an excellent empirical 
context for our investigation into digital platform competition. Through case studies of multiple mobile 
payment platforms in the UK market, we strive to provide answers to two research questions: What are 
the strategic attributes that define platform competition from an architecture standpoint? What are 
generic platform strategies within networked economies?  
                                                     
3 We employ the term platform derivatives to describe technological by-products of digital platforms that are 
constructed on the basis of developmental tools (e.g., application programming interfaces (APIs) or software 
development kits (SDKs)) supplied by these platforms. 
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This study contributes to a deeper understanding of how digital financial services such as mobile 
payments are leveraging on platform design to revolutionize their strategies within a regulated market 
environment. Synthesizing prior research, we identify two distinct strategic dimensions of digital 
platform competition: (1) value creation architecture, and; (2) value delivery architecture. In turn, the 
configuration of these two strategic dimensions shape the strategic orientation of platforms in the market. 
Our analysis generated six discrete platform profiles, each exemplified by a corresponding mobile 
payment service that seeks to revolutionize its offerings. The profiles serve as the basis on which to 
unravel digital platform competition. Our findings further reveal that these six platform profiles translate 
into three distinct platform strategies, each with its own merits and shortcomings. 
2. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION 
 
2.1 Overview of Literature on Mobile Platforms 
Research into mobile payments has received substantial attention among scholars in their bid to explain 
the logic behind how mobile payment service providers innovate and compete [14, 32, 50]. Indeed, most 
mobile payment studies are centered on attempts to illuminate the drivers of service adoption [63], such 
as: exploring the cooperative and competitive dynamics among mobile payment providers within 
industries [17, 32]; prescribing the strategic design of mobile payment platforms/services towards market 
ignition [49]; revealing the challenges of creating a mobile payments market in the first place [50]; or 
scrutinizing the potential of novel mobile payment technologies (e.g., near field communication (NFC)) 
[15, 48]. A common theme among these studies is that they largely treat the external market as their unit 
of analysis (e.g., multi-sided platform perspective), thereby constraining our knowledge of how mobile 
payment platforms compete from an architectural standpoint. Past studies of digital platforms hint that 
such platforms achieve competitiveness through superior architectural configurations that are less 
susceptible to replication [51]. 
Arguably, one way of comprehending digital platform competition is to theoretically dissect such 
platforms into layered modular technology architectures [80]. We contend that competitive mobile 
payment platforms embody differentiated architectural configurations that mirror their strategic 
orientation. In turn, these strategic orientations in conjunction with their matching architectural 
configurations translate into distinct platform strategies, which when combined, form the basis for 
competition within the mobile payments market. We hence turn to the research stream on strategic 
groups as an appropriate theoretical lens for characterizing digital platform competition in the mobile 
payments market. 
 
2.2 Strategic Groups: An Overview 
Scholars have employed strategic groups as a theoretical lens [44] to uncover why certain firms in the 
same industry perform better than their rivals. The term strategic groups was first coined by Hunt [35] to 
explain firm competition in the home appliance industry. Firms belonging to the same strategic group 
exhibit similar competitive attributes and market orientations, they differ from those strategic groups that 
target other segments of the same industry [44, 70]. Porter [56, p. 129] proposed a more granular view on 
strategic groups, describing them as a “group of firms in an industry following the same or a similar 
strategy along the strategic dimensions”. The methods by which firms compete are heterogeneous, as 
varying emphases are placed on different competitive attributes. 
To derive strategic groups, scholars applied a myriad of competitive attributes, which include: available 
resources (e.g., distribution channels, assets, and technology) [6, 12, 45]; cognitive factors (e.g., top 
management perception, reputation, and identity) [24, 52, 58]; or economic conditions (e.g., 
product/service portfolio, firm performance and size, sales, margin, profit, and market share) [25, 42, 65]. 
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Past studies further indicated that firms’ dynamic capabilities can solidify the barriers of strategic groups 
[40, 69]. Yet, despite extensive research on strategic groups, previous work has centered on traditional 
industries and largely ignored firms situated in networked economies such as platform-driven market 
environments. 
 
2.3 Strategic Groups within Industrialized Economies 
Porter [56] claimed that firms’ affiliation with strategic groups stems from having control over limited 
resources. By belonging to the same strategic group, members can install mobility barriers to preclude 
other firms from entering, or discouraging member firms from leaving the group at will [28]. Mobility 
barriers reflect segregation strategies adopted by strategic group members to designate and enforce 
conditions of loyalty through controlling member firms’ access to exclusive shared resources.  
Past studies suggest that competitive attributes underlying mobility barriers are typically idiosyncratic to 
the industry [44, 56]. Mascarenhas and Aaker’s [43] work on the oil-drilling industry suggests that 
competitive attributes in one industry (e.g., offshore drilling capabilities) may not be applicable to others. 
The study by Mehra [45] in the US banking sector revealed that configurations of industry-specific 
resources also constitute definitive attributes of strategic groups. Mehra [45] noted that the ownership of 
strategic resources, by itself, does not necessarily generate competitive benefits, countering instead that 
optimal “configurations of [strategic] resources” are necessary to unlock their full potential. In light of 
the abovementioned studies, we contend that strategic groups are mainly shaped by industry specific 
resources and that the composition and configuration of these resources serve as the foundation for how 
firms within a given industry compete with one another. 
 
2.4 Strategic Groups within Networked Economies 
Increasingly, firm competition is driven by networked business logics in which strategic linkages are 
forged among multiple firms to pool complementary capabilities and resources to augment one another’s 
products and services [4, 13, 19, 30]. The motivation for firms is to build up sustainable competitive 
advantage that is grounded in valuable, rare, and inimitable joint resources [cf. 13]. Gulati et al. [30] 
argued that a firm’s network, comprising a set of strategic linkages, constitutes its own inimitable firm 
resource because they are rooted in complex managerial processes and difficult to replicate [4]. Within 
the automotive industry, Nohria and Garcia-Pont [47] maintained that strategic linkages among 
automakers (e.g., joint ventures) form an indispensable competitive resource, as they circumvent certain 
resource constraints (e.g., patents), and other organizational shortcomings. This aids firms in overcoming 
entry barriers installed by existing or emerging strategic groups. Accordingly, firms, which lack industry-
specific resources, can forge linkages with other firms to compensate for their own organizational 
deficiencies. Similarly, in networked economies where firms are intricately connected, access or control 
over strategic linkages is a valuable resource [cf. 30, 53]. 
Beyond having access to strategic linkages, the configuration of such strategic linkages is equally 
important for realizing the potential of interfirm relationships [23, 45, 51]. Configuration is the 
purposeful arrangement and combination of functional elements to generate a desired output [23]. 
Similar to the notion of combinative capabilities [37, p. 508] where firms compete through “new 
resource combinations [i.e. configurations] that are rare, valuable, hardly imitable, and non-
substitutable”, firms purposely combine and (re)configure firm linkages to create valued market outputs. 
Possessing dynamic capabilities, which reflect one’s “ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal 
and external competences” [69, p. 516], firms with access to strategic linkages respond to market 
changes by reconfiguring or even terminating existing strategic linkages with other firms. The study by 
Pagani [51] in the multi-media industry supports the notion of network orchestration. Pagani [51, p. 629] 
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postulates that “as modularization takes hold, the ability to coordinate among the modules will become 
the most valuable business skill”. Strategic linkages and configurations are synonymous with interfirm 
modularity [68], where multiple platformized firms supply buildings blocks and components to create 
modularized goods and services within digitalized value networks [2, 80]. 
 
2.5 Digital Platform Competition 
Extant literature has explored how platforms compete with one another from three perspectives, namely, 
product, multi-sided, and ecosystem [71]. From a product platform perspective [36, 38], competitiveness 
is achieved by controlling a stable platform core that acts the technological foundation for a family of 
platform derivatives. Firms with product platforms usually compete through economies of scale and 
scope, which are realized based on innovation of the core and peripheries. Originating from industrial 
economics, the multi-sided platform perspective [39, 41, 60] holds that competitive platforms embody 
positive networks effects whereby the value of a platform depends on the population and growth of 
distinguishable users (e.g., buyers and sellers on Amazon). Studies belonging to this research stream 
focuses on identifying efficient matching mechanisms (e.g., pricing) to entice and galvanize users against 
rival platforms. Finally, the platform ecosystem perspective places emphasis on the composition and 
configuration of technological components. Platforms in possession of superior technological 
components and configurations are deemed to be competitive in the marketplace [9, 10] because they 
tend to produce favorable conditions for soliciting contributions from third parties (e.g., external 
developers), thereby culminating in positive network effects. 
Prior research on platform competition within the payment industry has largely subscribed to the multi-
sided platform perspective [11, 59]. Beyond a few exceptions from the computer or software industry [9, 
10], there is a paucity of studies that shed light on how platforms compete from a technological 
viewpoint in highly regulated industries such as that of the mobile payments market.  
 
2.6 Digital Platforms 
Digital platforms are layered modular technology architectures within business networks [54, 74, 80]. 
Within these business networks [3], platforms can orchestrate technological components to foster co-
innovation with cooperative stakeholders, who might also be competitors among themselves [5, 51]. 
Additionally, platforms can house competitors within the same platform stack (e.g., Amazon and Apple) 
[80]. From the above description, it is thus conceivable that digital platforms resemble the technological 
manifestations of interfirm strategic linkages within networked economies. We therefore build on past 
studies about platform ecosystems to elicit determinants of digital platform competition that correspond 
to the modular composition (similar to strategic linkages) of such platforms as well as their 
configurations (similar to strategic linkage configurations). 
Value Creation Architectures: The first strategic dimension of digital platform competition lies in the 
modular composition or strategic linkages among stakeholders in a network. Simply put, platforms 
supply the technical foundation for third parties (e.g., external developers) to develop complementary 
platform derivatives (e.g., iOS apps) on separate layers of a platform (e.g., service layer) [80]. In so 
doing, platform owners (e.g., Apple) leverage on boundary resources (e.g., APIs) [20, 27] to channel the 
creativity of network members towards the development of value-added derivatives. Because platforms 
supply developmental tools (or building blocks) for other platform members, an enduring challenge for 
platform owners is governance. Platform owners are constantly challenged to enforce control and support 
generativity (i.e., unprompted changes by heterogeneous audiences) [81], while ensuring reciprocal value 
appropriations [22, 73, 77]. Platforms have the (business) logic of transforming resources into valuable 
market outputs. In this regard, platforms compete within value networks by offering the best resource 
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configuration (i.e., stable core and flexible derivatives) with the greatest added value. We hence define 
value creation architecture as modular components of a digital platform that can be exploited by third 
parties to develop value-added derivatives. 
Value Delivery Architectures: The second strategic dimension of digital platform competition stems 
from the configuration of strategic linkages among stakeholders belonging to a value network. In other 
words, for platforms to efficiently diffuse derivatives across their value network, they rely on access to 
technological backbones in the form of digital infrastructures (e.g., Internet) [31, 33, 67, 72]. Hanseth 
and Lyytinen [31, p. 4] conceive digital infrastructures “as a shared, open…heterogeneous, and evolving 
socio-technical system…of [IT] capabilities”. Likewise, Henfridsson and Bygstad [33, p. 908] equate 
digital infrastructures with “the collection of technological and human components, networks, systems, 
and processes that contribute to the functioning of an information system”. Conversely, Tilson, et al. [72, 
p. 748] define digital infrastructures as “basic information technologies and organizational structures, 
along with the related services and facilities necessary for an enterprise or industry to function”. 
Consistent with the preceding theorizations, we define value delivery architecture as omnipresent digital 
infrastructures that operate as technological backbones of value networks to facilitate the efficient 
delivery of standardized platform derivatives among stakeholders belonging to the same value network. 
One can see from our definition that the motivation behind why digital platforms strive for unimpeded 
access to digital infrastructures is to streamline the delivery of platform derivatives. Digital platforms 
lacking access to digital infrastructures, especially when these infrastructures are dominant and 
exclusive, will be compelled to either: (1) forge linkages with other firms that have access; or (2) utilize 
alternate access options that replicate established infrastructures. 
Platforms within network economies vary in their modularity and, by extension, compete on two 
strategic architectural dimensions: namely (1) value creation, and; (2) value delivery (see Figure 1). 
Specifically, platforms practice modularity on their value creation architectures (i.e., platform level) to 
(co)create value-added derivatives. Likewise, platforms also practice modularity on value delivery 
architectures (i.e., infrastructure level) to deliver derivatives in a standardized format. We posit that 
platforms exhibiting similar attributes along these two strategic dimensions should share identical 
competitive instincts, and belong to the same strategic group (or platform profile). 
 
 
Figure 1. Value Network 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
This study adopts an interpretive multiple case study approach to uncover competitive attributes that 
give rise to distinct platform-driven strategic groups (or platform profiles) [76, 79]. In this sense, we 
blend both exploratory (i.e., Theory I) and explanatory (i.e., Theory II) approaches [29] by synthesizing 
focal concepts from extant literature on platform and strategic groups to craft an analytical lens for: (1) 
identifying competitive attributes pertinent to platforms from an architectural standpoint; (2) deriving 
formal classifications of platform profiles, as well as; (3) disentangling how value creation, delivery, and 
competition unfold among these platform profiles. We deem the case study approach to be an appropriate 
method of inquiry as it can answer both “how” and “why” questions in complex and nebulous research 
environments [79], a setting similar to the context of this study. Through an analysis of key actors within 
the UK mobile payments market, we seek to untangle the intertwining relationship between technological 
architectures and the competitive strategies pursued by these platform profiles. 
 
3.1 Research Setting: Mobile Payments Market in the United Kingdom (UK) 
Payment is an indispensable service within national economies. To guarantee secure and reliable 
payment services for an entire country, access to established payment infrastructures is subjected to 
stringent and costly regulatory oversight. In this light, access to established payment infrastructures can 
be deemed to be an asset within the payment industry. To unravel the competitive attributes governing 
different platform profiles, we turn to the UK mobile payments market as our empirical context. The UK 
payments industry is in the midst of market convergence and transformation. Regulatory changes, falling 
transaction costs, and intensifying competition have culminated in the gradual deconstruction of once 
vertically integrated financial institutions (e.g., banks) by permitting new actors to enter the industry by 
disintermediating once lucrative value streams. Under this broader context, mobile payments have 
emerged as one of the most competitive market spaces in the payment industry. 
Due to massive growth opportunities in the mobile payments market, new payment providers are 
encroaching on territories that are held by market incumbents. Payment instruments have evolved from 
simplistic plastic payment cards to sophisticated digital payment applications that are installed on 
consumers’ mobile devices. These mobile payment platforms move value between payers and payees in 
a digitized fashion, which in turn pose a threat to the payment incumbents (e.g., banks) that have 
traditionally occupied this space. These new mobile payment platforms could foster new consumption 
habits and decouple long-standing customer relationships with incumbents. To compete, payment 
incumbents are compelled to launch their own mobile payment solutions (e.g., Barclay’s Pingit) as a 
preemptive measure to maintain their relevance to existing customers. 
Apart from the disruption brought on by emergent technologies, regulatory changes have also intensified 
market competition. UK payment regulators have called on incumbent payment scheme owners (e.g., 
Faster Payments4) to offer new payment providers non-discriminatory access to established payment 
infrastructures. These regulatory changes have enabled the new payment providers to interface their 
platforms with established payment infrastructures when moving value between payers and payees. 
Though the abovementioned regulatory changes are likely to accelerate competition among payment 
actors in the UK mobile payments market, there is notably little knowledge of how mobile payment 
providers, as owners of digital platforms, compete from an architectural standpoint. 
 
 
                                                     
4 Faster Payments Service (FPS) is a UK banking initiative to reduce payment times between customer bank 
accounts from three working days, which transfers usually take via the long-established BACS system, to typically 
a few hours. 
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3.2 Case Selection: Six Distinct Platform Profiles  
To derive distinct platform profiles within the UK mobile payments market, 16 semi-structured 
interviews were carried out with five industry experts and 11 financial institutions offering mobile 
payment services. We began by conducting five semi-structured interviews with UK payment industry 
experts who are well-acquainted with the industry due to their unique position in the midst of the shake 
up in the fintech landscape (see Table 1). These initial interviews allow us to construct an overview of 
the UK payment industry and glean insights into the: (1) roles of key actors (e.g., banks, payment start-
ups, acquirers or merchants’ bank, technology providers, payment infrastructure owners, and credit card 
firms) operating in the industry; as well as (2) explicit and implicit mechanisms underlying competition 
among these actors. 
 
 
From the expert interviews, we selected 11 UK financial institutions, which have been touted by the 
industry experts as revolutionary players in the mobile payments market, to serve as case companies for 
our study. Additional semi-structured interviews were conducted with representatives from these 11 
financial institutions. Furthermore, to accurately position the 11 financial institutions within the UK 
payment industry landscape and authenticate claims made by the interviewees, we also gathered data 
from secondary sources (see Table 1). Guided by our analytical framework (see Figure 1), we inspected 
the 11 cases with respect to the two strategic dimensions of value creation and value delivery 
architectures. Our goal is to comprehend how these case companies design their respective mobile 
payment services to: (1) create value through co-innovation, and; (2) deliver value through access to 
Table 1. Breakdown of Data Sources 
Financial Institution Primary Data Secondary Data 
Interviewee Time Source No. Articles 
Industry Experts 
Berenberg 
VP / Equity Analyst on Financial Technology 61 mins - - 
IBM Executive Architect, Banking and Financial 
Markets 
72 mins - - 
Consult Hyperion Director of Innovation 48 mins - - 
Vocalink Strategy Lead 125 mins - - 
AMEX Mobile Product Innovation and Strategy 153 mins - - 
Banking Institutions 
Barclays (Pingit) SVP of Mobile Solutions 66 mins Finextra.com 120 
Thepaypers.com 10 
Blockchain.info 
Co-Founder 82 mins Finextra.com 2 
CEX.io Chief Information Officer (CIO) 45 mins Thepaypers.com 2 
Circle Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 45 mins Finextra.com 13 
CryptoPay Founder 112 mins Thepaypers.com 1 
Droplet Chief Technology Officer (CTO) 68 mins Thepaypers.com 2 
Google Wallet Head of Europe, the Middle East and Africa 65 mins Thepaypers.com 21 
HSBC Global Head of Mobile Payment 85 mins Finextra.com 39 
Thepaypers.com 1 
Paym Head of Development 65 mins Finextra.com 47 
Thepaypers.com 8 
Santander Innovation Analyst 210 mins Finextra.com 29 
Thepaypers.com 1 
Zapp  Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 44 mins Finextra.com 71 
Thepaypers.com 10 
Total 16 interviews 1,346 mins 2 sources 377 articles 
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established payment infrastructures. From the analysis of the 11 cases, six distinct platform profiles (or 
platform-based strategic groups) surfaced according to attributes delineated across the strategic 
dimensions of value creation and delivery architecture. From our case pool, we present the six most 
prominent instantiations corresponding to each platform profile. 
These six illustrative cases of mobile payment services are either operated by incumbent financial 
institutions or owned by market leaders in the payment industry, namely: (1) Pingit (Barclays); (2) 
Droplet (payment start-up); (3) Paym (collaborative payment solution devised by consortium of UK 
banking institutions); (4) Zapp (Vocalink, a payment technology provider); (5) Blockchain.info 
(blockchain start-up), and; (6) Circle (blockchain start-up). To capture novel fintech actors that differ 
significantly in their technological approach to payment processing, we have opted to include two 
blockchain start-ups. Blockchain is an emerging technology for digital value transfer (e.g., payment 
systems) that replicates the functionalities of established payment infrastructures. We selected two 
pervasive blockchain start-ups: Blockchain.info and Circle. Both startups leverage on the Bitcoin 
blockchain technology to transfer digital value (i.e., Bitcoins) among payers and payees. Whereas end 
users of Blockchain.info have to convert Bitcoins into fiat currency (e.g., British pounds) via a third party 
(e.g., Bitcoin exchange), their counterparts in Circle can perform direct conversion between Bitcoins and 
fiat currency. We chose these blockchain companies because they not only operate in the UK, they are 
also recognized as global leaders with respect to the level of venture capital investment garnered and the 
size of their user base. Besides, Circle is the first Bitcoin startup in the world to be granted an e-money 
license by UK regulators, thereby enabling the company to form sustainable banking relationships and 
negotiate access to established payment infrastructures [55]. 
 
3.3 Data Collection 
Data for this study were gathered from two sources: 16 semi-structured interviews and secondary 
archival records (see Table 1). Semi-structured interviews have the advantage of permitting the 
interviewer to glean extra insights (e.g., publicly inaccessible data) that may enrich the study further. The 
interview protocol was devised in accordance with our analytical framework and contained questions that 
have been formulated to unravel the mechanisms underpinning how each of the 11 mobile payment 
services works in practice. Specifically, when interviewing representatives from the 11 financial 
institutions, we not only asked them to reconstruct both narratively and visually how a typical transaction 
could be executed on their respective mobile payment platforms, but we also probed them on the identity 
of external partners who are instrumental in supplying the necessary capabilities and resources to 
generate the service offering. All semi-structured interviews were recorded and subsequently transcribed 
for coding purposes. Apart from the interviews, we also distilled the product pages of the 11 mobile 
payment platforms together with payment reports, white papers, and press releases from industry 
associations (e.g., the European and UK Payments Council) as well as online news outlets (e.g., 
Finextra.com) and news aggregators (i.e., ThePaypers.com) reporting on the payment industry (see Table 
1). Through the collection of data from secondary sources, we can triangulate insights gleaned from 
interviews with events documented in the public domain. 
For detailed presentation of the six illustrative fintech cases of mobile payment services, we draw 
primarily on interviews conducted with the: (1) Senior Vice President (SVP) of Mobile Solutions at 
Barclays to shed light on Pingit; (2) Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Zapp; (3) Head of Development at 
Paym; (4) Chief Technology Officer (CTO) of Droplet; (5) Co-Founder of Blockchain.info, and; (6) 
CEO of Circle, as well as secondary archival records that have been extracted for each service. 
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3.4 Data Analysis 
The analysis of the empirical data was performed in three steps: (1) industry analysis, (2) intra-case 
analysis, and; (3) inter-case analysis. Table 2 gives a synopsis of how interview quotes were coded in 
accordance with content analytical techniques. 
Table 2. Coding Examples from Data Analysis 
Dimension Exemplary Quote Intra-Case Analysis Inter-Case Analysis 
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Quote 1: It has to be, of course, then commercially 
relevant to be disclosing any API's to that party…it's 
very much about providing information into, or to, 
the Pingit app as opposed to integrating Pingit into 
another app, for example. 
Pingit is moderating 
platform access such that 
co-creation value streams 
are inwards and 
orientated towards the 
platform. 
Whereas Pingit maintains 
stringent control over the 
ability of external 
developers to develop 
value-added derivatives 
on its mobile payment 
platform, Paym practices 
the opposite. 
Consequently, Pingit 
competes by ensuring the 
consistency and quality of 
its service offerings while 
Paym competes by 
mobilizing third parties to 
engage in co-innovation. 
P
a
ym
 
Quote 2: [Paym] facilitates payments but it doesn’t 
do payments itself directly.  
Quote 3: The way the service works, assuming you 
and I both registered through our banks, I would log 
into my mobile banking application, I would select 
the Paym option and then I can send money to you by 
sending it to your phone number 
Quote 4: It's an extension of the functionality that a 
banking app that I have on my phone offers me. 
Paym shares its platform 
with third parties such 
that the co-creation value 
streams are reciprocal in 
nature. 
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Quote 5: when we use the Faster Payment 
infrastructure we as, of course, is one of the founders 
of the Faster Payments infrastructure we have 
connectivity into the Payments Councils Faster 
Payments product. 
Barclays, as the owner of 
Pingit and co-owner of 
the Faster Payments 
payment infrastructure, 
has direct access to send 
and receive payments in 
UK. 
Both Pingit and Paym has 
direct access to an 
established payment 
infrastructure by virtue of 
their parent financial 
institution. Consequently, 
competitive 
differentiation between 
Pingit and Paym is hard 
to achieve in terms of 
their value delivery 
architecture. 
P
a
ym
 
Quote 6: Faster Payments is the UK's real-time 
account-to-account transfer banking [infrastructure], 
Paym is a way of driving more transactions through 
that banking [infrastructure]. 
Quote 7: I'm then providing my bank with the 
instruction to make a payment and that payment will 
either go through Faster Payments or it will go 
through Link and those are the two approved, two 
supported, payment schemes in this service. 
Paym has direct access to 
an established value 
delivery architecture. 
 
 Industrial Analysis: After a careful review of the primary and secondary dataset, the first author 
reconstructed the empirical landscape to derive an overview of the underlying mechanisms in the 
UK payment industry: how it is structured and governed, who are the key actors, as well as; existing 
strategic linkages among these actors. The objective of this industrial analysis was to disentangle 
interorganizational linkages that are required for processing payment transactions throughout 
different payment infrastructures.  
 Intra-Case Analysis: The first author drafted comprehensive case descriptions to outline the 
business logic underpinning each mobile payment service. Guided by the research questions and 
theoretical concepts from strategic groups and platform literature, the first author applied content 
analytical procedures [34, 57] to code and interpret the primary interview data in an iterative manner 
to unpack the logic of mobile payment platforms from an architectural viewpoint [21, 76, 79]. 
Specifically, the coding is aimed at pinpointing the modular attributes, which constitute the value 
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creation architecture of each platform, and the eventual configuration of strategic linkages with third 
parties that constitute their value delivery architectures (see Table 2).  
 Inter-Case Analysis: Inter-case analysis was performed to enhance the generalizability of our study 
[46, 79]. By comparing the cases in terms of their value creation and value delivery architectures, 
we discovered commonalities and discrepancies among these distinct platform profiles (see Table 
2). Particularly, we identified six distinct platform profiles. To ensure the analytical consistency of 
our findings, we applied a differentiated role strategy after the initial data analysis [1]. The first 
author acted as the primary data collector and coder. The co-authors, on the other hand, played the 
role of the devil’s advocate by putting forth alternative interpretations and counter-arguments. 
Whenever disagreements surfaced, codes were revisited and discussed until consensus was reached. 
The entire coding process followed an iterative cycle and data analysis was only completed when all 
authors agree on the placement of quotes in accordance with the analytical framework. 
4. CASE ANALYSIS: ILLUSTRATIVE MOBILE PAYMENT PLATFORMS 
Platformization has opened the door for mobile payment services to revolutionize how value is created 
and delivered through interfirm co-innovation. In this section, we present insights gleaned from 
analyzing the 11 mobile payment platforms. From our data analysis, we identified six platform-driven 
strategic groups (or platform profiles) within the UK mobile payment market, each with its own 
innovative approach to configuring its value creation and delivery architectures. Table 3 summarizes the 
platform profiles derived from our data analysis. We draw on these illustrative case examples to 
elaborate on the competitive attributes for each platform profile.  
 
 Table 3. Platform Profiles 
Value Delivery Architecture 
Direct Access Indirect Access Open Access 
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Pingit (Monopolistic) 
Value Creation Architecture 
Integrative: Internal development, 
vertically integrated platform, 
capturing value without third 
parties   
Value Delivery Architecture  
Direct: Having direct access to 
established payment infrastructures 
(e.g., Faster Payments) 
Droplet (Assimilative) 
Value Creation Architecture  
Integrative: Internal development, 
vertically integrated platform, 
capturing value without third 
parties   
Value Delivery Architecture 
Indirect Access: Relying on third 
parties to have access to established 
payment infrastructures (e.g., 
BACS). 
Circle (Hybrid) 
Value Creation Architecture 
Integrative: Internal development, 
vertically integrated platform, 
capturing value without third 
parties   
Value Delivery Architecture 
Indirect Access: Relying on third 
parties to have access to established 
payment infrastructures (e.g., 
VISA, MasterCard) 
Open Access: Unobstructed access 
to the bitcoin network 
In
te
g
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Paym (Coopetitive) 
Value Creation Architecture 
Integratable: Interorganizational 
platform, capturing value with third 
parties   
Value Delivery Architecture 
Direct: Having direct access to 
established payment infrastructures 
(e.g., Faster Payments) 
Zapp (Inclusive) 
Value Creation Architecture 
Integratable: Interorganizational 
platform, capturing value with third 
parties   
Value Delivery Architecture  
Indirect Access: Relying on third 
parties to have access to established 
payment infrastructures (e.g., 
Faster Payments) 
Blockchain.info (Open) 
Value Creation Architecture 
Integratable: Interorganizational 
platform, capturing value with third 
parties   
Value Delivery Architecture 
Open Access: Unobstructed access 
to the bitcoin network. 
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4.1 Pingit  
In 2012, Barclays launched its own internally-developed mobile payment service: Pingit (Figure 2). 
Pingit was initially designed to be a person-to-person (P2P) mobile payment service and as a standalone 
application, it registered solid growth in its user base, which in turn incentivized businesses to adopt 
Pingit. It is a proprietary mobile payment service as its design and development are fully internalized. As 
alleged by the Senior Vice President (SVP): “We have a very rapid development cycle…we’re doing a 
release every month [updates]…so anytime we’re adding to those features…we’re really adding to the 
long-term benefit of the product…we have a significant team that’s developing and supporting those 
products or sub-products…under the Pingit umbrella”. Additionally, Pingit offers developmental tools to 
approved external developers to build related applications and extend the reach of its value creation 
architecture: “It has to be, of course, commercially relevant to be disclosing any API’s to that party…it’s 
very much about providing information into, or to, the Pingit app as opposed to integrating Pingit into 
another app…the Techstars [start-up] accelerator program was enormously successful, [the goal is] to 
have a different set of APIs that kind of the startup app development world can use in a slightly different 
way” (SVP).  
 
 
Figure 2.  Pingit Mobile Payment Platform 
 
Pingit (see Figure 2) has a dual approach to process payment transactions. For Pingit users (i.e., payers 
and payees) who are Barclays’ customers, the settlement occurs internally within the Pingit platform in 
real-time. As the SVP elaborated: “A consumer [pushes] the money which is what a Pingit transaction 
[is]…we can just move the money from one Pingit account to another”. By housing a closed loop system, 
Pingit harnesses efficiencies from economies of scale by processing transactions internally within its own 
platform. For Pingit users (i.e., payers and payees) who are not affiliated with Barclays, Pingit is still able 
to serve them by leveraging on its value delivery architecture. Barclays is a founding member of the 
Faster Payments scheme that grants Pingit direct access to an established payment infrastructure to 
process interbank transfers in near real-time. As the SVP remarked: “we use the Faster Payments 
infrastructure, of course, as one of the founders of the Faster Payments infrastructure we have 
connectivity”.  
Value Creation Architecture: Pingit pursues an independent approach to the development of its platform 
when competing with other mobile payment services. By denying other banking institutions from 
interfacing with Pingit, Barclays exercises total control over the value creation architecture of its inbuilt 
platform. But at the same time, Pingit is open to customers from rival banking institutions, who crave a 
mobile payment solution. As the SVP clarified: “As a competitive bank, [rival banking institutions] can’t 
use Pingit but as a consumer…it’s an open market from a consumer perspective…it’s our product and 
our service and we use it as a differentiator from the other banks in the space”. Having a large user base, 
Pingit is also in a comfortable position to dictate its collaborative relationships with external parties, who 
desire to develop approved platform derivatives for the mobile payment service. In turn, it expands the 
reach of Pingit’s value creation architecture in both service diversity and quality. 
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Value Delivery Architecture: Through Barclays, Pingit possesses the competitive advantage of having 
direct access to the Faster Payments payment infrastructure, the dominant value delivery architecture for 
processing real-time payments. This enables Pingit to serve non-Barclays customers who have bank 
accounts at rival banking institutions. In this aspect, Barclays’ value delivery architecture (i.e., Faster 
Payments) plays a pivotal role in bolstering the appeal of Pingit to potential customers beyond its own 
institutional borders. 
Monopolistic Platform: By resembling a monopolistic, self-contained mobile payment service on its 
value creation architecture, Pingit maximizes the value to be gained from its proprietary platform 
technology. Furthermore, with respect to its value delivery architecture, Pingit has taken advantage of its 
direct access to an established payment infrastructure (i.e., Faster Payments) to reach out to customers at 
rival banking institutions in a cost-efficient manner. 
 
4.2 Droplet 
Launched in 2012, Droplet (see Figure 3) is a Birmingham-based mobile payment startup that allows 
small businesses and individuals to perform mobile payment transactions within brick and mortar stores.  
 
 
Figure 3.  Droplet Mobile Payment Platform 
 
By promoting itself as the ‘Skype for payments’, Droplet’s core value proposition stems from its market 
position as a free payment service for both payers and payees. Built on standard hardware and open 
source software, Droplet’s standalone application is an internally developed payment service that grants 
the company absolute control over how its service can be tailored to address market needs. As the Chief 
Technology Officer (CTO) explained: “The software is Linux, we don’t use any Microsoft technologies 
anywhere in the stack at all…the vast majority of our frameworks are open source, but obviously our 
[own software] isn’t open source”. As for granting platform access to external developers, the CTO 
stated: “We’ve seen a couple of companies build experimental things on Droplet which has been great 
and really exciting… but not to the level that we want…without [API keys5] it won't work so they need to 
apply to us for that [API key] …We can revoke that [API keys] at any time if we want to”.  
                                                     
5 API keys are authentication codes that must be incorporated into third-party applications to gain access to the 
developmental tools (i.e., APIs) offered by Droplet.  
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To exploit the full potential of its value creation architecture in facilitating mobile payments between 
payers and payee, Droplet not only forges strategic linkages with financial institutions whereby payers 
can top-up their Droplet accounts via direct bank transfers or debit cards linked to their personal bank 
accounts, but it also offers approved developmental tools (i.e., APIs) to external developers for building 
their own Droplet-related applications. Through supplying boundary resources (i.e., approved 
developmental tools) as part of its value creation architecture, Droplet encourages external developers to 
generate their own platform derivatives with customized business rules to meet the ongoing needs of the 
market.  
With regard to its value delivery architecture, Droplet is dependent on both direct debit providers to 
withdraw the top-up amount directly from customers’ bank accounts (e.g., GoCardless) and payment 
infrastructure access providers (e.g., Ingenico) for debit card top-ups. As soon as a payment 
infrastructure access provider receives a top-up request on behalf of Droplet, it will credit the payment 
into Droplet’s bank account. Afterwards, transactions among Droplet customers are instantly settled 
within its internal system. In this way, the money in Droplet’s bank account remains untouched during 
transactions. As the CTO acknowledged: “We are quite insulated from the real world of banking… 
[payment transactions] can carry on infinitely with no costs to us and no money movement”. For those 
customers who would like to withdraw money from their Droplet accounts and exit the platform, Droplet 
instructs its bank to send what are known as cost convenient payment batches (i.e., BACS6 payment) to 
the beneficiaries. 
Value Creation Architecture: Droplet adheres to an independent approach to the development of its 
platform to minimize its dependency on external developers. Droplet operates a self-contained mobile 
payment service that is realized through a blend of self-developed software, inbuilt APIs, and off-the-
shelf hardware. By pursuing such an approach, Droplet achieves agility in platform development in that 
it can acquire capabilities externally [69] to respond to fast changing market environments. By housing a 
closed loop system, Droplet competes through the provision of instantaneous payments that occur within 
its platform boundaries. This in turn significantly reduces its variable cost structure: “The plan is to grow 
the system to a scale where more transactions happen inside our economy and reduce our overall 
reliance on money in and money out…no money is moved at all. This can carry on infinitely with no cost 
to us and no money movement…so we have merchants in our economy that then buy things from other 
merchants using their Droplet balance” (CTO). 
Value Delivery Architecture: Droplet has indirect access to the BACS payment infrastructure to move 
money out of its platform. BACS is an established payment infrastructure renowned for its affordability 
but slow settlement speed. Droplet cooperates with multiple interchangeable access providers to maintain 
its flexibility. As the CTO admitted: “[These payment providers] are all interchangeable, so if we want 
to switch suppliers, we switch suppliers and nothing changes [for Droplet]”. Consequently, in the 
absence of direct access to established payment infrastructures, Droplet partners with multiple payment 
infrastructure access providers to optimize indirect access for its value delivery architecture and acquire 
efficiency gains for market competition. 
Assimilative Platform: Droplet is a self-contained mobile payment service that assimilates external 
resources to maintain independency on its value creation architecture. Likewise, Droplet’s loose coalition 
with payment infrastructure access providers to indirectly access predominant value delivery 
architectures gives it the flexibility to depress its cost structure by switching partners when necessary. 
 
 
                                                     
6 Bankers' Automated Clearing Services (BACS) is the payment infrastructure for the clearing and settlement of 
automated payment methods in the UK such as direct debit. 
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4.3 Paym 
Launched in 2014, Paym (see Figure 4) is a mobile payment service that was initially owned by the UK 
Payment Council and later by its institutional members. The Payment Council is an industry consortium 
whose membership encompasses most major British financial institutions (e.g., banks and building 
societies). 
 
Figure 4.  Paym Mobile Payment Platform 
 
The Payment Council was inaugurated with a mandate of nurturing the continuous growth of the UK 
payment industry. Paym is fully developed and operated by an external payment technology provider 
called Vocalink. Interestingly, Vocalink is also the technology provider for several UK payment 
infrastructures (e.g., Faster Payments). As alluded to by the Head of Development: “Vocalink [is] our IT 
provider…we’ve contracted with Vocalink to provide the database and the associated functionality 
around it…we went out to tender and Vocalink won the tender and then built the product that we had 
specified”. Born out of the collaboration between the Payment Council and Vocalink, Paym endows UK 
banking institutions with the capacity to offer mobile payment services to their existing customers. In 
contrast to Pingit and Droplet, Paym is not a standalone application, but rather operates as a module 
within existing mobile banking applications developed by institutional members of the Payment Council. 
Paym hence exists as an interoperable mobile payment service that accommodates diverse banking 
applications (e.g., HSBC and Santander). In this sense, Paym, unlike Pingit and Droplet, does not 
exercise control over its value creation architecture by vetting platform derivatives developed by 
partnering banking institutions. Instead, by positioning itself as a module which can be inserted into 
existing mobile banking applications, Paym functions as a interorganizational platform to connect Paym-
linked bank accounts across partnering banking institutions for processing push payments and 
accommodate the development of firm-specific platform derivatives. 
Paym perpetuates traditional relationships among banking institutions and payment infrastructures (e.g., 
Faster Payments). The Head of Development mentioned: “The idea is that you already trust your bank, 
you get this functionality and then everybody can send money to each other using their existing 
relationship…I'm then providing my bank with the instruction to make a payment and that payment will 
either go through Faster Payments or it will go through LINK and those are the two approved, two 
supported, payment schemes in this service”. 
Value Creation Architecture: Paym pursues a collaborative approach on its value creation architecture to 
encourage interfirm modularity among banking institutions to develop competitive mobile payment 
services. Envisioned as an interoperable mobile payment service, the development of Paym has been 
deliberately subcontracted to an external payment technology provider (i.e., Vocalink) who is familiar 
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with pre-existing interorganizational dependencies among banking institutions and can ensure the 
interoperability of the platform across a wide range of mobile banking applications. By being highly 
integratable across heterogeneous banking applications, Paym attains its competitiveness by acting as an 
inclusive mobile payment service: “The idea is that I can sign up for Paym and I don’t need to create a 
new relationship with a new financial services provider…it's an extension of the functionality that my 
[mobile banking app] already offers” (Head of Development). 
Value Delivery Architecture: Paym, as a mobile payment service offered by the UK banking consortium, 
has, on its value delivery architecture, direct access to Faster Payments, an established payment 
infrastructure with real-time processing of financial transactions. Paym thus facilitates regular bank wire 
transactions so much so that it serves to solidify the current market positions of banking institutions. As 
the Head of Development asserted: “The bank platform talks directly to Paym and Paym talks directly 
back to the bank platform…those are the only connections that exist”. 
Coopetitive Platform: By integrating into existing mobile banking applications developed by banking 
institutions that are also engaged in rivalry with one another, Paym competes on its value creation 
architecture by fueling this rivalry to foster competition in developing firm-specific platform derivatives 
and better its payment services. Conversely, since banking institutions are already interconnected by 
having direct access to an established payment infrastructure (i.e., Faster Payments), the competitiveness 
of Paym on its value delivery architecture is miniscule. 
 
4.4 Zapp  
Zapp (see Figure 5) is a mobile payment service owned by the UK payment infrastructure provider, 
Vocalink.  
 
 
Figure 5.  Zapp Mobile Payment Platform 
 
Like the three aforementioned mobile payment solutions, Zapp is designed to facilitate mobile payments 
between payers and payees. However, for its value creation architecture, Zapp shares commonalities with 
Paym. Similar to Paym, Zapp’s value creation architecture stems from its modularization: it is positioned 
as a module which can be inserted into existing mobile banking applications. For this reason, Zapp is 
reliant on contemporary banking partnerships. As the CEO explained: “It’s a feature within the [mobile 
banking] app … that essentially turns a banks mobile banking app into a vehicle to make payments. So, if 
you like, we are the messaging service that sits like a scheme between banks on one side and acquirers 
and merchants on the other side and we manage the flow of information in order to make a payment”. To 
initiate payments, Zapp has only indirect access to the Faster Payments payment infrastructure. In this 
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setup, banks act as proxies to initiate payments on behalf of Zapp between payers’ and payees’ bank 
accounts. Not unlike Paym, Zapp reinforces traditional relationships among banking institutions and 
payment infrastructures. The CEO emphasized that “Zapp works as part of their [mobile banking] app - 
it’s re-intermediating the bank into [customers’] relationship”.  
Value Creation Architecture: Zapp pursues a collaborative approach on its value creation architecture in 
that it primarily competes through modularity. It invites banking institutions and other businesses (i.e., 
merchants) to integrate its modularized mobile payment service into their applications and develop firm-
specific platform derivatives. To achieve interoperability and resilience, technology development is 
developed partially in-house with certain operations being subcontracted to an external vendor (i.e., 
Oracle). Zapp thus attains competitiveness by being an inclusive mobile payment service that is 
amenable to a variety of businesses and financial institutions. 
Value Delivery Architecture: Zapp has indirect access to the Faster Payments payment infrastructure 
because it functions primarily as an interorganizational platform to connect bank accounts across banking 
institutions to form a mobile payment network. Consequently, Zapp configured its strategic linkages with 
financial institutions in the form of indirect access to an established and fast processing value delivery 
architecture. 
Inclusive Platform: Zapp competes by being an inclusive platform that strives to be readily accessible 
for various actors in the payment industry (e.g., banking institutions, merchants, and acquirers) by being 
integratable into external payment systems. Additionally, Zapp is dependent on collaborations to gain 
indirect access to established value delivery architectures for processing payments. This perpetuates 
conventional value streams within the payment industry and solidifies the competitive position of current 
market incumbents. 
 
4.5 Blockchain.info 
Founded in 2011, Blockchain.info is a London-based Bitcoin startup that offers three main products: 
search, bitcoin wallets, and Bitcoin developer tools. Through the free online wallet service, Bitcoin 
owners can store and transfer them through the Bitcoin network whereas the search engine provides 
analytics about the status of the network (e.g., recent transactions or volume). The Bitcoin wallet service 
is targeted towards non-technical users, whereas more adept users utilize Blockchain.info’s open APIs. 
The APIs on this platform permit external developers to integrate the preceding services (e.g., bitcoin 
wallets or analytics) into their own service offerings. (See Figure 6.) 
 
 
Figure 6.  Blockchain.info Mobile Payment Platform 
 
Access to the APIs is open to all. As proclaimed by the co-founder of Blockchain.info: “We are 
technologists that focus on building APIs that make using Bitcoin protocol simple and easy…our APIs 
are tool sets for anyone who is impassioned to create innovative [bitcoin] ideas”. Referring to its free 
Bitcoin wallet service: “We serve consumers who want a simple and easy way securely store their 
Bitcoins, and transact with anyone they want to” (co-founder). Blockchain.info is an independent startup 
that is not reliant on other technology providers by operating its own local servers. At the same time, the 
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platform is highly open and accessible to external developers by giving them the freedom to integrate 
parts of Blockchain.info’s value creation architecture into their applications. As elaborated by the co-
founder, Blockchain.info’s APIs are documented and publicly available without restriction: “Our APIs 
are basically gateways to interface with any type of protocol, so we are highly compatible, we are 
entirely open, there are no walled gardens” (co-founder). 
Value Creation Architecture: Like Paym and Zapp, Blockchain.info also subscribed to an integratable 
approach for its value creation architecture. Blockchain.info’s source code for various services (e.g., 
Bitcoin wallet) is publicly accessible, thereby providing external developers with the opportunity to 
review and improve code quality. Moreover, external developers can copy and modify the code in 
accordance with their needs to create derivative service offerings. By crowdsourcing ideas from its 
developer community, Blockchain.info is able to improve the quality of its services by collating and 
integrating these ideas into its own services after an internal review process. As the co-founder stated: 
“Our lead developer approves pull requests that come from the community and he obviously reviews the 
code, we go through a testing regiment…and then we release it.” 
With regards to its hardware, Blockchain.info is, to a large degree, an isolated service because it does not 
utilize cloud computing (e.g., Amazon AWS). Rather, it operates its own servers to ensure independence 
and security over customers’ Bitcoin deposits. As the co-founder articulated: “From a hardware 
perspective, we have a large amount of infrastructure, we use dedicated hardware, we never use cloud 
services…we do that for privacy reasons… [what we are doing], it’s very unusual, most people would 
not do that, they would run hardware by Amazon, and would cost a fraction what we would pay”. 
Software-wise, the co-founder explained: “On the Github repository, we have everything in the public 
domain and it [is being] constantly used and collaborated upon by people that [are not] Blockchain.info 
employees”. 
Value Delivery Architecture: For its value delivery architecture, Blockchain.info depends solely on the 
Bitcoin network to deliver Bitcoins between payers and payees. As soon as the Bitcoin payment is 
broadcasted to the Bitcoin network, specialized computers (i.e., Bitcoin miners) around the globe receive 
transaction requests and verify them through cryptography. These verified transactions are then recorded 
in a publicly distributed ledger system (i.e., Bitcoin blockchain), which is essentially a P2P book-keeping 
system of all transactions since the inception of the Bitcoin blockchain.  
Open Platform: Blockchain.info increases its market share by leveraging on external developers and 
subsidizing its service (e.g., Bitcoin wallets) for customers. In doing so, Blockchain.info, as a platform, 
derives value from the Bitcoin community by being integratable into various agnostic third-party 
services. This culminates in positive conditions to reinforce and extend Blockchain.info’s competitive 
position. To deliver Bitcoins throughout the Bitcoin network, Blockchain.info operates on top of the 
Bitcoin Blockchain, which is an open value delivery architecture without access constraints. 
 
4.6 Circle 
Founded in 2013, Circle (see Figure 7) is a Boston-based Bitcoin startup that offers mobile payment 
service in the form of Bitcoin brokerage and free wallets targeted towards end users. Compared to 
Blockain.info, Circle does not endorse an open developer program that could harness Circle’s APIs. With 
its independent value creation architecture, Circle, has the ambition to transform Bitcoin into an accepted 
payment currency. 
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Figure 7.  Circle Mobile Payment Platform 
 
The CEO articulated: “We want to make it easy to store and move value in the same way that people 
store and share content messages on the Internet…people use [currencies] in everyday life, they are paid 
in certain currencies and they understand their purchasing power in those currencies, goods and 
services are priced that way, but we also want that to work globally…in an interoperable way, the way 
the Internet works, which is…this instant and distributed system that supports the instantaneous 
movement of data and that is all money is, is just data”. Through its e-money license, which requires 
regulatory compliance (e.g., know your customer (KYC)), Circle, on its value delivery architecture, 
possesses an advantage of having indirect access to established payment infrastructures. Consequently, in 
addition to being able to settle transactions among Circle customers instantaneously within its own 
platform, payments can also be processed through: (1) established payment infrastructures (i.e., VISA 
and MasterCard), and; (2) the Bitcoin network. 
Value Creation Architecture: Circle’s value creation architecture is relatively independent as it has the 
internal resources and capabilities to operate its own payment service, and is not tied to any specialized 
external resources. As the CEO maintained: “We’ve build our own digital banking platform from scratch 
in house, designed around kinds of user experiences that we think that are important for a global person-
to-person payment application…we leverage on cloud infrastructure…our core transactional 
infrastructure of our payment and banking system is all built in house”. 
Value Delivery Architecture: Circle, on its value delivery architecture, forged strategic linkages to gain 
access to two separate digital infrastructures: (1) established payment infrastructures (e.g., MasterCard, 
VISA), and; (2) the Bitcoin network. The CEO claimed that “we want to support…an open Internet of 
value and so that’s why in addition to integrating into the legacy central banking systems, legacy card 
networks…we also want to support an open protocol which is the Bitcoin Blockchain”. 
Hybrid Platform: Circle functions as an independent and hybrid platform that does not rely on interfirm 
modularity. Furthermore, Circle forged strategic linkages to harness efficiencies from two separate value 
delivery architectures: (1) established payment infrastructures to process transactions in fiat currencies, 
and; (2) the Bitcoin Blockchain for permissionless global value transfer to emulate direct access rights to 
an established payment infrastructure. 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
In networked economies, goods and services are derived from layered modular architectures in the form 
of digital platforms [26, 64, 68, 80]. Digital platforms play a pivotal role in networked economies 
because they constitute nodes within business networks from which value is concentrated [66]. Because 
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past studies on digital platforms are confronted with conceptual ambiguities and challenges in 
comparability, de Reuver et al. [16] advanced a research agenda that places emphasis on the importance 
of a unified vocabulary and comparative analysis when investigating digital platforms. 
In this study, we embrace a technological view of digital platforms that dissects mobile payment 
platforms as layered modular technology architectures [80]. From this viewpoint, we theorized that 
digital platforms compete through architectural configurations, which strive to generate more value in 
comparison to their rivals [51]. Specifically, we delineated platforms into value creation and delivery 
architectures, both of which constitute strategic dimensions pertinent for deciphering competition among 
mobile payment platforms. Competitive platforms differentiate among themselves through engaging in 
fintech innovations that emphasize the significance of modular composition and configurations to induce 
positive network effects within business networks [51, 78]. Figure 8 offers an overview of the core 
findings from our data analysis. By inductively deriving competitive attributes along the strategic 
dimensions of value creation and value delivery architectures, we arrived at a taxonomy of six platform 
profiles. Findings suggest that digital platforms compete in the marketplace by being: (1) either 
integrative or integratable on their value creation architecture, and; (2) having direct, indirect, or open 
access to pre-existing value delivery architectures to move value among stakeholders within the network.  
 
 
Figure 8.  Value Creation & Delivery Architectures 
 
 
5.1 Value Creation Architectures: Integrative and Integratable Approaches 
Integrative Approach: Mobile payment platforms (i.e., Circle, Droplet, and Pingit), which subscribes to 
an integrative approach, can exert control on their value creation architectures at the platform level to co-
create value with an exclusive selection of private business partners and shield their services from 
unauthorized parties. These platforms enact closed loop systems to settle payment transactions within 
their own boundaries. Settling payment transactions among users within the same payment system is 
virtually free, instantaneous, and guaranteed. Conversely, sending payments beyond the closed loop 
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system contributes to the cost structure in terms of fees, time, and risk. Integrative platforms tend to 
assimilate resources and arrange access points in ways that culminate in an inward-looking, vertically-
integrated, and closed-loop ecosystem (see Figure 9). 
 
 
Figure 9.  Integrative and Integratable Value Creation Architectures 
 
But to reap rewards from economies of scale, integrative mobile payment platform must deliver a 
compelling service to attain critical mass. From the illustrated cases, all integrative platforms have their 
own standalone mobile payment service to regulate derivatives being developed on top of their value 
creation architectures and ensure a consistent user experience. Independence in the value creation 
architecture allows integrative platforms to be nimble in responding to dynamic markets environments 
[61]. However, to ensure competitive sustainability, owners of integrative platforms must be sufficiently 
equipped and adept to continuously nurture their internal developmental capabilities to remain an 
enticing option for business partners within such private value networks. Otherwise, integrative 
platforms may have to relinquish their tight control and embrace interfirm modularity to compensate for 
deficiencies in their value creation architectures. This in turn could dilute their integrative approach to 
value creation. 
Integratable Approach: Platforms with integratable value creation architectures connect and mobilize 
stakeholders within business networks. The outcome is a mobile payment platform in which the 
responsibility of value creation and appropriation is distributed among stakeholders within the network 
(see Figure 9 again). Blockchain.info, Paym, and Zapp exhibit characteristics of integratable platforms in 
that their services are designed with collaboration in mind and they intentionally co-innovate with 
external developers to extend the capabilities and market reach of their value creation architecture. 
Paym’s payment feature is designed with the explicit intention of complementing existing mobile 
banking applications. By integrating Paym’s modularized payment service into mobile banking 
application, Paym connects these mobile banking applications to form an interorganizational mobile 
payment platform. Likewise, Zapp’s value creation architecture, like that of Paym, is designed to be 
integratable into existing mobile banking applications as a modularized payment service, thereby leading 
to the formation of an interorganizational mobile payment platform. Conversely, even though 
  
 
146 
Blockchain.info has its own standalone applications targeted towards customers, Blockchain.info’s 
mobile payment service is highly attractive for third parties (e.g., business startups) because it is designed 
to be integratable into their existing applications without the need for permission. Platforms with 
integratable value creation architectures modularize and exploit interorganizational resources to co-create 
value within an orchestrated business network. We define the structure from platforms taking such a 
collaborative approach as a federated value network. 
On a cautionary note, an interorganizational platform encounters challenges from reduced control, 
increased transaction costs, misalignment between business and IT, as well as intense rivalry among 
stakeholders. In other words, if the costs of maintaining integratable platforms outweigh the benefits of 
cultivating interorganizational collaboration, owners of such platforms may be inclined to turn to an 
integrative approach to achieve flexibility in responding to business opportunities. 
 
5.2 Value Delivery Architectures:  Three Modes of Access 
Direct Access: Mobile payment platforms with direct access to established value delivery architectures 
are often able to profit from these industry-specific resources (see Figure 10). Pingit (Barclays) and 
Paym, which have unobstructed access to established payment infrastructures, compete by exploiting 
their direct access rights to deliver guaranteed and instantaneous mobile payment services via these value 
delivery architectures. Direct transactions delivered through Pingit and Paym reinforce their direct access 
rights, their status as payment platforms, and ultimately their contemporary market positions. Direct 
access to established value delivery architectures, which offer the greatest possible market reach within 
an economy, is tantamount to a valuable configuration of strategic linkages that cannot be emulated by 
competing platforms readily. 
 
 
Figure 10.  Direct, Indirect, and Open Value Delivery Architectures 
 
Nonetheless, direct access comes with the burden of costly maintenance (e.g., monthly fix and variable 
costs) as well as extensive coordination between platform and infrastructure owners. Moreover, such 
value delivery architectures, being critical national infrastructures, are heavily regulated. Direct access 
owners (e.g., banking institutions) are legally obliged to offer non-discriminatory indirect access to rival 
institutions. To overcome this disadvantage, integrative payment platforms with direct access (e.g., 
Pingit) attempt to reduce direct access challenges by creating their own vertically-integrated, closed loop 
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mobile payment system to settle payment transactions within its own boundaries. Transactions settled 
within integrative platforms suppress variable costs. For financial institutions that have direct access but 
do not possess the competency to develop an integrative platform (e.g., Paym), they join up with owners 
of interoperable mobile payment services (or interorganizational platforms) to achieve competitiveness 
and customers relevance. The downside is that such an arrangement demands costly direct access for 
each transaction to serve customers at other financial institutions even though these institutions operate 
on the same interorganizational platform. This in turn adds to the variable cost structure. 
Indirect Access: Mobile payment platforms with indirect access to established value delivery 
architectures achieve competitiveness by cooperating with third parties (e.g., banking institutions) 
offering the best indirect access conditions (see Figure 10 again). In our study, Droplet and Zapp do not 
possess direct access rights. To compensate for the lack of this industry-specific resource, both platforms 
forged strategic linkages with third parties. For instance, Droplet is versatile by partnering with multiple 
financial intermediaries. Droplet applies a plug-and-play strategy in selecting interchangeable 
intermediaries that offer the most economical indirect access options. Zapp, on the other hand, formed 
hard-to-replicate strategic linkages with banking institutions that have privileged direct access rights to 
established payment infrastructures. 
Challenges associated with indirect access stem from platforms’ dependency on third parties and ongoing 
transaction costs that accompany each usage, alteration, and adjustment of the value delivery 
architecture. This also implies that third parties can impose constraints on mobile payment platforms 
whenever a transaction is initiated that requires access to established payment infrastructures. To 
outweigh these costs and ensure competitiveness, integratable mobile payment platforms with indirect 
access (e.g., Zapp) forged strategic linkages with select third parties in the business network that has the 
furthest market reach and can guarantee real-time processing of payments. Alternatively, integrative 
platforms with indirect access (e.g., Droplet) harness their internal capabilities to create a complementary 
closed loop system that emulates direct access attributes (i.e., instant and guaranteed payments). This 
way, platforms with indirect access can circumvent the restrictions of slow value delivery architectures 
(e.g., BACS) when sending payments across financial institutions. 
Open Access: Mobile payment platforms with open access achieve competitiveness by leveraging novel 
value delivery architectures (e.g., Bitcoin blockchain). Open access endeavors to emulate direct access 
rights (i.e., unobstructed payment without intermediaries) in a cost-effective fashion (see Figure 10). 
Nevertheless, new value delivery architectures do not have the same market reach as that of established 
ones nor have they been comprehensively tested. To overcome this, Circle incorporates both indirect and 
open access to simultaneously access the fiat money network and also service customers within the 
Bitcoin network. Still, Circle’s indirect access comes with its own costs. To maintain indirect access to 
established payment infrastructures and sustain partnerships with incumbent financial institutions, Circle 
must invest in internal resources to comply with national laws (e.g., anti-money laundering). This is 
because customers who transact purely within the Bitcoin network are normally not identifiable due to 
Bitcoin’s permissionless and pseudonymous nature. 
Blockchain.info does not possess connectivity to established payment infrastructures. Besides, 
Blockchain.info has no intention of leveraging on pre-existing value delivery architectures because it 
aims to acquire a dominant position within the Bitcoin network. To accomplish this, Blockchain.info is 
highly integratable on its value creation architecture while facilitating third part transactions through 
open access over its value delivery architecture (i.e., Bitcoin blockchain). However, Blockchain.info 
faces hurdles in that the Bitcoin network, at the time of writing, is still in its infancy with unproven 
business processes and competing technological standards. Consequently, it cannot match up to pre-
existing value delivery architectures in terms of its speed, reliability, and market reach. 
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5.3 Three Types of Platform Competition Strategies 
Germination Strategy: Monopolistic and assimilative platform profiles resonate with what we label as 
the strategy of germination. The germination strategy allows firms to cultivate and grow private business 
networks by capturing value without intervention from third parties at the platform level. In this sense, 
value streams are tightly controlled and directed inwards to reinforce an insular platform. Pingit 
(Monopolistic) and Droplet (Assimilative) possess the resources and capabilities to implement a self-
sustaining platform by shielding their value creation architecture from third parties. For their value 
delivery architectures, both platforms showcase high independency and flexibility in channeling their 
value outputs (i.e., payments) through pre-existing value delivery architectures. The challenge here is to 
maintain agility by avoiding the enactment of strategic linkages with partners that will introduce long 
term legacy systems or platform derivatives on their value creation architectures. With regards to value 
delivery architectures, the germination strategy has an ambivalent relationship. Platforms rely on both 
direct and indirect access to value delivery architectures to process transactions, while at the same time, 
reduce their outflow as much as possible to reduce costs. Continuous payment outflows could undermine 
the germination strategy of platforms. 
Orchestration Strategy: Platforms with coopetitive and inclusive profiles adhere to what we label as the 
orchestration strategy. In this regard, Paym (Coopetitive) and Zapp (Inclusive) designed their platforms 
to be highly integratable with existing mobile banking applications. The challenge of an orchestration 
strategy is to derive a value creation architecture that aligns the business and technology interests among 
platform stakeholders. For value delivery, the orchestration strategy is highly dependent on established 
value delivery architectures to connect stakeholders and attain high levels of joint market reach. 
However, each transaction on pre-existing value delivery architectures contributes to the cost structure 
for each platform stakeholder even though they belong to the same mobile payment service. 
Transformation Strategy: Platforms with hybrid (Circle) and open (Blockchain.info) profiles reverberate 
with what we label as the transformation strategy. Transformations within technology industries are 
mainly driven by two factors: product and processes innovations [75]. Tushman and Anderson [75] 
argued that for non-assembled goods (i.e., commodities), process innovation is more critical as compared 
to product innovation. In this study, platforms with transformation strategy embrace process innovation 
to deliver payments through differentiated and cost-effective arrangements. This is realized through 
forging strategic linkages with novel value delivery architectures (i.e., Bitcoin blockchain). In this regard, 
Blockchain.info and Circle attempt to introduce architectural innovation in the mobile payments market. 
Particularly, both companies can circumvent the dominance of pre-existing value delivery architectures 
even though novel value delivery architectures, in the likes of Blockchain, bear the risk of failing to 
become a dominant standard in value movement. 
 
5.4 Implications for Theory and Practice 
In conclusion, this study touches on how fintech in the likes of mobile payment services have leveraged 
on digital platformization to revolutionize their value creation and delivery architectures. Digital 
platformization has also provided opportunities for new financial service providers to free themselves 
from traditional financial institutions such as banks by altering how these mobile payment services 
compete with one another. This study thus contributes to extant literature on digital platform competition 
on three fronts. First, we performed a comparative analysis of mobile payment services in the UK market 
to inductively derive attributes along the two strategic dimensions of value creation and delivery 
architectures through which these fintech innovate to compete with one another. From these attributes, 
we classify mobile payment services into six distinct platform profiles and articulate the competitive 
  
 
149 
strategy associated with each profile. One of the key findings for this study is that the competitiveness of 
digital platforms is dictated by their competitive attributes, as derived from firm-specific resources and 
capabilities, along the two focal dimensions of value creation and delivery architectures. Specifically, the 
study identifies two competitive attributes (i.e., integrative and integratable) for the dimension of value 
creation architecture and three competitive attributes (i.e., direct, indirect, and open) for the dimension of 
value delivery architecture in determining the platform profile. In turn, the interplay between these two 
strategic dimensions shape platform strategy, leading to either germination, orchestration, or 
transformation strategy in relation to how these fintech seek to redefine their competitive landscape. 
By adopting mobile payment services as our empirical context, this study contributes to extant literature 
on platform and strategic management by uncovering the direction of value streams and explicating how 
such value streams can be appropriated by these fintech. Specifically, integrative platforms tend to 
internalize value from private business networks by shielding themselves from third parties. Conversely, 
integratable platforms extract value from federated business networks by promoting the development of 
interorganizational platform derivatives in a reciprocal manner. 
Lastly, this study extends prior research on innovation by showcasing how fintech innovations, when 
coupled with digital platforms, can support an ambidextrous approach towards innovation. As is evident 
from the case of Circle, the modularity of platforms enables these fintech to revolutionize the competitive 
landscape on two fronts concurrently. One, such platforms facilitate modular innovation on the value 
delivery architecture to sustain the logic of established payment infrastructures. Two, such digital 
platforms can culminate in architectural innovation in the same technology stack, which in turn could 
culminate in the replacement of pre-existing value delivery architectures with new ones (e.g., Bitcoin 
blockchain). Successful architectural innovation has the potential of delivering significant competitive 
advantage over market incumbents as it destroys the basis of their competitiveness, namely direct access 
to established payment infrastructures in the context of mobile payments market. 
From a practitioner viewpoint, we not only support strategic planning on the part of platform owners by 
increasing their awareness for critical reflections of their architectural configurations and potential 
business partners, but we also inform policy makers in drafting legislative frameworks to foster 
innovation in the current revolutionary fintech landscape. This paper is constrained in its generalizability, 
as the case studies were conducted in the UK mobile payments market. These limitations translate into 
future research avenues for replicating our study in other platform-driven markets to validate and refine 
our taxonomy of platform profiles beyond the UK mobile payments market. 
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